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THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING IN SUBURBIA
Michael N. Danielson

CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS AND URBAN AID
Demetrios Caraley

UNDERSTANDING CENTRAL CITY HARDSHIP
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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

MICHAEL N. DANIELSON discusses the factors that account for local resistance to opening the suburbs to subsidized housing. He argues that lack of incentives for local officials and residents, combined with the weak articulation of latent sources of support for open housing, tend to preclude significant policy change from within suburbia.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY analyzes the patterns of support and opposition that have evidenced themselves in congressional voting on federal financial assistance to large cities. In the article's conclusions, he speculates on the prospects for expanded federal aid to large cities in the face of the continual decrease in the proportion of the nation's population that lives in them.

RICHARD P. NATHAN and CHARLES ADAMS present a comparative analysis of the degree of "hardship" being experienced by fifty-five of the nation's largest central cities. The authors conclude that the urban crisis in America is highly differentiated and that census data are valuable tools for studying the differences that exist among cities.

JEROME SLATER critically examines the increasingly common view that the United States has been either an "imperialist" or an "imperial" power. After scrutinizing the distinctions between these two views, he argues that both are misleading about the intentions of policy makers and the actual capacity of the United States to control other nations.

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN, DENIS G. SULLIVAN, and F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON focus on the 1974 Democratic mid-term conference to analyze patterns of delegate behavior at party conventions. They identify the character of persisting party cleavages, the sources of increasing group caucus power, and the conditions that facilitate legitimation and party unity.

DAVID L. PALETZ and MARTHA ELSON review various criticisms of the kind of coverage television gives to presidential nominating conventions. Examining 1972 data, the authors conclude that given the nature of television coverage, the nominees of divisive conventions are disadvantaged later at the polls.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Politics of Exclusionary Zoning in Suburbia

MICHAEL N. DANIELSON

With growing awareness of the impact of suburban policies on metropolitan settlement patterns in recent years has come increasing criticism of local land-use and housing practices. One major civil rights group, the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, has concluded that "there can be no effective progress in halting the trend toward predominantly black cities surrounded by almost entirely white suburbs . . . [u]ntil local governments have been deprived of the power to exclude subsidized housing and to manipulate zoning and other controls to screen out families on the basis of income and, implicitly, of race. . . ."[1] At the same time, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was calling the suburbs "the new civil rights battleground" and urging blacks "to do battle out in the townships and villages to lower zoning barriers and thereby create new opportunities for Negroes seeking housing closer to today's jobs at prices they can afford to pay. . . ."[2]

Similar views have been expressed by a wide variety of urban interests. Residential developers have attacked "selfish and exclusionary zoning barriers" and urged that a way "be found to get away from the constrictive home-rule aspects

[1] See Joseph P. Fried, *Housing Crisis U.S.A.* (New York, 1971), pp. 50–51.

[2] See Geoffrey Sheilds and L. Sanford Spector, "Opening Up the Suburbs: Notes on a Movement for Social Change," *Yale Review of Law and Social Action*, II (Summer 1972), 305.

MICHAEL N. DANIELSON is professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University. He is the author of *Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis*, coauthor of *One Nation, So Many Governments*, and editor of *Metropolitan Politics*. He has recently completed a study of *The Politics of Exclusion*, from which this article is adapted.

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of the legislation that supports and protects these restrictions."[3] Editorials in metropolitan newspapers warned "the entrenched, well-to-do suburbanites" that they must recognize "that one-half of the nation cannot afford to build barriers of any sort against the other half—whether it be the barrier of racial discrimination or the practical barrier of long and time-consuming commuting."[4] And housing experts condemn an "arrangement that benefits the wealthy and the middle class at the expense of loading large costs onto the very poor" as "a gross injustice that cries out for correction."[5]

Reaction in the Suburbs

To most of this clamor, the average suburbanite and the typical suburban office holder turn a deaf ear. Few of those who demand changes in local policies live within particular suburban jurisdictions in sufficient numbers to have a significant impact on local opinion or the actions of local officials. Lower-income and minority families which would benefit from relaxed suburban barriers are kept out of most communities by the high cost of housing and exclusionary policies motivated by racial prejudice, the fear of crime, fiscal and environmental considerations, and the desire to preserve community character. As a result, neither victims of exclusion nor local supporters of open housing usually can aggregate sufficient political strength to secure much influence or representation on local councils and planning boards, particularly in the smaller and more homogeneous suburban jurisdictions.

The negative response of local political systems to calls for change also reflects the satisfaction of most suburbanites with the existing system of housing and land-use control. Relatively few residents of the suburbs see housing for less affluent groups as a major problem. Only 10 percent of those questioned in a survey in New York's Westchester County in 1972 expressed dissatisfaction with their present housing. Drugs, property taxes, crime, education, pollution, the problems of the elderly, and mass transportation were all listed as more important matters for state and local governments than broadened housing opportunities (see Table 1).

In addition, few suburbanites are willing to acknowledge the role of suburban exclusion in fostering and maintaining an economically and racially separated society. Instead, most emphatically reject the notion that the "suburban sanctuary of the middle class has been created at the expense of the urban poor by compelling them to live in areas of concentrated poverty."[6] Nor are many suburban dwellers prepared to accept any responsibility for the city, its residents,

[3] Stewart M. Hutt, counsel, New Jersey Builders Association, quoted in Richard J. H. Johnston, "Low-Income Housing Exclusions in U. S. Assailed," *The New York Times*, November 7, 1969.

[4] "People, Jobs and Housing," editorial, *Washington Post*, July 6, 1971.

[5] Anthony Downs, *Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America* (New Haven, Conn., 1973), p. 11.

[6] Ibid., p. 166.

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TABLE 1

Perceptions of State and Local Governmental Priorities by Residents of Westchester County, N. Y.

	All Residents	*Upper and Middle Income Residents*	*Moderate and Lower Income Residents*
	(Percent listing problem as important)		
Drugs	47	44	51
Property taxes	46	48	43
Crime	31	30	31
Education	27	28	27
Air and water pollution	25	25	24
Help for senior citizens	25	20	34
Mass transportation	21	24	15
Low and moderate income housing	14	13	16
Middle income housing	10	8	14
Race relations	8	9	7
New jobs	8	9	7
Roads and highways	7	8	6
Planning and zoning	7	8	7
Recreation	7	9	4

SOURCE: Oliver Quayle and Company, "A Survey of Attitudes Toward Government Assisted Moderate and Low Income Housing in Westchester County, "Study #1546 (Bronxville, N.Y., December 1972), p. 21.

and their housing problems. A suburban mayor in the Cleveland area feels "the public housing people are just looking for a lot of land for Cleveland's problems which Cleveland isn't willing to take care of."[7] Outside St. Louis, a key official rejects suburban involvement in "the problems of the unfortunate people in the city."[8]

Given local autonomy, the nature and attitudes of suburban constituencies, the benefits that residents of the suburbs derive from exclusionary policies, and the dependence of local governments on property taxes, the suburban political system provides few incentives for its components to act in anything but their self-interest. Speaking of the costs associated with subsidized housing, a suburban mayor emphasizes that "appeals to the good nature and selflessness of the suburban official or the suburban voter will be pointless if the economic cards are stacked the wrong way."[9] As a result of these political realities, most suburbs

[7] Mayor Robert Lawthur, Lakewood, Ohio, quoted in Roldo Bartimole, "A Close Look: Cleveland," *City*, V (January–February 1971), 45.

[8] Supervisor Lawrence K. Roos, St. Louis County, Mo., quoted in Robert Adams, "Suburbs Feel No Debt to City," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 23, 1971.

[9] Supervisor John F. McAlevey, Ramapo, N. Y., quoted in Richard Reeves, "Counterattack by Cities," *The New York Times*, March 8, 1971; reprinted as "Counterattack by the Cities," in Louis H. Masotti and Jeffrey K. Hadden (eds.), *Suburbia in Transition* (New York, 1974), p. 242.

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successfully resist pressures at the local level for major changes in their housing and zoning policies, particularly when the aim is the expansion of housing opportunities for lower-income and minority groups.

Variations among Suburbs

Resistance, however, is not a universal suburban reaction to demands that local housing barriers be lowered. Large suburban jurisdictions with heterogeneous populations tend to be more responsive to pressures for change than smaller-scale and relatively homogeneous suburbs. Opinion is less monolithic in these suburbs; and political leaders are less constrained by dominant constituency interests. In addition, minorities are more visible, their collective voices louder, and their interests more easily aggregated in larger jurisdictions. Big suburbs, particularly suburban county governments in major metropolitan areas, also are more likely to employ planning and housing professionals. These officials examine housing needs and development trends on a communitywide and metropolitan basis; and their professional training and personal values prompt concern about the problems of lower-income and minority groups. All of these factors lead to greater recognition of housing problems by political leaders in suburban jurisdictions such as Nassau County in New York, which had 1.4 million residents in 1970. "There is no excuse for a generally affluent suburban community, where 90 percent of the people enjoy good housing," Nassau's elected executive told the county legislature in 1969, "to permit the other 10 percent to live in conditions which rival some of the worst slums in the nation."[10] Two large suburban counties in the Washington area, Fairfax and Montgomery, have been among the most active suburban governments in seeking to develop and implement plans designed to broaden housing opportunities for their diversifying populations. On the other hand, many large suburbs such as Oyster Bay in New York and Baltimore County have steadfastly resisted efforts to ease local housing restrictions.

Here and there, affluent suburbs with troubled social consciences seek to diversify their populations. In Princeton, a university community amidst the suburbs of central New Jersey with a penchant for both liberal causes and exclusionary zoning, the local planning board warned in 1973 that "Princeton will become a one-class, upper-income community [unless] positive steps are taken to halt the trend." Arguing that "the health and vitality of the community depend on a diversity of people of different cultural backgrounds, ages, incomes, and interests," the local planners recommended that almost half of the new housing construction in the community during the 1970s and 1980s be earmarked for families presently priced out of the local housing market.[11] Concern in Summit,

[10] County Executive Eugene H. Nickerson, quoted in Roy R. Silver, "Nickerson Urges Housing for Poor," *The New York Times*, January 12, 1969.

[11] See Craig E. Polhemus, "Princeton Is Encouraging Low-Income Housing," *The New York Times*, July 22, 1973.

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an upper-income suburb of 25,000 in northern New Jersey, over housing conditions for local blacks led to community sponsorship of 90 units of low-rent garden apartments in 1968. Across the continent in Palo Alto, similar constituency concerns spurred the local government in 1972 to approve the construction of 740 units of mixed-income housing.

Local officials with strongly held views about the social responsibilities of their communities also can make a difference. A successful campaign for a limited number of units of subsidized housing in Ramapo in New York's Rockland County was led by the community's mayor, a self-styled "believe[r] in public housing from way back" who was "willing to absorb 500 units to make the point that public housing isn't the horrible thing that most of the recent expatriates from New York City think it is."[12]

Another factor motivating suburban leaders to advocate some relaxation of zoning barriers is the fear of losing local autonomy. In the view of a council member in an exclusive Connecticut suburb, "local zoning restrictions must be eased not only for social reasons, but because if this does not happen, then sooner or later our local autonomy or choice will be taken away by the State Legislature."[13]

For most suburbanites, however, perhaps the only persuasive argument for relaxing exclusionary barriers is the housing needs of local residents. In the Westchester County survey, 78 percent agreed with the statement: "I tend to favor more moderate and low income housing in Westchester so that public servants such as teachers, firemen, and policemen can live in the communities they serve"; while 70 percent supported "more subsidized low and moderate income housing in Westchester to enable our young people to stay here instead of being forced to live elsewhere."[14] Support for subsidized housing was heavily conditioned on its availabilty to members of the local community. While 83 percent were favorable if first priority was given to "people now living in this town . . . and second priority to people now working here," 76 percent were opposed if no priorities were assigned on the basis of where the occupants lived or worked.[15]

Concern over the housing needs of local public employees was the principal factor underlying the enactment of legislation in Fairfax and Montgomery Counties designed to spur the construction of lower-cost housing by private developers. The Fairfax Board of Supervisors approved a series of ordinances in 1971 requiring that 6 percent of the housing in most developments of fifty or more units be priced below $20,000, and that 9 percent be priced between $20,000 and $25,000,

[12] Supervisor McAlevey, Ramapo, N. Y., quoted in Alan S. Oser, "Innovator in Suburbs Under Fire," *The New York Times*, March 28, 1971.

[13] Town Selectman Henrietta Rogers, New Canaan, Conn., quoted in "New Canaan Aide Questions Zoning," *The New York Times*, March 7, 1971.

[14] Oliver Quayle and Company, "A Survey of Attitudes Toward Government Assisted Moderate and Low Income Housing in Westchester County," Study # 1546 (Bronxville, N. Y., December 1972), p. 74.

[15] Ibid., p. 63.

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provided that federal subsidies were available. A similar plan was adopted by the Montgomery County Council in 1973. A group of ministers organized as the Coalition for Housing Action led the campaign in Fairfax, and placed heavy emphasis on the needs of county employees, 90 percent of whom earned less than $12,000 a year in 1971. Supporters of the new law in Montgomery also stressed the needs of employees, pointing to the requirement that county police officers making $12,000 a year were required to live within a jurisdiction where an annual income of $25,000 was needed to purchase a new home in 1973. In both counties, backing for the housing plans came primarily from public employees. Typical was the view of the Fairfax County Police Association which emphasized that "most of our police officers, in order to buy a home, must go out into Prince William and Loudoun Counties. We feel they should be able to buy housing here."[16]

In most suburbs, however, concern over local housing needs is not automatically translated into broadened housing opportunities. The fact that "our own cops, firemen and teachers can't buy houses in Westport"[17] led the Planning and Zoning Commission of the affluent Connecticut suburb to approve a change in local zoning in 1973 to permit the construction of 400 apartments in scattered sites, with 60 of the units priced within the range of town employees and others with moderate incomes. Within a month, vehement opposition to apartments from residents prompted the forty-member representative town meeting to overturn unanimously the proposed apartment ordinance. In Bergen County in northern New Jersey, 1600 residents of a community signed petitions that helped kill a garden-apartment proposal despite concerns such as those expressed by one local resident: "My daughter will be getting married in a few years and I'd like to see her remain here. A nice little development wouldn't hurt anyone. Give our kids a chance. It's unfair. We had our chance to move out here."[18]

Opposition to improving housing opportunities for local residents stems from many of the basic considerations that fuel the politics of exclusion—dislike of apartments, the bad image of subsidized housing, fear of community change, worries about property values, and concern over local services and taxes. Another important factor is the suspicion of suburbanites that priority for local residents cannot be maintained if the barriers to the construction of lower-cost housing are lowered. As the mayor of one of New Jersey's largest suburbs notes: "We'd welcome lower-cost housing for our youth and elderly. But there's no guarantee we could keep it for them. And given the choice, we just won't do it."[19]

[16] Charles Boswell, president, Fairfax County Police Association, quoted in Monroe W. Karmin, "Forced Integration? Not in Fairfax," *Wall Street Journal*, September 29, 1971.

[17] See Franklin Whitehouse, "Westport Warms to Apartments," *The New York Times*, May 24, 1970.

[18] See Richard Reeves, "Land Is Prize in Battle for Control of Suburbs," *The New York Times*, August 17, 1971; reprinted as "The Battle Over Land," in Massotti and Hadden, *Suburbia in Transition*, p. 308.

[19] Mayor Newton Miller, Wayne, N. J., quoted in Jack Rosenthal, "Suburbs Abandoning De-

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Variations among suburbs also reflect the inherent difficulty of achieving general policy changes in a decentralized polity through political action at the grass roots. Extraordinary political resources, a highly decentralized base of support, or a widely perceived need for action resulting from a crisis are requred to produce similar policy changes in large numbers of local governments. When the units are small and numerous, as is the case with suburbs in most of the larger metropolitan areas, the prospects for securing general policy changes through grass-roots efforts are reduced further. At best, such efforts are likely to result in occasional victories and piecemeal change in local policies.

Local Arenas and Local Interests

Because of the obstacles to broad-based action at the grass roots, the suburban political arena primarily attracts those with local interests and narrow objectives. Groups whose interests transcend a particular locality tend to focus their energies on the states, the national government, or the courts, where successful efforts frequently result in policy changes which affect large numbers of local jurisdictions, rather than only a single unit as is the case with victories at the grass roots.

Efforts to change suburban housing and land-use policies have followed this general pattern quite closely. Among open-housing groups, challenges at the grass roots have come primarily from locally oriented interests, such as fair-housing committees, neighborhood stabilization groups, civic and civil rights organizations, and community-based developers of low-cost housing. Typically, these interests have limited objectives and capabilities. They tend to focus on housing conditions in their particular community and the needs of local residents. More often than not, their activities are confined to a single jurisdiction. Thus, a suburban fair-housing committee seeks to expand housing opportunities for middle-income blacks within its community, while a local civil rights group campaigns for municipal approval of a housing project for lower-income families.

As suburban housing restrictions attracted increasing attention in the late 1960s, national civil rights and religious groups, labor unions, foundations, and public-interest organizations were drawn to the issue. The growing involvement of these broader-based interests played a major role in both increasing the visibility of suburban housing restrictions and forcing judges, federal administrators, and other public officials at all levels of government to address the problem. Unlike local groups, these broader interests devoted little of their energy to persuading individual suburban governments to change their housing and land-use policies. Their common objective was policy changes which would improve the access of lower-income and minority groups to housing in large numbers of suburban jurisdictions rather than in a particular community. Thus, even when dealing "with local cases or problems," as Sheilds and Spector emphasize, the

pendence on City," *The New York Times*, August 16, 1971; reprinted as "Toward Suburban Independence," in Masotti and Hadden, *Suburbia in Transition*, p. 302.

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national open-housing interests "seek situations which will have importance nationally.[20]

These objectives have led the American Civil Liberties Union, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the National Housing and Economic Development Law Project to focus almost exclusively on court actions designed to overturn restrictive suburban housing and land-use policies. Other national groups, such as the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Center for National Policy Review, and the Housing Opportunities Council of Metropolitan Washington, have concentrated on lobbying for changes in federal policies. Coordination, and the collection and dissemination of information concerning suburban housing problems have been the primary activities of another set of groups, including the National Urban Coalition, the Exclusionary Land-Uses Practices Clearing House, and the National Job-Linked Housing Center.[21]

Not all national open-housing interests, however, eschew involvement at the local level. Much of the energy of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) since its creation in 1950 has been devoted to the organization of fair-housing groups at the grass roots and efforts to secure local fair-housing legislation. Other national organizations with local affiliates also are active at the suburban grass roots. A number of the NAACP's 1700 branches have been involved with housing issues in particular suburbs. Local affiliates of the American Jewish Committee and the Urban League also have engaged in grass-roots activities designed to broaden housing opportunities in the suburbs.

Among the national organizations interested in opening the suburbs, probably the most active at the local level has been the League of Women Voters (LWV). The league is more decentralized than the other major open-housing groups as well as being the only one with a substantial political base in suburbia. A federation of 1250 chapters with a largely white, upper-income suburban membership of 170,000, the league places considerable emphasis on local autonomy and grass-roots action. In the early 1970s, over 100 of its chapters were engaged in efforts "to educate their communities to the goal of a free choice of a decent home in a decent environment for every family."[22] In the process, LWV chapters pressed for the creation of local housing authorities, supported the construction of low-income housing, participated in the organization of nonprofit development corporations to sponsor subsidized housing, fought local discriminatory practices, endorsed zoning reform, and backed metropolitan "fair-share" plans for the allocation of subsidized housing among suburban jurisdictions.

Despite the importance of local activities for groups such as the NAACP, the

[20] Sheilds and Spector, "Opening Up the Suburbs," p. 305.

[21] For an informative review of the activities of these and other national open-housing organizations, see ibid., pp. 301–305.

[22] League of Women Voters Education Fund, "Suburban Zoning, The New Frontier" (Washington, D. C.), p. 3.

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NCDH, and the LWV, none concentrates all its efforts on grass-roots activities. The national headquarters of the NAACP has been involved in challenging suburban zoning in the courts, lobbying for open housing in Washington, and conducting educational efforts aimed at reducing suburban hostility to residential integration. NCDH has become increasingly committed to suburban housing activities that transcend particular localities, including litigation, lobbying in Congress and administrative agencies, and research and technical assistance. Even the highly decentralized League of Women Voters is engaged in court action through its national litigation office.

Given the orientation of the broader-based open-housing interests, the primary burden for action at the suburban grass roots falls on local groups, be they purely local or affiliated with national organizations. Among these organizations, substantial differences exist in size, resources, and constituency base. Their objectives, programs, priorities, vitality, visibility, and effectiveness also vary considerably. In general, diversity reduces the incidence of cooperation and cohesion among open-housing interests within a particular community or suburban area. Collective action also is impeded by the fragmentation of local government in suburbia, since supporters of open housing typically are scattered among a variety of local jurisdictions. And the combination of group diversity and dispersed constituency support handicaps efforts to change local housing policies in the hostile political climate of the typical suburban jurisdiction.

Among the various open-housing interests in the suburbs, fair-housing groups are the most common. A substantial majority of the more than 2000 local fair-housing committees in the United States have been organized in suburban areas. Their goal is the elimination of racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing; and they have taken the lead in pressing for the enactment of fair-housing ordinances and local human-relations commissions in the suburbs. Most suburban fair-housing groups lack professional staff, have a membership composed largely of upper-income whites, and devote much of their energy to finding housing for blacks who can afford to live in the suburbs, often on a highly individualized basis.

Exceptions to this general pattern are the handful of fair-housing groups which have full-time staff, a substantial membership base, and other resources which enable them to pursue more ambitious and systematic programs. For example, the Mid-Peninsula Citizens for Fair Housing in the San Francisco area tests compliance with local fair-housing laws, investigates complaints of racial discrimination, undertakes legal actions against discriminatory housing practices, seeks to educate local officials and the suburban housing industry about their legal obligations to ensure equal housing opportunities, and campaigns more generally for open housing. Elsewhere, larger and more sophisticated fair-housing groups operate housing information centers and comprehensive housing-listing services, provide counseling services for families seeking homes in the suburbs, and undertake "carefully planned and conducted testing operations for the pur-

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pose of filing complaints with state human rights agencies and with HUD and the Department of Justice."[23]

Despite the increasing sophistication and capability of some fair-housing groups, most continue to focus their resources on discriminatory practices affecting the access of blacks to the existing housing stock in suburbia. Relatively few local groups followed in the footsteps of the national fair-housing organization, NCDH, which in the 1970s placed more and more emphasis on increasing the supply of lower-cost housing in the suburbs and removing zoning and other local barriers which reinforce segregated residential patterns. Typical of the attitude of local groups is that of the Fair Housing Congress of Southern California, which sees so much illegal discrimination in the existing housing market that its leaders are reluctant to divert their scarce resources to other activities.

Another local open-housing interest with a limited perspective on the suburban housing problem is the neighborhood stabilization movement. Neighborhood stabilization groups were organized in the 1960s in a number of city and suburban areas undergoing racial transformation. Their primary concern has been existing housing conditions, and the creation of stable racially integrated neighborhoods. Most of these groups and their umbrella organization, the National Neighbors, "have recognized that to stabilize any one neighborhood, it is essential to assure an open housing market and general mobility."[24] These groups, however, tend to be preoccupied with their pressing local problems; and few have the time or resources to get very involved in broader issues such as the production of suburban housing or the removal of local barriers to the outward movement of lower-income and minority families. Moreover, most of the stabilization groups are active in communities undergoing racial transformation, which typically are the result rather than the cause of suburban exclusion.

Direct challenges of suburban zoning and housing policies usually come from more amorphous local groupings. Campaigns for subsidized housing and zoning reform have been launched by local coalitions of civil rights, civic, and religious groups. Similar groupings have organized nonprofit housing corporations in the suburbs. In Princeton, New Jersey, for example, the local chapter of the League of Women Voters and other community groups formed Princeton Community Housing to build subsidized housing. Nonprofit housing corporations which have sought to build in the suburbs also have been created by labor unions in the case of the Region Nine United Automobile Workers Housing Corporation in Mahwah, New Jersey; religious groups as with the Park Heights Corporation in Black Jack in the St. Louis area and the Interfaith Housing Corporation in the Boston region; and minority-group organizations such as the Colored People's Civic and Political Organization in Lackawanna outside Buffalo and the Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization in suburban Union City in the San Francisco Bay area.

[23] George Schermer, "Strategy, Tactics, and Organization for the Fair Housing Movement," (Washington, D. C., January 16, 1973), p. 2.

[24] Ibid., p. 3.

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More often than not, these efforts are limited to a single local jurisdiction. When the groups involved also are locally based, there tends to be a heavy emphasis on local needs. Local groups and coalitions seeking eased zoning, the creation of a local housing authority, or permission for a nonprofit housing corporation to build suburban housing typically stress the community's responsibilities to its own residents rather than its obligations to lower-income and minority families in general. Suburban open-housing interests are especially likely to ignore or downplay the housing needs of inner-city blacks.

Even when suburban open-housing groups have a broader perspective, political realities often narrow their focus. The ministers who launched the campaign for zoning reform in Fairfax County initially were drawn to the issue by concern over the plight of blacks unable to find housing outside the District of Columbia. As the campaign developed, however, the search for support led the Coalition for Housing Action to an increasing emphasis on local housing needs, and especially the housing problems of teachers, policemen, and other local-government employees. The leaders of the campaign justified the shift on pragmatic grounds. They also argued that increasing the stock of lower-cost housing in Fairfax would inevitably benefit inner-city blacks. "When you open up a community economically," insisted Rev. Gerald Hopkins, a minister, "you open it up racially."[25] But this objective of zoning reform rarely was voiced during the drive for political support among the overwhelmingly white population of Fairfax County.

Opening the Suburbs through Confrontation

Concern for local sensibilities, priorities, and political feasibility has not been a conspicuous feature of the activities of the Suburban Action Institute (SAI), a public-interest organization founded in 1969 by Paul Davidoff, a planner and attorney, and Neil Gold, a former staff member of NCDH. Based in Westchester County, Suburban Action has directly challenged local zoning in a lengthening list of communities in the New York area. Unlike most local open-housing groups in the suburbs, SAI has emphasized the need "to open the suburbs for all, in particular for the non-affluent and non-white."[26] Suburban Action's stress on bringing blacks and the poor to affluent suburbs, its insistence on far-reaching changes in local housing and land-use policies, its lack of a constituency in the communities it has challenged, and the abrasive and publicity-oriented style of its founders have made SAI the most controversial of all the open-housing interests active at the suburban grass roots. The organization's style is best appreciated in the words of Paul Davidoff, its chief spokesman:

> Suburban populations . . . have employed the power of the state to protect their own very selfish desire to create a community that is amenable to themselves,

[25] Quoted in Karmin, "Forced Integration? Not in Fairfax."

[26] Paul Davidoff, "A Lake Is Backdrop for Debate on Suburban Integration Plan: Pro," *The New York Times*, November 4, 1973.

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> but to prohibit the large mass of the population from sharing in those amenities. They have not bought the land, but instead have done the cheap and nasty thing of employing the police power to protect their own interest in the land and to exclude the largest part of the population. . . . We think this is terribly abusive, terribly inappropriate for a group which is politically not inclined to argue the case for increased government control.[27]

Suburban Action's perspective on housing in the suburbs has been broader than that of most local open-housing groups. SAI stresses the linkages between the plight of the older cities and suburban policies which restrict access to housing and jobs. For Davidoff, "decent housing means reasonable access to employment, good education, recreation and environment . . . the key to these is locational choice."[28] In broadening locational choices, and in particular in creating "new opportunities for linking suburban jobs to unemployed and underemployed residents of slums and ghettos," SAI sees the contemporary problem in the suburbs "as larger and more complex than the fair housing issue of the fifties and sixties . . . [when] no changes were necessary in the allocation of land resources."[29] Solution of this problem, in SAI's view, required fundamental changes in the suburban land-use control system, heavy emphasis on the production of housing for lower-income and minority groups in the suburbs, and public policies which ensure that low-cost housing is dispersed throughout the metropolis.

To accomplish these objectives, Suburban Action has engaged in a wide range of activities. Research has been undertaken on a variety of suburban housing and land-use issues. Efforts have been made to educate and raise the consciousness of suburbanites, large suburban employers, and opinion leaders. Local zoning ordinances and housing policies have been criticized in a variety of local forums and the media, with the "focus on rich people's communities, especially those with rich liberals as residents."[30] Corporate decisions to locate offices and plants in suburban areas which exclude moderately priced housing developments also have come under fire, with SAI filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and other federal agencies in an effort to check corporate moves to exclusionary suburbs. Litigation was another important element to Suburban Action's program. By 1974, it had filed suits against exclusionary zoning in dozens of suburbs in the New York area. SAI also has gone to court to block the federal government from making sewer and recreation grants to an exclusionary suburb in Westchester County, to prevent the construction of an

[27] Quoted in Jerome Aumente, "Domestic Land Reform," *City*, V (January–February 1971), 56.

[28] "A Lake Is Backdrop for Debate on Suburban Integration Plan: Pro."

[29] Suburban Action Institute, "Statement of Purpose" (Tarrytown, N. Y., September 1973), pp. 2–3.

[30] Neil Gold, Suburban Action Institute, see National Urban Coalition, Clearinghouse on Exclusionary Land Use Policies, "Report: Seventh Conference on Exclusionary Land Use Policies" (Washington, D. C., June 24, 1971), p. 18.

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Internal Revenue Service processing center in a community on Long Island with strict housing controls, and to force the construction of low-cost housing on the site of a former military base in Nassau County.

Of most importance to local government, and certainly the most controversial of Suburban Action's activities, have been the organization's efforts to build housing in suburbs with restrictive land-use controls. Typically, SAI has quietly secured options on land, often in conjunction with private developers. Then plans have been prepared for a large-scale mixed-income housing development which could not be implemented without changes in local zoning. Finally, a well-publicized announcement of the plan is accompanied by a threat to seek relief in the courts if local approval is not forthcoming. In 1973, for example, SAI declared that it was ready to develop housing for 8000 people on 253 acres adjacent to Candlewood Lake in New Fairfield, Connecticut. In explaining how the plan would be implemented in the face of local hostility, Neil Gold indicated that Suburban Action probably would have to go to court, and expressed confidence "that the courts will sustain our right to build a mixed income racially integrated community on Candlewood Lake."[31]

Suburban Action unveiled similar plans for a number of other suburbs in the early 1970s. Most ambitious was a scheme for a $150 million planned community on 720 acres in Mahwah in northern New Jersey. If built the project would almost triple Mahwah's 1970 population of 10,000. Of the 6000 housing units in the proposed new community, 2400 were to be priced for families with annual incomes under $10,000, with the remainder within reach of those with incomes of less than $20,000 a year. In this case, litigation preceded the housing proposal, as SAI challenged restrictive zoning in Mahwah and three neighboring suburbs in the courts a few months before its plans for 'Ramapo Mountain" were announced. For Readington, a rural area strategically located in the path of suburbanization in New Jersey's Hunterdon County, SAI sought to have 230 acres rezoned from single-family homes on lots of one and three-quarter acres to permit the construction of 2000 apartments. In Western Suffolk County on Long Island, Suburban Action wanted to build as many as 6000 housing units on 400 or more acres. And an 850-unit complex has been designed for a site in Fairfax County in Virginia.

The coupling of local development plans with court action reflected the concern of SAI's leadership that litigation alone would do little to broaden housing opportunities for lower-income families in the suburbs. Unless open-housing groups were prepared to construct housing when suburban land became available, Suburban Action was convinced that private builders and affluent families will be the prime beneficiaries of successful litigation against zoning. To provide home-building capability, SAI created Garden Cities Development Corporation to handle the preparation of development plans, land acquisition, and construction. Although

[31] Quoted in Michael Knight, "New Fairfield Zone Board Bars Candlewood Lake Development," *The New York Times*, October 12, 1973.

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Garden Cities was "geared up [and] ready to move" in 1974,[32] the development corporation had yet to construct a single unit of housing in any of its proposed new communities.

In fact, except for stimulating a flock of lawsuits, nowhere had the politics of confrontation borne fruit for SAI. Instead, the proposals of Suburban Action and Garden Cities encountered fierce local resistance in most instances, and outright rejection at the hands of local zoning boards. Three-fourths of the adults in New Fairfield, a community of 8000, signed petitions against the SAI plan for Candlewood Lake; and the local zoning board unanimously rejected the project. In another Connecticut suburb where SAI took an option on eleven acres for the purpose of building 160 units of federally subsidized housing, the mayor told the press that "everyone I've spoken to is wholeheartedly opposed to the project"; and the local planning board refused to rezone the land in question.[33] A local official in Suffolk County insisted that "they are going to have to abide by our zoning ordinances" and predicted " an uphill fight all the way" if SAI persisted with its planned 6000 housing units on Long Island.[34] Nor was local support forthcoming in Mahwah, whose mayor indicated that "the town and the country are fed up with loudmouths and radicals seeking to divide us and destroy everything we love and have worked for."[35] The planning board in Mahwah refused to consider SAI's request for rezoning, citing a moratorium it had imposed on rezoning pending revision of the local master plan, a revision prompted in part by the fact that the existing master plan had permitted planned-unit development in the area selected by Suburban Action for "Ramapo Mountain."

In all of these suburbs, SAI's motives in seeking changes in local housing and land-use policies have been attacked. "What are they going to get out of it?" is a question constantly asked by suburbanites in communities confronted by SAI.[36] Fueling these questions is the involvement of Suburban Action and Garden Cities with private developers and landowners. SAI was accused by a prominent resident of Candlewood Lake of playing "the part of a destroyer" by paving the way for the "big land speculators" who are "cheering every time Suburban Action Institute brings another suit in another court."[37] Suspicions about SAI's arrangements with private developers, as well as complaints about its efforts to influence local legislation, have prompted suburban foes to seek a federal investigation of

[32] Neil Gold, Garden Cities Development Corporation, quoted in Ernest Dickinson, "Activists in Suburbs Under Fire as Landlords," *The New York Times*, March 24, 1974.

[33] First Selectman Joseph L. McLinden, Ridgefield, Conn., quoted in Jonathan Kandell, "Ridgefield Faces a Housing Battle," *The New York Times*, August 6, 1972.

[34] Supervisor Charles W. Barraud, Jr., Brookhaven, N. Y., quoted in David A. Andelman, "Suffolk Is Facing Zone Challenge," *The New York Times*, February 28, 1973.

[35] Mayor Lawrence Nyland, Mahwah, N. J., quoted in Jan Rubin, "Nyland Blasts Tactics of SAI," *Ridgewood Herald News* (New Jersey), May 4, 1972.

[36] See Richard Zimmerman, "The Open Housing Activists: One Goal, Different Styles," *Sunday Record* (Bergen County, N. J.), June 18, 1972.

[37] Malcolm Cowley, "A Lake Is Backdrop for Debate on Suburban Integration Plan: Con," *The New York Times*, November 4, 1973.

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the organization's tax-exempt status. Suburban Action also has been called "a racist organization" which "uses black Americans as pawns and patsies in its effort to upset the zoning laws." According to this critic, SAI has no real concern with the housing problems of inner-city blacks and Puerto Ricans, most of whom could not afford to live in the developments proposed by Suburban Action and Garden Cities. Instead, the plight of lower-income blacks is "a means by which Suburban Action Institute can wheedle money from foundations and instill a feeling of guilt in middle-class white liberals."[38]

To counter local opposition, Suburban Action's founders hoped to build "a local base of support" among "the Suburban church; builders and housing developers; some groups within the fair housing movement; and suburban employers of low and moderately skilled workers."[39] Little backing for SAI, however, came from any of these groups. Other open-housing interests in the suburbs found Suburban Action's aggressive style counterproductive. They feared that their own quieter and more locally oriented efforts would be jeopardized by the backlash from local confrontations with SAI. In addition, Suburban Action has, in the view of its founders, "run up against strong opposition" because of its insistence "that local housing groups begin to demand housing not only to meet the needs of local residents, but also to meet the needs of the region's population."[40]

While winning Suburban Action few allies in the suburbs or within the open-housing fraternity, public attention has helped SAI secure funds from social-action oriented foundations such as the Field Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Dr. and Mrs. Martin Peretz Foundation, the Florence and John Schumann Foundation, the Stern Foundation, and the Taconic Foundation. In fact, most of the major victories of Suburban Action's politics of confrontation were won in the board rooms of foundations rather than in suburban town halls. While these successes enabled Suburban Action to make some headway with two of its prime aims—"to document social and economic discrimination [and] focus public attention on it"—the unequal odds posed by the local political arena to the advocates of open housing in the suburbs have thwarted SAI's professed central purpose of developing "strategies that can lever significant change."[41]

The Lack of a Suburban Constituency for Open Housing

Regardless of their approach, open-housing groups in the suburbs have failed to mobilize significant constituency support. This failure has resulted primarily from the desire of most suburbanites to maintain existing local housing and land-

[38] Ibid.

[39] Paul Davidoff, Linda Davidoff, and Neil Newton Gold, "Suburban Action: Advocate Planning for an Open Society," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XXXVI (January 1970), 21.

[40] Ibid., p. 17.

[41] Suburban Action Institute, "Statement of Purpose," p. 1.

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use policies rather than from the organizational, strategic, and tactical weakness of open-housing interests in the suburbs. To be sure, an approach such as Suburban Action's which emphasizes large-scale change and suburban responsibilities for the urban poor is much less likely to appeal to residents of the suburbs than efforts which seek small additions to the local housing stock to meet the needs of those who live and work in the local community. Even when campaigns are focused on local needs, however, widespread support rarely is forthcoming.

Among the various components of the suburban population, lower-income suburbanites clearly have the most to gain from an expansion of the supply of moderately priced housing. These residents, however, are hardly a cohesive force in suburban politics. Large numbers of suburbanites with modest incomes have little stake in increasing housing opportunities. Many are homeowners who perceive a substantial interest in the suburban status quo. Others are satisfied with their existing housing. Even more are fearful that relaxed housing and land-use controls will bring blacks into their neighborhoods. These racial fears are played on with considerable success by opponents of open housing in the suburbs. Awareness of these fears also leads advocates of change to deemphasize or ignore the needs of blacks in their efforts to mobilize the support of lower-income whites in suburbia.

Those lower-income suburbanites who are dissatisfied with existing housing conditions commonly lack influence in most suburban political arenas. In the suburbs as elsewhere, individuals with modest incomes tend to be less interested and involved in politics than those with higher incomes. They tend to be poorly informed, to fail to perceive their stake in local public policies, and to lack the time, resources, skills, and organizational capabilities to promote and defend their interests effectively. Further limiting the influence of lower-income groups is the small scale of most suburbs, which makes it difficult for minority interests to overcome their political weaknesses by the strength of numbers, as is possible in larger jurisdictions.

Because they often possess a strong organizational base, public employees have been more active on housing issues than other lower-income suburbanites. Local public employees played an important part in the campaigns for zoning reform in Fairfax and Montgomery Counties. Teachers, firemen, and other local civil servants were mobilized in Greenwich, Connecticut, during the mid-1960s to support rezoning so that they could realize the "dream of owning a moderately priced house in their hometown."[42] Such efforts have been limited, however. Socioeconomic differentiation and the small scale of most suburbs means that many local employees do not live in the same jurisdiction in which they work. As a result, local employees and other less affluent residents of the suburbs have neither flocked to the banners of the open-housing movement nor otherwise or-

[42] See William Borders, "New Faces in Greenwich," *The New York Times*, March 7, 1967. The campaign was organized by Lewis S. Rosensteil, a large landowner, who offered to sell half-acre plots to local employees for under $1000 if Greenwich would rezone his holdings to permit more intensive development. Nothing came of the effort.

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ganized effectively to press for changes in local housing policies in most of suburbia.

Black residents of the suburbs also have provided little support for the open-housing movement at the grass roots. Since many blacks in the suburbs have relatively modest incomes, the same factors which limit the involvement of lower-income whites in local politics restrict black participation. Further constraining the political capabilities of suburban blacks on the housing issue is their concentration in a handful of jurisdictions and their almost complete exclusion from the more exclusionary suburbs. In addition, blacks who have made the move to attractive suburban areas often are as hostile to open-housing policies as whites. Frequently with good reason, middle-class blacks fear that their neighborhoods will be the prime targets for subsidized housing and the resettlement of lower-income blacks should suburban housing barriers be lowered. Opposition from homeowners caused local officials in North Hempstead on Long Island to drop plans for the construction of single-family public-housing units in a black neighborhood. In Manhasset, also on Long Island, middle-class blacks organized as the Great Neck Civic Association fought the location of a $10-million public-housing project adjacent to their homes, contending that it would concentrate minority housing.

Among the remaining groups in suburbia, most of the support for open housing comes from backers of liberal causes at the upper end of the income and education scales. Upper-income suburbanites troubled by the socioeconomic separation of the metropolis provide most of the backing for the efforts of fair-housing organizations, chapters of the League of Women Voters, affiliates of the American Jewish Committee, and other groups promoting open housing at the grass roots in suburbia. They also constitute most of the audience for educational efforts in the suburbs. Of the "up to 2000 people" who attended suburban meetings of the Regional Plan Association dealing with housing issues in the New York area, most according to the planning association were "people with college educations and substantial incomes."[43]

While building support among upper-income suburbanites is hardly a waste of time—witness the fierce opposition in New Fairfield to Suburban Action's plan for Candlewood Lake—affluent liberals in the suburbs do not provide a sufficient constituency base for open-housing action in most communities. In the typical metropolitan area, such individuals constitute a significant proportion of the population in only a handful of suburbs. Where concerned suburbanites are concentrated, local governments often are more willing to seek to diversify their populations than is generally the case. Even when successful, however, the impact of these efforts is inherently limited by the small number of jurisdictions involved. Also restricting the amount of lower-cost housing that is feasible within these suburbs is local concern about higher taxes, fears of possible change in com-

[43] C. McKim Norton, Regional Plan Association, see National Urban Coalition, Clearinghouse on Exclusionary Land Use Policies, "Report: Sixth Conference on Exclusionary Land Use Policies" (New York, April 15, 1971), p. 6.

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munity character, and the high price of land in wealthier suburban areas. Whatever housing results often falls short of the needs of local residents, to say nothing of a particular suburb's "fair share" of the housing needs in the metropolis as a whole. It is probably true that "communities with the attitude of Summit are in a ratio of one to several hundred," as NCDH noted in praising the New Jersey suburb for its plans to provide low-cost housing for local blacks.[44] But the ninety units planned for Summit would accommodate only less than a quarter of the families with housing problems in the affluent suburb. And four years after the plan was announced, only forty of the units had been constructed, with progress on the remainder stalled by siting controversies.

[44] National Committee Against Discriminations in Housing, *Jobs and Housing: An Interim Report* (New York, March 1970), p. 63.

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Congressional Politics and Urban Aid

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

If the 1960s were the time of the "violent" or "explosive" urban crisis, 1975 could be called the year of the "quiet" or budgetary crisis. For in 1975 there were no major riots, and the cities were not burning. What was happening in large cities was a drastic further tightening of their perennial "fiscal crunch," as the economic recession produced "short-falls" in anticipated revenues at the same time that inflation caused a rapid increase in costs. The result was that city after city ran a deficit in its adopted (1974–1975 fiscal year) budget and projected a large gap in its new (fiscal 1975–1976) budget. This was a gap between the anticipated increased cost of continuing its existing level of services and benefits and the revenues it could expect from its existing package of taxes plus state and federal aids. Although New York City's near default and bankruptcy was the most dramatic budgetary crisis and received the greatest media coverage, cities like Detroit, Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, Baltimore, Buffalo, and St. Louis, among others, also experienced budgetary problems of varying degrees of severity.[1]

City governments responded to the threatened deficits in their 1974–1975 budgets by combining some decrease in their level of operations (including laying off personnel) with short-term borrowing to meet their payrolls and other bills

[1] See "Painful Cutbacks Forced on Cities by U.S. Economy," *The New York Times*, November 29, 1974; "Many Cities in Crisis Cut Payrolls and Raise Taxes," *The New York Times*, May 27, 1975.

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until the end of the fiscal year. To cope with the projected revenue gap in their new budgets, city governments scheduled further curtailments in services and personnel, attempted to freeze salaries, proposed new taxes, sought larger amounts of state aid, and, finally, turned to the federal government for expanded financial assistance.

There were obvious disincentives to city governments cutting services and raising taxes: The inadequate performance level of many large cities in supplying housekeeping services and amenities, reducing slum conditions and poverty, controlling crime, etc., coupled with their high level of taxation was already producing a strong stimulus for middle- and upper-income families as well as for businesses to relocate to the suburbs. If city governments raised taxes while curtailing services, they would simply strengthen that stimulus and speed the long-term erosion of their economic bases. Furthermore, city governments could increase taxes only with authorizing legislation from their state legislatures, something a number of legislatures were unwilling to provide in whole or in part. With respect to increased state aid, most state governments in 1975 were finding that their revenues too were dropping while their costs were increasing, thus limiting their ability to produce a new budget that was balanced and provided significantly more generous state aid to local governments.

The federal government in fiscal 1974–1975 was also running a deficit—one of the largest in its history[2]—as a result of the recession *cum* inflation in the economy and was projecting a record-breaking deficit for the 1975–1976 fiscal year. But unlike city and state budgets, the federal budget is not required to be balanced each year. Mayors of various large cities individually and through their interest group—the U.S. Conference of Mayors—turned therefore to the federal government with the hope that it would provide significant new aid, as it had done during the depression of the 1930s and the "violent" crisis of the 1960s.[3]

The major proposal of the mayors was one that originated in the Senate, primarily by Senator Edmund Muskie, for a new program of "countercyclical" aid to cities, to be put into effect whenever—as in 1975—the unemployment rate exceeded 6 percent. Such countercyclical aid would at least partially compensate city governments for falling tax revenues and increased welfare and other poverty-related costs caused by recession. It would also enable cities to avoid cutting back on spending and on the size of work forces and thus to avoid further depressing the economy and the employment level. In the spring of 1975, the mayors spoke of countercyclical aid at an annual level of $5 billion, but by the time of their yearly meeting in early July, they had dropped their level of aspiration to

[2] In terms of the "unified budget" and current dollars, the $43.6 billion deficit for fiscal 1974–1975 had been exceeded only by those for three World War II years—$53.8 billion for 1942–1943, $46.1 billion for 1943–1944, and $45 billion for 1944–1945. Although only marginally larger than the 1974–1975 deficit in dollar terms, the World War II deficits were much larger as a percentage both of overall governmental expenditures and of the gross national product.

[3] "Mayors Step Up Appeals for Federal Aid to Cities," *The New York Times*, March 24, 1975.

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$2 billion annually.[4] Later in July the Senate passed an "Intergovernmental Anti-Recession Act of 1975" as a floor amendment to a pending public works bill; the amendment authorized countercyclical aid at the $2 billion annual level.[5] In December a House-Senate conference committee accepted the Senate's countercyclical aid amendment. The Senate then adopted the conference report, but the House took no action by the time the first session of the Ninety-fourth Congress expired in late December.

The House and the Senate together did enact in 1975 a $5.3 billion emergency public service jobs appropriation bill in May and a $1.7 billion emergency housing bill in June; the first would have helped city governments directly by funding certain jobs on their work forces while the second would have helped indirectly, by stimulating the economy. President Ford complained that both bills were overly expensive and vetoed them, and his vetoes were sustained in the House of Representatives.[6] (Later, scaled-down compromise versions of these bills were passed by Congress and Ford signed them into law.)

Finally, after President Ford ceased threatening to veto such a measure and just in time to prevent certain default, the House and Senate in early December passed a "New York City Seasonal Financing Act," authorizing federal loans of up to $2.3 billion a year through mid-1978. The city was required to repay the loans made in any fiscal year by the last day of that fiscal year and also to pay interest at a rate 1 percent above the Treasury borrowing rate. The act was widely considered as giving the minimal aid required to stave off default, since it only provided a source of short-term borrowing for New York City to help ease its cash flow shortages but did not provide any expanded federal financing to reduce the city's overall revenue needs.

On the crucial floor votes for each of these measures—the Senate amendment adding countercyclical aid to the public works bill; the House and Senate votes to clear the conference reports on emergency public service jobs and emergency housing and then the House attempts to override the presidential vetoes on both bills; and the House and Senate votes to authorize borrowing for New York City—on all of these votes a majority of the Democrats voted in favor of enacting the prourban measure, while on none of them did a majority of Republicans also vote favorably.

These 1975 votes confirmed the pattern of the past three decades—namely, that for good or ill,[7] the Democrats have been the prourban party in Congress and the

[4] "Mayors Seek $5-Billion in Emergency Aid," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, April 5, 1975; "Big-City Mayors Ask U. S. for Emergency $2-Billion," *The New York Times*, July 6, 1975. The first version of the bill would have triggered at 6 percent unemployment, a $1 billion spending level and added another $1 billion for each additional percent unemployed. The later version halved these levels—a 6 percent unemployment rate triggering $500 million and each additional percent of unemployment increasing the funding by another $500 million.

[5] See 94 Cong., 1st Sess, S. 1359, Report of the Committee on Government Operations, Report to Accompany S. 1359; *Congressional Record*, July 29, 1975, pp. S14176ff.

[6] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, June 7, 1975, p. 1159; ibid., June 28, 1975, p. 1353.

[7] And views will differ, depending on one's attitudes toward the desirability of federal finan-

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Republicans have been the antiurban party. This has meant that legislation authorizing major new kinds of federal financial aid to cities has been almost impossible to enact unless a Congress with heavy Democratic majorities and a Democratic president were serving in office simultaneously. The *heavy* Democratic majorities have been necessary because the "southern Democratic" members of Congress have typically voted on urban programs more like Republicans than like the remainder of their Democratic colleagues. In order to pass legislation for urban aid, therefore, the number of Democrats had to be large enough to constitute floor majorities even in the face of large-scale southern Democratic defections. Having a Democratic *president* in office has been necessary because typically it has been the Democratic presidents rather than the Republican ones who have served as important sources of legislative proposals for urban aid and have provided approval rather than vetoes for those urban aid measures passed by Congress. The remainder of this article seeks to document these propositions by analyzing the past trends and bases of support for federal aid to cities. In its conclusions, the article also speculates on future prospects for urban aid and specifically on whether Democrats in Congress and in the White House can continue to be as prourban as they have been in the past, despite the continual decrease in the proportion of the nation's population that lives in large cities.

The Basis and Magnitude of Federal-Urban Aid

Federal financial aid programs to cities are based primarily on Congress' so-called "spending power." The "spending power" derives from Congress' constitutional authority "to lay and collect taxes . . . to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States."[8] As Congress has exercised it since the founding of the country and as the Supreme Court eventually ruled in 1936,[9] this clause permits the spending of federal monies not only in the substantive areas which Congress can regulate under its various enumerated powers. It also permits federal appropriations for any purpose that comes within the meaning of the broad terms "common defense" or "general welfare" of the United States.

Although some limited and sporadic forms of federal assistance to local governments actually go back to the very beginning of the Republic, it was the year 1932 that constituted, as Roscoe C. Martin has put it, "a sort of geological fault line" in the development of relationships between the federal government and large cities.[10] For with one exception, all the major urban-oriented grant programs that are currently in existence were enacted since 1932. (The exception is highway aid, which was begun in 1916.)

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cial assistance to large cities.

[8] Article I, Section 8.

[9] *U. S.* v. *Butler*, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

[10] *The Cities and the Federal System* (New York, 1965), p. 111.

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FIGURE 1

Direct Federal Aid to Cities as Percentage of City General Expenditures for Cities Above 300,000 in Population (excluding Washington, D. C.)



SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *City Government Finances,* 1951–1952 to 1973–1974.

The main urban problem areas for which there were federal grant programs in fiscal 1974–1975 were poverty and unemployment (public assistance or "welfare" grants, medical assistance grants, food stamps, antipoverty grants, comprehensive manpower assistance grants); housing and physical decay (urban renewal, low rent public housing, model cities, rent supplements, and neighborhood facilities grants); education (elementary and secondary education grants); crime (law enforcement assistance grants); water pollution (waste treatment works construction and water and sewer facilities grants); health (hospital and medical facilities construction grants); and transportation (federal aid to highways and urban mass transportation grants). The grants in these specific problem areas since 1972 have been supplemented by general revenue-sharing payments.[11]

[11] None of these grant programs is "urban" in the sense of benefiting large cities exclusively.

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It should be understood that not all these "urban" grant programs provide for the payment to be made directly to the city governments. Under some programs, the grant is made to the state government, either for eventual redistribution of all or part of the monies to city governments or for the state itself to operate a program that deals with a problem in large cities. A few grant programs benefit city governments more indirectly, by providing subsidies or other payments to individuals (e.g., food stamps) or private groups (e.g., grants to community corporations under the Office of Economic Opportunity) to help them cope with conditions that constitute problems for city governments.

Because only some "urban" grants are paid directly to city governments, while others are paid to the states and still other grants go to private individuals and groups, it is impossible to state with precision the total amount of federal money that is actually spent to help large cities. The Bureau of the Census publication, *City Government Finances* reports only federal grants made directly to local governments. In 1973–1974, federal aid to the nation's largest cities of over 300,000 in population (excluding Washington, D.C.) comprised $2,293,944,000 or some 10.6 percent of their aggregate general expenditures, up from .7 percent in 1951–1952.[12] (See Figure 1.) This represents a dramatic 99-fold increase in the aggregate amount of such grants—one that has been 15 times as fast as the rise in those cities' general expenditures. Even with that increase, however, the federal government's absolute level of "effort" in 1973–1974 for direct aid to large cities remained minimal, at under 1 percent of its total outlays.[13]

Because grants under some of the very largest programs that benefit cities, including public assistance, elementary and secondary education, medical assistance, highways, and food stamps are not paid to city governments, these census figures obviously understate the amount of federal money spent seeking to ameliorate undesirable urban conditions with which city governments must cope. In order to make an exact calculation, it would be necessary to add to the direct federal grants the portion of federal grants to states that are "passed through" to city governments and the payments that go directly to private individuals and groups in large cities. These figures are not, however, available in published census reports on governmental finances.

Party Differences and Urban Support

In order to identify party differences on urban voting in Congress, an examination was made of all those roll-call votes on urban aid issues that were among the

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Large cities are, however, direct or indirect beneficiaries of each of the programs and normally have received larger-sized grants under particular programs than other local governments. But local governments other than those of the largest cities are also eligible for grants and are recipients of benefits. Figures showing the allocation of money for particular programs as between large cities and other local governments are not available.

[12] Calculated from U. S. Bureau of the Census, *City Government Finances*, 1951–1952 to 1973–1974.

[13] Calculated from ibid., 1973–1974, and U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1975*, table 370.

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FIGURE 2

Majorities in Support and in Opposition on Selected Key Urban Votes, 1945–1974, by Party, and for the Democratic Party, by Region



"key votes" selected annually between 1945 and 1974 by the Congressional Quarterly, Inc., a nonpartisan organization that publishes the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* and other reports and books analyzing Congress.[14] These "key votes" were not necessarily the votes on bills on final passage; they are intended to represent the most significant decisions made in the consideration of bills, which are sometimes motions to amend or recommit in order to expand or contract the coverage of a program or to decrease or increase its appropriations.

[14] An identification of the votes and description of the legislative purpose of the bills involved can be found in the Appendix to this article.

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FIGURE 3

Percentage of Democratic and Republican Members of Congress Supporting Urban Legislation on Selected Key Votes, 1945–1974



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As Figures 2 and 3 show, on forty-four "key" urban votes taken in the House between 1945 (when the Congressional Quarterly began keeping score) and 1974, a majority of all the Democratic members who voted cast their votes in favor of the prourban position in every one of the forty-four instances. On the other hand, in thirty-seven out of the forty-four cases, a majority of the Republicans who were voting took the antiurban position. Similarly in twenty-eight "key" urban votes taken in the Senate during the same time period, a majority of the voting Democrats was in favor of the prourban position on all but two of the twenty-eight votes while a majority of voting Republicans voted against on all but ten. Inspection of Figure 3 will also show that the majorities from the two parties for and against urban programs typically were not marginal ones, but represented sharp differences between the dominant Democratic and Republican point of view: The difference in the average level of support for urban programs in the period 1945 to 1974 was between 76 percent for the Democrats and 28 percent for the Republicans in the House, and between 75 percent for the Democrats and 38 percent for the Republicans in the Senate.

It should be noted that the difference between the dominant Democratic and dominant Republican positions on urban issues becomes even more striking if the votes of those Democrats defined as "southern"[15] by the Congressional Quarterly Service are not included in the overall Democratic totals but are treated separately. Since the late 1930s majorities of this bloc of "southern" Democrats have voted more consistently with the Republicans than with the remaining "northern" Democrats[16] on urban issues. On the key votes already referred to, a majority of "southern" Democrats voted with a majority of their northern Democratic brethren in support of the urban position only sixteen out of forty-four times in the House, giving an average level of support of 45 percent, and nine out of twenty-eight times in the Senate, giving an average level of support of 47 percent (see Figures 2 and 4). Thus, the plotting of urban voting scores of the northern Democrats alone raises the average support level from 76 to 94 percent in the House and from 75 to 90 percent in the Senate and therefore shows even more accurately the very dramatic difference on urban issues that has existed between the "nonsouthern" or "national" Democratic party and the Republican party (see Figure 5).

Given these very strong characteristic positions on urban issues of "northern" Democratic, "southern" Democratic, and Republican members of Congress, a necessary condition for a particular Congress to enact major prourban legisla-

[15] The *Congressional Quarterly* defines as "southern" all those Democrats coming from the states of the old Confederacy—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—and the two border states of Kentucky and Oklahoma.

[16] The *Congressional Quarterly* defines as "northern" all other Democrats, whether they are in fact from the "North," strictly speaking, or from the Midwest, West, Pacific Coast, etc. It is with these meanings that the terms "southern" Democrats and "northern" Democrats are used in this article.

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FIGURE 4

Percentage of Southern Democratic Members of Congress Supporting Urban Legislation on Selected Key Votes, 1945–1974



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FIGURE 5

Percentage of Northern Democrats and Republican Members of Congress Supporting Urban Legislation on Selected Key Votes, 1945-1974



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tion has been the existence and large size of a Democratic majority. Accordingly, in the four years since 1945 with Republican majorities in Congress (1947–1948, 1953–1954), no new urban aid programs were passed and only one old program was expanded. The converse is not true, however, and prourban positions did not fare equally well in all the years that the majorities were Democratic. Persistent success for prourban positions in Congress depended on the Democratic majority being sizable enough so that even with large-scale southern Democratic defections, enough Democratic votes were left from the preponderant majorities of northern members who consistently supported the prourban stand and from the varying-sized minorities of southern Democrats who voted with them to constitute majorities on the floor. On a few occasions, the majorities also required the votes of the handful of Republicans who deserted the dominant antiurban point of view of their party and voted for the prourban position.

Party Differences in Action: The Eighty-seventh and Eighty-ninth Congresses

An analysis of two specific sessions of the House of Representatives may make clearer the impact of differences in the distribution of seats between parties from Congress to Congress. During most of[17] the Eighty-seventh Congress—the Congress that was elected with President Kennedy in 1960 and was in session in 1961–1962—there were 263 Democrats and 174 Republicans in the House of Representatives. This lineup gave the appearance of the House being safely in the control of the prourban Democratic party. And the Democrats did in fact have "nominal" control, being able to elect members of their party as speaker of the House and as chairmen of the various standing committees. The appearance was, however, deceptive as only 159 of the Democrats were "northern" and 104 came from the South. The result was that the total number of 174 Republicans plus 104 southern Democrats greatly exceeded the number of 159 northern Democrats so that "working control" of the House—as President Kennedy used to refer to it—with respect to enacting urban legislation was largely in the hands of the Republican-southern Democratic, antiurban, "conservative coalition." Thus on two issues that led to an urban "key" vote—passage of the Emergency Educational Act of 1961 and the attempt to establish a cabinet-level Department of Urban Affairs and Housing—the prourban position lost, even though northern Democrats voted in favor by 97 percent on the first and 87 percent on the second. On both these votes, heavy southern Democratic majorities joined the near unanimous Republicans to defeat the nominal Democratic House majority party.[18]

[17] "Most of" because through deaths and resignations, the number of northern Democrats, southern Democrats, and Republicans changes slightly over the course of a Congress.

[18] H.R. 8890, Emergency Educational Aid Act of 1961, authorizing grants for school construction, etc. Question, under "Calendar Wednesday" procedures, on whether bill should be considered. Consideration rejected 170–242: Democrats (D) 164–82 (northern Democrats [ND] 132–4, southern Democrats [SD] 32–78); Republicans (R) 6–160. H. Res. 530, Resolution disap-

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FIGURE 6

Distribution of Seats by Party and for Democratic Party, by Region, House of Representatives, Eighty-seventh and Eighty-ninth Congress



Only on the third urban key vote—that on passage of the Emergency Housing Act of 1961—where 66 percent of the southern Democrats voted with a 98 percent northern Democratic majority, did the nominal majority win out.[19] In short, for the northern Democratic supported, prourban position to prevail, some two-thirds of the southern Democrats had to shift away from their characteristic, long-term stance and vote with their nonsouthern colleagues (see Figure 6A). Since this rarely happened on "key" or other votes, almost no urban programs were voted upon favorably by the House in the Eighty-seventh Congress.

A sharp contrast to the Eighty-seventh Congress is the Eighty-ninth, which was elected in 1964, during President Johnson's landslide victory, and served in 1965–1966. When it began, the Eighty-ninth Congress had 140 Republicans and 295 Democrats, of which only 92 were southerners and 203 were from outside the South. This meant that the total number of Republicans and southern Democrats combined barely exceeded that number of northern Democrats alone. It also meant that when only a small minority of 20 percent of the southern Democrats voted with the rest of their party, the northern Democratic, prourban position prevailed in roll-call votes in the House (see Figure 6B).

The Eighty-ninth Congress consequently saw the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, "Medicaid" for recipients of public assistance, the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, rent supplements and expansion of other housing programs, model cities, and the expansion of anti-poverty programs. On the "key" vote on each of these issues a majority of the voting Republicans and (with one exception on Medicaid) a majority of southern Democrats took the antiurban position. But each time the number of northern

proving President Kennedy's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1962 to create cabinet-level Urban Affairs and Housing Department. Resolution of disapproval agreed to 264–150: D 111–137 (ND 18–124, SD 93–13); R 153–13.

[19] H.R. 6028. Passed 235–178: D 210–38 (ND 141–3, SD 69–35); R 25–140.

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Democrats available to vote favorably was so large that with only minority support from southern Democrats (plus sometimes a small handful of Republicans), the prourban position won.[20] On only one "urban key vote" during the Eighty-ninth Congress—that to delete funds for rent supplements from a supplemental appropriation act—did the "conservative coalition" come out the winners. This happened when an unusually small number of northern Democrats turned out on the floor to vote and in addition an unusually large percentage of those northern Democrats—some 15 percent—voted with the conservative coalition, a combination of factors that caused the postponement of rent supplements funding for a few months.[21]

The lineup of forces in the House for the two years of the Eighty-ninth Congress was exceptional; the Democratic party had not enjoyed such large majorities since the early Roosevelt Congresses of 1933–1938. The typical House situation since 1939 has been something like the lineup of the Eighty-seventh (or first Kennedy) Congress or worse. Prourban majorities have therefore been difficult to put together in the House most years, even though it has almost always been under nominal Democratic control.

The Ninety-fourth Congress and the Role of the President

In the 1974 congressional elections the Republicans suffered sharp defeats, creating a potentially very prourban House of 204 northern Democrats, 87 southern Democrats, and 144 Republicans. But unlike the 1930s and the Eighty-ninth Congress of the Johnson administration, the current Ninety-fourth Congress is not serving with a prourban Democratic president. A major aspect of the president's importance in determining the federal government's responsiveness to the financial needs of large cities comes from the fact that it is he who provides in his messages to Congress and his annual budget most of the major proposals that

[20] H.R. 2362, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, providing grants to school districts with large numbers of children from low-income families. Passed 263–153: D 228–57 (ND 187–3, SD 41–54); R 35–96. H.R. 6675, Social Security Amendments of 1965, establishing "Medicare" for the aged and medical assistance or "Medicaid" for public assistance recipients and other medically needy. Passed 313–115: D 248–42 (ND 189–2, SD 59–40); R 65–73. H.R. 6927, Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, establishing cabinet-level department. Passed 217–184: D 208–66 (ND 170–10, SD 38–56); R 9–118. H.R. 7984, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, extending public housing, urban renewal, etc., and providing for "rent supplements" to low-income families. Motion to recommit to delete rent supplements provisions rejected 201–208: D 72–204 (ND 21–163, SD 51–41); R 130–4. S. 3708, Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1965, authorizing "model cities" grants. Passed 178–141: D 162–60 (ND 141–11, SD 21–49); R 16–81. H.R. 15111, Economic Opportunity Act amendments of 1966, continuing program and authorizing appropriations for 1967. Motion to strike enacting clause (thereby killing the bill) rejected 156–208: D 49–193 (ND 5–159, SD 44–34); R 107–15.

[21] H.R. 11588, General Supplemental Appropriations Bill. Amendment to delete funding of rent supplements in fiscal 1966 accepted 185–162: D 86–160 (ND 24–141, SD 62–19); R 99–2.

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Congress seriously considers for new or for expansion of existing grant programs and for increased spending levels. And among presidents as among members of Congress, party differences have been clear: Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson—all Democrats—were inclined to propose and support new and expanded "urban" programs and to ask for sizable appropriations increases to fund those that were already in effect. Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford—all Republicans—were more inclined to consolidate rather than expand, and sometimes even to cut back or scrap some existing programs; they also attempted to keep spending levels from arising abruptly from what they had been in previous years.

Congress itself does on rare occasions consider proposals for major additions to or expansions of urban grant programs that are originated by its own members and do not constitute a part of the president's "legislative program." This happens most often when as in 1975 the president and majorities in Congress belong to different parties. Even then, however, the president's support or at least acquiescence is almost a prerequisite for any major increases in federal financial assistance to cities. The president can normally defeat congressionally enacted proposals with a veto, since vetoes can be overridden only by a very difficult to attain two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate. Two dramatic examples of the huge weight of a presidential veto were President Ford's disapproving in 1975 the "emergency [public service] jobs appropriations bill" and the "emergency housing bill." Although on the first bill 99 percent of the northern Democrats and 79 percent of the southern Democrats (as well as 13 percent of the Republicans) voted to override, the veto was sustained by five votes; on the second bill, 95 percent of the northern Democrats and 71 percent of the southern Democrats (as well as 13 percent of the Republicans) voted to override; that attempt failed also, by sixteen votes.[22]

Various presidents have also claimed the right to "impound," i.e., not spend, funds even after they were appropriated by Congress with the president's signature or over his veto. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 may, however, have all but eliminated presidential impoundments that Congress opposes.[23]

[22] H.R. 4481, Emergency Jobs Appropriations, Fiscal 1975. Passage over the president's veto. Rejected 277–145 (282 required for two-thirds): R 19–123; D 258–22 (ND 192–4; SD 66–18). H.R. 4485, Emergency Housing Assistance. Passage over the president's veto. Rejected 268–157 (282 required for two-thirds): R19–122; D 249–35 (ND 186–9; SD 63–26). Many Democratic freshman members of Congress expressed great dismay at the failure of the Democrats to override these two vetoes when the total Democratic majority in the House exceeded the two-thirds necessary. In light of long-term trends, however, the northern Democratic-inclining members should have been pleased that the southern Democrats gave the votes to override 71 percent support in each case, whereas their long-term support of urban legislation has, as already reported, been only 45 percent.

[23] See Public Law 93-344, Title X.

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A More Prourban Senate

The Senate in recent decades, incidentally, has not been as antiurban in voting behavior as much of the time as has been the House. Although since World War II the combined total of Republican and southern Democratic senators has always exceeded the number of northern Democrats, during this period aid to education, mass transit, expanded housing, and other kinds of prourban bills that could not be enacted in the House did pass in the Senate. This relatively more prourban complexion has existed despite the fact that all states have equal voting power in the Senate regardless of the size of their population, thus giving tremendous overrepresentation to sparsely populated rural states. There appear to be two reasons for the basically more prourban Senate complexion: First, the northern Democratic strength has normally been larger in proportion to total membership in the Senate than in the House—especially since 1959—meaning that smaller defections from the southern Democratic or Republican ranks were sufficient to enable the northern Democratic position to prevail on floor votes.[24] Second, the relatively small defections needed were frequently forthcoming in the Senate. This held true not only for the southern Democrats but even for the Republicans who in significant minority—and occasionally even in majority—strength supported a number of housing and education bills that were overwhelmingly opposed by Republican members in the House.

Party Lineups and Committee Action

The distribution of seats in Congress among the northern Democrats, southern Democrats, and Republicans affects the outcome of controverted legislation, incidentally, not only through votes taken on the floor of the two houses. It also has great effect through its impact on the makeup and policy complexion of the standing committees. It is these committees that shape and report the legislation to be voted upon on the floor. These committees also can choose to preclude, for all practical purposes, favorable floor action by failing to report particular legislation out of committee. On most committees including the ones that handle the bulk of urban legislation—Education and Labor; Banking, Currency, and Housing; and Appropriations in the House; and Labor and Public Welfare; Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; and Appropriations in the Senate—the "ratio" of seats between Democratic and Republican members has been set by each Congress to reflect the "ratio" of seats between the parties in the entire parent body. Thus, to the extent that the House or Senate was Republican-controlled or Democratic-

[24] Thus, in the five Congresses beginning with the Eighty-sixth (1959–1968), northern Democrats have held an average of 43 (or 44 percent) of the seats by themselves. As a result whenever the northern Democratic ranks stayed solid, they needed to pick up the votes of very few southern Democrats and Republicans to have a absolute majority of the Senate. On the other hand in the House, northern Democrats held an average of 170 (or only 39 percent) of the seats by themselves, thus requiring larger defections from the southern Democratic or Republican ranks in order to prevail.

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controlled by only a very small margin, the committees were controlled by majorities of Republicans or by coalitions of Republicans and southern Democrats and thus typically took committee action consistent with the antiurban point of view. To the extent, on the other hand, that the House or Senate was controlled by heavy Democratic majorities, the Democratic majorities on committees were large. Under these circumstances, even with the bulk of the southern Democratic members of the committee voting with the Republicans, the northern Democrats had a majority and thus were able to exercise working control over the committee and report urban legislation favorably.

Bases of Party Differences in Urban Support: Ideology and Constituency

Why the Democratic party in Congress has been prourban and the Republican party, most especially in the House, has been antiurban is a question that cannot be answered definitively in the space available here. One part of the explanation is that since Woodrow Wilson's time, the leading Democratic national officeholders, in the presidency and in Congress, have been persons ideologically committed to using the power and funds of the federal government to alleviate widely felt problems. This was so whether the problems were experienced by farmers, businessmen, union laborers, or more currently, urban dwellers and city governments. The dominant Republican ideological position has been that for the most part, social and economic problems should be dealt with not by the federal government, but by the states or by private efforts. The Republicans have, however, been willing to flex their ideological principles to support the federal government's coming to the aid of some big businesses (e.g., Lockheed, Penn Central) and of farm operators facing economic problems. In addition to ideology, almost all Republicans have also been committed to holding down spending by the federal government, and federally aided urban programs are usually costly. Persons who self-select themselves to try to gain the congressional or senatorial nominations of a particular party—Republican or Democratic—are likely to be those who for the most part find that party's broad ideological image or policy orientation appealing. If elected they therefore carry to Congress ideological or policy outlooks that provide motivation to support their party's traditional position.

Another part of the explanation for the difference in prourban and antiurban stance between the Democrats and Republicans in Congress is that they have tended to come from different kinds of constituencies: since the 1930s, the main bulk of northern Democratic strength in the House and Senate has been from urban districts and urban states that are directly experiencing the problems of urbanization. The main bulk of Republican strength on the other hand, has been from more rural districts and states where the urban problems are not felt at first hand and where big cities antipathies have traditionally existed. For the great bulk of northern Democratic and of Republican members of Congress, therefore, ideological inclinations and the perceived needs of their constituencies neat-

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ly coincided to provide mutually reinforcing motivation for prourban and anti-urban positions respectively.

The case of the southern Democratic members of Congress is a unique one. Certainly since the 1930s, the bulk of southern Democratic representatives and senators have been much closer, with respect both to personal ideological outlook and characteristics of their constituency, to the Republican party rather than to the Democratic. And accordingly, most of them have supported the Republican rather than the northern Democratic positions on urban and other welfare and "expansion of federal role" issues. The explanation for this anomaly of Republican-oriented members of Congress being even nominally Democratic is, of course, historical: from the Reconstruction era after the Civil War to the early 1960s, it was impossible for Republican candidates to be elected to the House or to the Senate from the states of the old Confederacy. This was the result not of policy agreement or disagreement with Republican party positions or of constituency characteristics, but of a strong tradition, passed on from generation to generation, of automatic allegiance to the Democratic party among all but a tiny fraction of white southerners. Broadly speaking, that tradition was based on the fact that President Lincoln, General (and later President) Grant, and General Sherman had been Republicans and that the Republican party was perceived as being responsible for freeing the slaves and imposing the indignities of northern military occupation on the South in the decades after Appomattox.[25]

Given this overwhelming opposition to anyone running for Congress under the Republican label, any policy differences among aspirants to Congress were fought out not in the general election as party opponents, but in the primary election for the Democratic senatorial or congressional nomination, whose victor was virtually guaranteed subsequent election. Accordingly, senators and representatives were elected to Congress as Democrats and gave the minimal required support to be counted as nominal members of their party by voting with their northern Democratic colleagues on the organization of the Congress, including the election of presiding officers, floor leaders, and committee chairmen. But the bulk of those southern Democratic members of Congress voted on urban legislation the way that persons with their "conservative," "antiexpansion-of-federal-role," "antifederal-spending" ideological outlook and from their basically rural and small town constituencies could be expected to do—that is, in support of the dominant Republican position.

It should be clearly understood that not all northern Democrats have represented urban districts or states and not all Republicans and southern Democrats have represented rural ones. Their dramatic difference in support for urban programs has therefore not been merely a reflection of their representing different kinds of constituencies. There is no comprehensive analysis of relative influence of party and constituency on urban voting, but whatever scattered evidence exists all points in the same direction, namely that party is much more important than

[25] See V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949).

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TABLE 1

Percentage of Time House Members Supported Larger Federal Role on Selected Roll Calls, 1961

	Urban		*Suburban*		*Rural*	
	Republican	*Democrat*	*Republican*	*Democrat*	*Republican*	*Democrat*
East	23.3	96.4	23.6	92.7	19.8	88.0
South	0.0	64.5	10.0	75.0	14.0	55.0
Midwest	4.0	98.8	5.1	97.5	5.2	91.0
West	8.3	98.9	0.0	98.3	20.2	97.2

SOURCE: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, February 2, 1962, p. 155.

constituency in accounting for roll-call voting. That is, regardless of type of constituency—city, suburban, or rural—northern Democratic members of the House have been much more prourban than Republicans or southern Democrats. Studies that do exist, for example, of voting on a 1959 aid to airports bill, a series of votes between 1959 and 1962 on water pollution control, a 1958 and a 1964 vote on the food stamp program, and of voting on the 1964 mass transit bill show that *in every single case Democratic members from rural districts voted more heavily in favor of the urban program—from three to fifteen times—than Republican members from urban districts, even when the votes of southern Democrats were included within the overall Democrat scores.*[26] Obviously, if support of the northern Democratic members from rural districts had been calculated separately and compared to the votes of urban Republicans, the differences in support would have been even more striking.

A 1962 study by the Congressional Quarterly Service which measured support for a "larger federal role" (defined as including but not restricted to urban programs) and did differentiate according to party, type of constituency, and region, came up with similar findings. What this study indicated was that the percentage of rural Democrats from outside the South supporting such an expansion was three to four times as large as among urban and suburban Republicans from the East and ten times as large as among urban and suburban Republicans from other parts of the country. Indeed, on the bills on which this study was based, even rural Democrats from the South on the average supported this kind of federal expansion more than twice as heavily as Republicans from any region or type of constituency including the urban and suburban East (see Table 1).

Still another study of House voting in 1973 on four key urban votes—per-

[26] Calculated from tables in Frederick N. Cleaveland et al., *Congress and Urban Problems* (Washington, D. C., 1969), pp. 65, 103, 285, 305, 345. Further supportive evidence for the proposition that party has been more important than constituency in roll-call voting on issues defined in this article as "urban" can be found in Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, rev. ed. by Edward V. Schneir, Jr. (Baltimore, 1970), esp. pp. 88–95; and in David R. Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen: The Difference Between Democrats and Republicans 1947–1962* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), esp. chap. 3.

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TABLE 2

Support for Four Selected Urban Votes from Northern Democrats and Republicans, by Constituency, House of Representatives, 1973

	Urban	*Suburban*	*Rural*	*All*
No. Democrats	98% (52)	84% (28)	50% (17)	85% (97)
Republicans	29% (14)	30% (57)	4% (45)	20% (116)

SOURCE: Recalculated from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* April 6, 1974, p. 880.

mitting use of highway trust funds for mass transit, authorizing funds for mass transit operating subsidies, increasing funds for community comprehensive planning grants, and increasing funds for urban renewal—showed that northern Democratic or Republican party affiliation was far more determinative of a prourban or antiurban position than type of constituency (see Table 2).

There are no specific studies of the relative influence of party and constituency on "urban voting" in the Senate. But analysis of roll-call votes shows that an extremely high degree of support has been given to urban measures by Democratic senators from outside the South, whether they represented highly urbanized states with large cities, like Massachusetts, Connecticut, California, or New York, or western farm or other types of nonurban states like Montana, Alaska, Idaho, New Hampshire, or Maine. This suggests that in the Senate, too, party has been more determinative of prourban or antiurban position than the urban or nonurban characteristics of the state being represented. Additional evidence for this interpretation is provided by the voting of senators from the same state who belong to different parties. Almost invariably the Democratic senator votes prourban on many more issues than the Republican senator. In the Ninetieth Congress (1969–1970), for example, such states as Arizona, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming each had one Democratic and one Republican senator. A Congressional Quarterly study of "Senate Support for Larger or Smaller Federal Role" shows that during this Congress, the Democratic senator provided significantly greater support for an expanded federal role in urban and other programs than his Republican colleague in *every* case.[27] Similarly, a Congressional Quarterly study of "conservative coalition" voting in the Ninety-third Congress (1973–1974) shows that of twenty-one states that had one Democratic and one Republican senator, in all but one case the Republican senator gave greater support to the "conservative coalition," one of whose positions is typically against increased spending for urban programs.[28]

Of course, all these studies show also that the kind of constituency represented does exert some influence. As could be expected, within each party, support for

[27] See "Fact Sheet on Federal Role," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* November 15, 1968.

[28] See ibid., January 25, 1975, pp. 189–194.

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urban programs and other similar expansion of the "federal role" normally is greatest from representatives and senators with the most urban districts or states, is slightly less from those whose districts or states are more suburban, and least from members with the most rural constituencies. (See Tables 1 and 2.) The difference in urban support within each party according to types of constituency, however, has been sharply less than the differences between the parties, even when southern Democrats are not factored out of the Democratic scores, let alone when they are.

Prospects for Increased Federal Aid to Cities

Looking to the future, what are the prospects for any greatly increased federal financial help to cities? There will probably be proposals in the years ahead to establish additional kinds of programs purported to provide new or more effective remedies or solutions for urban problems and to increase the overall level of urban funding, either through expansion of categorical grants or of revenue-sharing, or both. There will most likely also be proposals to redesign ongoing programs that are widely felt not to be working well or to be producing undesirable side effects. At least over the short-run future, there is little reason to doubt that under Democratic presidents and "northern" Democratic controlled Congresses, there will be a greater probability of new programs, greater additional spending, and proportionately more federal aid channeled to cities rather than under Republican presidents or Republican-southern Democrat, "conservative coalition" controlled congresses.

What the longer-term prospects are for drastic increases in federal spending to help solve the problems of large cities is more uncertain. The basic factor here is the decreasing proportion of the nation's population that every year lives in large cities, particularly in the older large cities of the East and Midwest which are experiencing the greatest difficulties and financial needs, and the increasing proportion living in the suburbs.

It is important to recognize that despite much talk of the United States being an "urban" nation, the reality of the matter is that it is "urban" only in the sense of being "metropolitan area-living," but not in the sense of being "large city-living." That is, while according to the 1970 census 69 percent of all Americans lived in metropolitan areas (defined essentially as a central city of at least 50,000 in population and those contiguous counties that are economically and socially integrated with the central city), only 31 percent lived in the central city portions, with 38 percent living in the "outside central city" or suburban portions. The 31 percent included all those living in cities of 50,000 and larger, and represents a decline from 33 percent in 1960 and 35 percent in 1950 (see Figure 7). Moreover, when one looks at what percentage of Americans in 1970 remained in the really large cities which are most seriously experiencing various kinds of urban problems, one finds that only 21 percent were in cities of 250,000 or more, 16 percent in those of half-million and larger, and a mere 9 percent in the cities with popula-

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FIGURE 7

Distribution of Population by Place of Residence: Central City, Outside Central City, Nonmetropolitan, 1950–1970



SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1974*, p. 17, table 16; p. 23, table 23.

tions of a million or over.[29] Actually of the fifty-six largest cities with a 1970 population of 250,000 or more, twenty-three lost population between 1960 and 1970 in absolute terms and twenty-two lost population between 1950 and 1960.

The decline in the proportion of the American population living in large cities will result in a steadily decreasing number of members in the House of Representatives who will be representing large city districts. The impact of the 1960–1970 population shifts on the distribution of House seats through reapportionment caused a decrease of 7 percent—from 110 to 102—in those seats primarily representing central cities of 50,000 or larger in population, and an increase of 26 percent—from 104 to 131—with basically suburban constituencies. The non-

[29] U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1974*, tables 16, 23.

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FIGURE 8

Distribution of Seats in House of Representatives by Type of Constitutency, 1968 and 1973



SOURCE: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 6, 1974, p. 878.*

metropolitan constituencies dropped 16 percent—from 155 to 130—while the number of seats from "mixed" constituencies rose from 66 to 72. (See Figure 8.) The strength of House representation from city constituencies not only remained smaller than the total nonmetropolitan strength, as before, but it also became smaller than total suburban strength.

What this long-term shift in types of districts is likely to do to the policy complexion of the House of Representatives is extremely difficult to predict. Thus far Democrats from suburban districts have been voting almost as strongly prourban as members from central city districts. If the Democratic party can maintain its present relative strength among suburban constituencies and if any additional suburban Democrats who are elected continue to share the policy outlooks of the central city representatives who will still be the dominant contingent in the northern Democratic membership, sources of support for urban programs will not be fundamentally weakened. Indeed, to the extent that rural Republicans and rural southern Democrats are replaced by suburban Republicans and suburban southern Democrats, the resistence to urban programs from the "conservative

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coalition" may actually weaken to some extent. If, on the other hand, the bulk of the new suburban seats can be captured by the Republican party, the low-spending, anti-big-city, conservative coalition forces in the House will be strengthened.

The impact of present population trends on the Senate is more difficult to nail down: senators in general, and even Democratic senators from urban states, will inevitably be recognizing the increasingly suburban nature of their overall constituencies. Therefore, even those who may be so inclined personally, may be less able to afford politically, the developing of reputations as out-and-out champions of big cities.

Incidentally, if the historical attachment to the Democratic party continues to weaken in the South and the emergent pattern of more two-party, competitive congressional politics spreads, most of the more conservative and antiurban southern aspirants for House and Senate seats may run as Republicans.[30] Since so many present southern Democrats are conservative and antiurban, the election of individuals with such outlooks as Republicans would have no great impact on the amount of congressional support for urban programs. But it would have the utility of better rationalizing party alignments in Congress by making the nominal distribution of seats between Democrats and Republicans more indicative of the true relative strength available for the different policy positions with which the dominant numbers of those parties have been traditionally associated.

The increasing suburbanization of the population, finally, may affect the intensity of presidential leadership that will be forthcoming for increased federal assistance to cities. For in a nation whose suburban population will be increasingly in a position to outvote its big city citizens, even Democratic presidents, let alone Republican ones, may not find it electorally profitable to assign their highest policy and budgetary priorities to programs that are perceived as basically benefiting large cities.

In short, the most probable long-term impact of the decline in the proportion of the nation's people living in large cities is that most of any additions to, expansions of, and increased spending on "urban" programs probably will be on those that interest and benefit suburbs as much or more than large cities. Examples are increased spending for education, mass transit, intercity rail transportation, environmental pollution, and general or special revenue-sharing programs based on

[30] A new factor promoting such a change is the action of the House Democratic caucus at the beginning of the Ninety-fourth Congress in January 1975, when it denied the chairmanships of three standing committees to the most senior members and previous chairmen of those committees. If this break with the seniority principle continues, southern aspirants to seats in the House of Representatives can no longer take for granted, if they run as Democrats, their eventual elevation to committee chairmanships through seniority and regardless of whether their policy stances deviate sharply with the dominant majority of their party colleagues. The Senate Democratic caucus' adoption of a rule requiring a secret ballot on the choice of committee chairman if 20 percent of the caucus members so desired, appeared to lay the groundwork for future challenges to Senate Democratic committee chairmen on similar grounds.

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formulas that are also favorable to suburbs. On the other hand, those "urban" programs whose thrust is primarily to improve the social and physical conditions of the poor, and especially of black, urban slum dwellers, will most likely receive treatment varying from only marginal improvement to "benign neglect."[31]*

APPENDIX

House of Representatives

Urban Key Vote	*CQ Key Vote, Year and Number*	*Bill Number*	*Legislative Purpose*
1	1945,6	H.R. 3615	Federal aid to airports
2	1946,2	H.R. 3370	School lunch grants
3	1949,2	H.R. 4009	Public housing and urban development
4	1954,1	H.R. 7839	Housing development
5	1955,6	S. 2126	Public housing
6	1956,4	H.R. 7535	School construction
7	1957,6	H.R. 1	School construction
8	1960,2	H.R. 10128	School construction
9	1961,4	H.R. 6028	Housing
10	1961,6	H.R. 8890	Emergency educational aid
11	1962,1	H. Res. 530	Creation of Department of Urban Affairs and Housing
12	1964,3	H.R. 3881	Urban mass transportation
13	1964,5	S. 2642	Economic opportunity (antipoverty) act
14	1965,3	H.R. 2362	Aid to elementary and secondary education
15	1965,5	H.R. 6675	Medicaid for welfare recipients
16	1965,8	H.R. 6927	Creation of Department of Housing and Urban Development
17	1965,9	H.R. 7984	Public housing and urban renewal
18	1965,10	H.R. 11588	Rent supplements appropriations
19	1965,12	H.R. 8283	Economic opportunity
20	1966,2	H.R. 14012	Rent supplements appropriations
21	1966,9	H.R. 15111	Economic opportunity
22	1966,11	S. 3708	Model cities
23	1967,3	H.R. 9960	Rent supplements appropriations
24	1967,4	H.R. 9960	Model cities appropriations

[31] Space did not permit taking into account in the analysis the factor of suburban diversities. It should be noted, however, that not all suburbs are problem-free white, upper middle class residential havens. Some suburbs—especially those that are older and closest to central cities—are already experiencing increases in crime, poverty, physical deterioration, and ghettoization. Members of Congress from constituencies that include such suburban areas may, therefore, turn out to be a source of long-term support even for programs aimed at alleviating the pathologies associated with slum poverty.

* I thank Bruce Feld, Gerald Finch, Jeffrey Pressman, Douglas Price, and Robert Reischauer for constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article.

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Urban Key Vote	*CQ Key Vote, Year and Number*	*Bill Number*	*Legislative Purpose*
25	1967,7	H.R. 11000	Rat control and extermination
26	1967,8	H.R. 5037	Law enforcement assistance
27	1967,12	H.R. 2388	Economic opportunity
28	1968,7	H.R. 18027	OEO appropriations
29	1968,11	S. 3497	Low-income housing
30	1969,3	H.R. 13111	Elementary and secondary education appropriations
31	1969,10	H.R. 12321	Economic opportunity
32	1970,1	H.R. 13111	Labor, HEW, and OEO appropriations
33	1970,5	H.R. 11102	Hospital construction
34	1970,9	H.R. 16916	Education appropriations
35	1970,10	H.R. 17548	HUD appropriations
36	1971,3	H.R. 7016	Education appropriations
37	1972,4	H.R. 14370	General revenue-sharing
38	1972,7	H.R. 15417	Labor-HEW appropriations
39	1972,12	S. 2770	Water pollution control
40	1973,8	H.R. 6452	Urban mass transit
41	1973,10	H.R. 8870	Labor-HEW appropriations
42	1974,10	S. 3066	Housing and community development
43	1974,11	H.R. 12859	Urban mass transit
44	1974,15	H.R. 16596	Public service jobs

Senate

Urban Key Vote	*CQ Key Vote, Year and Number*	*Bill Number*	*Legislative Purpose*
1	1948,2	S. 866	Low rent housing
2	1948,4	S. 472	Educational financing
3	1949,2	S. 1070	Public housing and urban development
4	1955,4	S. 2126	Public housing
5	1960,1	S. 8	School construction and salaries
6	1961,3	S. 1021	Schools and teachers' salaries
7	1961,4	S. 1922	Expanded housing programs
8	1963,2	S. 6	Urban mass transit
9	1963,3	S. 1	Youth employment
10	1963,5	S. 1321	National service corps
11	1964,4	S. 2642	Economic opportunity
12	1965,3	H.R. 2362	Elementary and secondary education
13	1965,10	H.R. 6675	Medicaid for welfare recipients
14	1965,11	S. 2212	Rent supplements
15	1965,13	H.R. 8283	Economic opportunity appropriations
16	1966,3	H.R. 14012	Rent supplements appropriations
17	1966,8	S. 3708	Model cities
18	1967,9	H.R. 9960	Rent supplements
19	1968,8	S. 3497	Housing and urban development
20	1968,11	H.R. 18037	Economic opportunity appropriations

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Urban Key Vote	*CQ Key Vote, Year and Number*	*Bill Number*	*Legislative Purpose*
21	1970,7	H.R. 17912	Food stamps appropriations
22	1971,5	S. 575	Public works jobs
23	1971,14	S. 2007	Day-care program
24	1972,11	H.R. 14370	General revenue-sharing formula
25	1972,14	S. 3939	Rail transportation
26	1973,2	S. 502	Bus and subway construction
27	1974,4	S. 1539	Aid to schools formula
28	1974,14	H.R. 14449	Economic opportunity funding

SOURCE: Full details on each of these votes can be found in *Congress and the Nation*, Vol. I (1945–1964) (Washington, D. C., 1965), "Key Votes," pp. 38a–97a; ibid., Vol. II (1965–1968) (Washington, D. C., 1969), "Key Votes," pp. 5a–41a; ibid., Vol. III (1969–1972) (Washington, D. C., 1973), "Key Votes," pp. 5a–47a; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1973 (Washington, D. C., 1974), pp. 929–941; ibid., 1974 (Washington, D. C., 1975), pp. 973–985.

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Understanding Central City Hardship

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There is a danger that the current, and justifiable, preoccupation with New York City finances by observers of the urban scene will cause them to overgeneralize. New York's fiscal ills have been chronicled in depth and classified in full. But New York's problems are not those of every city. For urban policy makers, the cardinal fact about United States cities is that they are different. The analysis in this article is part of an ongoing examination of the problems and conditions of local governments in the nation's largest metropolitan areas. We have focused here on central cities. Our primary interest is in two characteristics of these governments: (1) the seriousness of the social and economic problems which they face, and (2) the extent of what might be called their political isolation as indicated by the population size of central cities in relation to the population of the metropolitan area of which they are a part.

Such analysis is important as an indication of both the extent of, and need for, fiscal and political arrangements for burden spreading in metropolitan areas. If a particular central city is nearly as well or better off than its suburbs, techniques to spread burdens within that metropolitan area will be less essential than in cases where the central city faces significant economic and social hardship relative to its suburbs and where it accounts for a relatively small proportion of the total population of its metropolitan area. The latter cases are the ones we need to look at most closely in seeking relief measures for central cities.

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Many strategies are available to relieve central city hardship. At the local level, burden spreading can be achieved by consolidation; annexation; setting up special districts to provide services on a regional basis; revenue sharing within a region as under the new Minneapolis-St. Paul plan; and various other forms of interlocal cooperation.

States governments, too, can bring about burden spreading within metropolitan regions. They can authorize commuter taxes; equalize fiscal capacity and service levels through state financial aid to local governments (both general support and specific grants for welfare, education, and other local functions); directly assume certain functions; require regional action; expand county responsibilities; or in some cases facilitate (even mandate) consolidation or annexation measures.

The federal government can also help to equalize fiscal conditions within metropolitan areas as a result of the way its fiscal subventions are allocated; or, like the states, it too can require intergovernmental arrangements at the regional level for particular functions, such as transportation and health services. In addition, the federal government, as it has in recent years, can encourage the establishment of general regional planning and coordinating mechanisms as vehicles for helping to achieve greater burden sharing between central city and suburban jurisdictions.

We do not in this article draw conclusions as to where burden-spreading techniques should be adopted or which ones will work best. The aim so far has been to examine the conditions of local governments in metropolitan areas in order to identify those areas which, because of central city hardship conditions, need to be looked at most closely to assess new and existing techniques to spread burdens and equalize fiscal conditions.

Intrametropolitan Area Comparisons

Intercity comparisons of the severity of social and economic problems such as unemployment, poverty, and crowded housing, can be made in either of two ways. The most common approach measures conditions for individual cities compared with each other, ranking the cities by levels of distress for the measures considered. Another approach, however, is called for if one is concerned with the implications of social and economic problems for the governance of individual urban centers, and particularly the ability of city governments to do something about such problems.

Geographically dispersed central cities compete with one another only in a rather remote and long-term sense. In the short haul, each of them is much more intensively affected by whatever differences may exist in the severity of social and economic problems within its own boundaries in relation to its adjacent suburbs. In this context, what are needed are comparative data on the social and economic hardship of the central city in relation to its own surrounding suburban areas. Where the city-to-suburb hardship ratio is high and no structural measures

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have been adopted to spread this burden, flight to the suburbs can be expected to accelerate and urban crisis conditions will deepen.

How do the nation's largest central cities rank in these terms? Which of them are the worst off as compared with their suburbs for various economic and social indicators? In the metropolitan areas where the central city is most disadvantaged relative to its suburbs, is the central city also isolated in terms of its relative size and its governmental structure? In an effort to answer these questions, we shall deal with the most populous city in fifty-five of the nation's sixty-six largest metropolitan areas. These are standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's) that in 1970 had populations of over 500,000, as geographically defined in 1972.[1] A composite index was developed, which expresses the city-suburban relationship for six measures available from the 1970 census:

1. Unemployment (percent of civilian labor force unemployed)
2. Dependency (persons less than eighteen or over sixty-four years of age as a percent of total population)
3. Education (percent of persons twenty-five years of age or more with less than twelfth-grade education)
4. Income level (per capita income)
5. Crowded housing (percent of occupied housing units with more than one person per room)
6. Poverty (percent of families below 125 percent of low-income level)

City-suburban ratios were calculated for each measure. For per capita income level, where a higher amount is a "desirable" characteristic, the suburban amount in each instance was divided by the city-area amount. For each of the other five items, involving "undesirable" characteristics, the city-area value was divided by the suburban value.

The resulting ratios were standardized to give equal weight to each of these comparative measures. These standardized ratios were then summed to derive a set of composite index numbers which in turn were adjusted to a base level of 100.[2] Accordingly, a hardship index figure of over 100 in Table 1, column A, denotes that the primary central city is disadvantaged in relation to the balance of its SMSA: the higher the figure the greater the disadvantage. A figure under 100 denotes that, on balance, the central city is better off than its suburbs in terms of these six measures.[3]

[1] Eleven SMSA's over 500,000 were omitted from this analysis for the following reasons: (1) Washington, D. C., because of its uniqueness as a combined state and local government; (2) Honolulu and Jacksonville, because their consolidated city-county governments comprise entire SMSA's; (3) San Antonio, Memphis, and Nashville because the population of the central city is more than three-quarters of that of the SMSA; and (4) five other areas where the most populous central city has less than 18 percent of the total SMSA population—Albany-Schenectady-Troy, Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove, New Brunswick-Perth Amboy-Sayerville, Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, and Riverside-San Bernadino-Ontario.

[2] The Appendix to this article explains the standardization process used.

[3] Although the term, "hardship index," is used because we are interested in identifying

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As shown in Table 1, some comparative disadvantage is indicated for three-fourths of the fifty-five cities examined. For more than one-fourth of them, an index of 200 or more appears, denoting especially marked city-suburban divergences. Near the top of the list are four of the six cities with more than 1 million population: Chicago, New York, Detroit, and Philadelphia. Index figures for the other two, Los Angeles and Houston, indicate substantial equality between the central city and suburban territory. Almost all of the relatively most disadvantaged central cities are located in the northeastern and north central regions. Conversely, most of the cities which in terms of this comparative index are better off than the balance of their respective metropolitan areas are in the South and West.

Use of the Hardship Index

The hardship index as constructed here is one among many approaches that could be used to classify central city problems and conditions in relation to the rest of their metropolitan area. The specific indicators used could be modified. However, because it is reasonable to expect that these variables are correlated with other variables that might have been used, we believe the rankings presented here would generalize to other sets of indicators. It should also be noted that these rankings of the disparities between central cities and their suburbs are derived from norm-based criteria. That is, cities and suburbs rank high and low relative to other cities and suburbs, and not according to some absolute standard.

It should be noted that eight of the eighteen central cities listed in Table 1 which show up most favorably are in metropolitan areas defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget as having more than one central city.[4] Of the forty other cities listed, only three (Minneapolis, Springfield, and Gary) are in SMSA's with more than a single central city.

Findings Summarized

Examining the data presented in Table 1, a number of summary observations can be made:

1. The most important point that emerges is that the relatively greater disadvantaged central cities are concentrated among older cities in the northeastern and north central regions. In these two regions we find the most serious cases of city boundaries established in the late nineteenth century that at the time reflected the extent of urban settlement but now encase only the poverty-impacted core of a metropolitan area. Conversely, most of the central cities, which in terms

problem cases, cities and suburbs which rank well on the six indicators in this analysis should not be considered as being in the hardship category.

[4] Greensboro, Ft. Lauderdale, Seattle, Norfolk, Allentown, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Tampa.

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TABLE 1

Index of Central-City Hardship Relative to Balance of SMSA and Selected Population Data for Fifty-five of the Sixty-six Largest SMSA's

Primary Central City of SMSA	Central City Hardship Index[a] (A)	Number of County Areas in SMSA[b] (B)	SMSA Population, 1970 Total (000) (C)	Percent Central City (D)	Percent Central County (E)	Region[f] (F)
Newark	422	3	1,857	20.6	50.1	NE
Cleveland	331	4	2,064	36.4	83.4	NC
Hartford	317	c	664	23.8	[e]	NE
Baltimore	256	6	2,071	43.7	43.7[d]	NE
Chicago	245	6	6,975	48.2	78.7	NC
St. Louis	231	7	2,363	26.3	26.3[d]	NC
Atlanta	226	5	1,390	35.8	43.7	S
Rochester	215	4	883	33.6	80.7	NE
Gary	213	2	633	27.7	86.2	NC
Dayton	211	4	850	28.6	71.3	NC
New York	211	5	11,572	68.2	68.2[d]	NE
Detroit	210	3	4,200	36.0	63.5	NC
Richmond	209	4	518	48.2	48.2[d]	S
Philadelphia	205	8	4,818	40.4	40.4[d]	NE
Boston	198	c	2,754	23.3	26.7[e]	NE
Milwaukee	195	4	1,404	51.1	75.1	NC
Buffalo	189	2	1,349	34.3	82.5	NE
San Jose	181	1	1,065	41.9	100.0	W
Youngstown	180	2	536	26.1	56.6	NC
Columbus, Ohio	173	3	916	58.9	90.9	NC
Miami	172	1	1,268	26.4	100.0	S
New Orleans	168	4	1,046	56.7	56.7[d]	S
Louisville	165	3	827	43.7	84.1	S
Akron	152	2	679	40.5	81.5	NC
Kansas City, Mo.	152	6	1,254	40.5	52.2	NC
Springfield, Mass.	152	c	530	30.9	86.6[e]	NE
Ft. Worth	149	2	762	51.6	94.0	S
Cincinnati	148	7	1,385	32.7	66.7	NC
Pittsburgh	146	4	2,401	21.7	66.8	NE
Denver	143	5	1,228	41.9	41.9[d]	W
Sacramento	135	3	801	31.8	78.9	W
Minneapolis	131	5	1,814	24.0	52.9	NC
Birmingham	131	3	739	40.7	87.2	S
Jersey City	129	1	609	42.8	100.0	NE
Oklahoma City	128	3	641	57.2	82.2	S
Indianapolis	124	8	1,110	67.1	71.8[d]	NC
Providence	121	c	913	19.6	63.6[e]	NE
Grand Rapids	119	2	539	36.6	76.2	NC

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TABLE 1 (Continued)

Index of Central-City Hardship Relative to Balance of SMSA and Selected Population Data for Fifty-five of the Sixty-six Largest SMSA's

Primary Central City of SMSA	Central City Hardship Index[a] (A)	Number of County Areas in SMSA[b] (B)	SMSA Population, 1970			
			Total (000) (C)	Percent Central City (D)	Percent Central County (E)	Region[f] (F)
Toledo	116	3	693	55.4	69.9	NC
Tampa	107	2	1,013	27.4	48.4	S
Los Angeles	105	1	7,036	40.0	100.0	W
San Francisco	105	5	3,110	23.0	23.0[d]	W
Syracuse	103	3	637	31.0	74.3	NE
Allentown	100	3	544	20.1	47.0	NE
Portland, Oreg.	100	4	1,009	37.8	55.2	W
Omaha	98	3	540	64.3	72.1	NC
Dallas	97	6	1,556	54.3	85.3	S
Houston	93	5	1,985	62.1	87.8	S
Phoenix	85	1	968	60.1	100.0	W
Norfolk	82	4	681	45.2	45.2[d]	S
Salt Lake City	80	2	558	31.5	82.2	W
San Diego	77	1	1,358	51.3	100.0	W
Seattle	67	2	1,422	37.3	81.3	W
Ft. Lauderdale	64	1	620	22.5	100.0	S
Greensboro, N.C.	43	4	604	23.9	47.8	S

SOURCES: Central city disadvantage index calculated from data in U. S. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1972* (Washington, D.C., 1972), tables 2, 3, and 6; county areas and population from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1972 Census of Governments*, Vol. 1, Governmental Organization (Washington, D.C., 1972), table 19.

[a] See definition in text.

[b] Including city-counties.

[c] New England SMSA, comprising city and township areas, rather than entire counties.

[d] City-county.

[e] For New England SMSA's, the central county population figures are based on the following county areas: Boston, Sulfolk County; Springfield, Hampden County; Providence, Providence County. In the case of the Hartford SMSA, the associated county area extends over more than one SMSA and the county population information was, therefore, not used.

[f] The Northeast includes all of the New England states plus New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. The north central region includes Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas. The South includes Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. The West includes Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, and California.

of this comparative hardship index are better off than the balance of their respective metropolitan areas, are located in the South or West.

2. In approximately half of these fifty-five SMSA's, the central city accounts

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for 40 percent or more of the population of the SMSA, which suggests that the citizens of these units can have an important electoral influence on matters of areawide concern, especially where there is an overlying county government which finances significant services.

3. Counties, as would be expected, have broader jurisdictions than cities. Only three of what the Census Bureau classifies as the central county account for less than 40 percent of the population of the SMSA. Thus, for both types of jurisdictions (central cities and central counties) these figures suggest that central city isolation is perhaps not as severe as the frequent stereotype.

4. Besides New York, five other cities in the top two quintiles are combined city-counties. There are altogether ten such combined city-counties in the table.[5] Among these units without an overlying county, San Francisco and St. Louis stand out as having the smallest share of the total SMSA population, 23.0 and 26.3 percent respectively.

5. Six SMSA's of over 1 million population are above 200 on the composite index and at the same time account for less than 40 percent of their SMSA population. They are Newark, Cleveland, St. Louis, Detroit, Atlanta, and Philadelphia. These are the most serious problem cases. All but Atlanta among these six central cities lost population from 1960 to 1970.

6. At the other end of the spectrum, five SMSA's of over 1 million population are 100 and under on the composite index—Seattle; San Diego; Houston; Dallas; and Portland, Oregon.

7. The top three cities in the table—Newark, Cleveland, and Hartford—show up clearly as problem cases in that, besides their hardship ranking, the central city in every case accounts for less than 40 percent of the area's population, which would be expected to weaken their influence in dealing with matters of areawide concern.

Intermetropolitan Area Comparisons

The final point in this summary of findings raises an important issue. In terms of intrametropolitan disparities in hardship, Newark, Cleveland, and Hartford rank highest. Yet urban experts whose expertise is based on the Tocqueville method of knowing something firsthand about different metropolitan areas will quickly point out that although Hartford does indeed have problems, the city does not face as deep and serious a condition of urban blight as Newark or Cleveland. There is no question but that this is true. A big part of the reason that Hartford ranks third on the hardship index is that its suburbs are relatively well off.

To generalize from the Hartford case, because the composite index is constructed as a ratio of central city to suburban hardship, there are a variety of

[5] Three consolidated city-counties of over 500,000 population—Honolulu, Jacksonville, and Nashville—are eliminated from this analysis as they comprise all or nearly all the population of their SMSA.

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possible situations that can explain the ranking of a particular central city. For example, city "A" might rank high, although not at the top, in the composite index because it is extremely hard-pressed while its adjoining suburbs face only moderate distress. Alternatively, city "B," as in the case of Hartford, could have considerably less central city distress but much wealthier suburbs and end up with the same, or close to the same, composite index as city "A."

The Use of Separate Indexes for Cities and Suburbs

To study these kinds of differences which underlie the hardship index in Table 1, two separate indexes (similar to the composite index presented in Table 1) were constructed, one for central cities and the other for suburbs. These two indexes provide a basis for comparing central cities to one another and for comparing suburbs to other suburbs, thus enabling us to analyze the *reasons* for the rankings shown in Table 1.

A major problem encountered in any effort to make intercity and intersuburb comparisons is the necessity to account for regional cost-of-living differences. Because of such differences, adjustments had to be made in both of the income-related variables in the hardship index.[6] These adjustments are based on the indexes of family budgets compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.[7] Constructed for various family structures and consumption standards, these BLS indexes reflect differences in the size of the budget necessary to achieve a specific standard of living in forty urban areas in the United States. These budget size differences among urban areas reflect both differences in the quantities of goods and services needed to achieve a specific consumption standard and differences in the cost of these items. The most recent compilation is for autumn 1973.

The cities and suburbs are ranked in Table 2 in descending order according to their level of relative hardship as measured by the two interarea indexes. As noted earlier, the data sources and the standardization procedure used to construct the intercity and intersuburb indexes are the same as those used to construct the intra-SMSA index. Unlike the intra-SMSA index, however, the values were not normalized to a base of 100, hence, the difference in numerical formats.

Three Basic Combinations

Having compiled these intercity and intersuburb indexes, it is possible to compare the relative national rankings of the central city and its suburbs both *within*

[6] In the case of the composite index as previously described, such adjustments were not made on the assumption that, while cost-of-living differences may exist between cities and suburbs, the nature of those differences would be reasonably uniform throughout the country.

[7] See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Handbook of Labor Statistics* 1975-Reference Edition (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 14–15 and Tables 141–154. The way in which the BLS budget indexes were used to adjust the two income variables included in the interarea indexes is explained in the Appendix.

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TABLE 2

Interarea Hardship Indexes Comparing Cities to Cities and Suburbs to Suburbs

Intercity Hardship Index		*Intersuburb Hardship Index*	
City	*Hardship Index*	*Suburb*	*Hardship Index*
Newark	85.5	Birmingham	53.2
St. Louis	75.5	New Orleans	50.8
New Orleans	72.6	Salt Lake City	50.0
Gary	70.0	Jersey City	48.9
Miami	62.5	Tampa	47.6
Birmingham	61.8	Norfolk	46.3
Youngstown	60.3	Greensboro, N.C.	46.2
Baltimore	60.0	Phoenix	46.0
Cleveland	59.6	Providence	45.5
Detroit	58.6	Grand Rapids	45.3
Buffalo	57.2	Cincinnati	42.4
Jersey City	56.6	Gary	42.1
Hartford	56.2	Sacramento	40.8
Louisville	55.9	Houston	40.3
Cincinnati	53.5	Omaha	39.8
Providence	52.7	St. Louis	39.7
Springfield, Mass.	52.0	Youngstown	39.4
Tampa	50.9	Syracuse	39.4
Sacramento	50.4	Springfield, Mass.	39.2
Grand Rapids	50.3	Louisville	39.0
Atlanta	50.1	San Diego	38.4
Philadelphia	50.0	Indianapolis	37.3
Chicago	49.3	Toledo	37.1
Pittsburgh	47.1	Miami	36.9
Dayton	46.9	Portland, Oreg.	36.1
Rochester	46.3	Seattle	36.0
Richmond	46.2	Buffalo	35.4
Boston	45.8	Pittsburgh	35.1
New York	45.3	Ft. Lauderdale	34.0
Akron	43.4	Los Angeles	33.9
Norfolk	43.4	Dallas	33.4
Ft. Worth	42.8	Detroit	31.3
Milwaukee	42.2	Akron	31.2
San Jose	41.9	Ft. Worth	30.3
Toledo	41.4	Allentown	29.8
Syracuse	40.8	Oklahoma City	28.9
Indianapolis	40.3	Kansas City, Mo.	26.9
Phoenix	40.1	Philadelphia	25.9
Kansas City, Mo.	38.9	San Francisco	25.7
Houston	38.2	Minneapolis	25.5
Los Angeles	37.9	Boston	25.3
Portland, Oreg.	37.7	Richmond	24.9
Salt Lake City	37.6	Milwaukee	24.5
Oklahoma City	35.5	Baltimore	24.3

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TABLE 2 (Continued)

Interarea Hardship Indexes Comparing Cities to Cities and Suburbs to Suburbs

Intercity Hardship Index		*Intersuburb Hardship Index*	
City	*Hardship Index*	*Suburb*	*Hardship Index*
Omaha	35.3	New York	22.3
Columbus, Ohio	34.9	Rochester	22.3
San Diego	33.2	Dayton	22.1
Dallas	32.6	Denver	22.0
Denver	30.0	San Jose	21.5
Allentown	29.1	Atlanta	21.0
Minneapolis	28.9	Chicago	20.5
San Francisco	28.8	Newark	20.0
Seattle	28.5	Columbus, Ohio	19.5
Greensboro, N.C.	28.2	Hartford	18.3
Ft. Lauderdale	24.0	Cleveland	15.5

SOURCE: Calculated from data in U. S. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1972.*
NOTES:
1. Cities and suburbs are ranked in descending order according to the level of relative hardship measured by the hardship indexes.
2. Suburb population is defined as the difference between the SMSA population and the population of the SMSA primary central city.
3. The data sources and standardization procedure used to construct the intercity and intersuburb indexes are the same as those used to construct the intra-SMSA hardship index. See the Appendix for a discussion. The refinements made to the two income variables in order to reduce the effects of regional cost-of-living differences are also explained in the Appendix.

SMSA's and *among* SMSA's. From here on, we distinguish between the *intra-SMSA* index as shown in Table 1 and the two separate *interarea* indexes for cities and suburbs. In Table 3, the fifty-five SMSA's are arrayed according to three types of relationship between the two interarea indexes. The first relationship (Type 1, *Significant Disparity)* includes cases in which either the central city or its suburbs ranks in the second or first quintile on the interarea hardship index, and where there is a difference of two quintile groups or more between the rankings of the central city and its suburbs on the two interarea indexes. The second combination (Type 2, *Both High*) includes cases in which both the central city and its suburbs rank near the top (having the worst conditions) on the two interarea indexes. The third combination (Type 3, *Both Middle Quintile or Below*) includes cases in which both the central city and its suburbs rank in the middle or below on the two indexes.

Type 1: Significant Disparity

Altogether, there are eighteen Type 1 cases. Nine are SMSA's where the central city is in the second or first quintile (most adverse) on the intercity index. Seven of these nine SMSA's are above 200 on the composite index. These are the most

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TABLE 3

Quintile Rankings of Cities and Suburbs on the Individual Central City and Suburban Hardship Indexes[a]

	Type 1[b]			*Type 2*[c]			*Type 3*[d]		
Group 1	*SMSA*	*City*	*Sub-urb*	*SMSA*	*City*	*Sub-urb*	*SMSA*	*City*	*Sub-urb*
Central cities scoring 200 or more on the intra-SMSA index	Newark	1	5	St. Louis	1	2	Chicago	3	5
	Cleveland	1	5	Gary	1	2	Rochester	3	5
	Baltimore	1	4				Dayton	3	5
	Hartford	2	5				New York	3	5
	Atlanta	2	5				Richmond	3	4
	Philadelphia	2	4						
	Detroit	1	3						
	Type 1[b]			*Type 2*[c]			*Type 3*[d]		
Group 2	*SMSA*	*City*	*Sub-urb*	*SMSA*	*City*	*Sub-urb*	*SMSA*	*City*	*Sub-urb*
Central cities scoring between 100 and 200 on the intra-SMSA index	Buffalo	1	3	Birmingham	1	1	Akron	3	3
	Miami	1	3	New Orleans	1	1	Pittsburgh	3	3
	Indianapolis	4	2	Youngstown	1	2	Boston	3	4
	Syracuse	4	2	Cincinnati	2	1	Ft. Worth	3	4
				Grand Rapids	2	1	Milwaukee	3	4
				Jersey City	2	1	Los Angeles	4	3
				Providence	2	1	Toledo	4	3
				Tampa	2	1	Kansas City, Mo.	4	4
				Louisville	2	2	Oklahoma City	4	4
				Sacramento	2	2	San Jose	4	5
				Springfield, Mass.	2	2	Minneapolis	5	4
							San Francisco	5	4
							Columbus, Ohio	5	5
							Denver	5	5
	Type 1[b]						*Type 3*[d]		
Group 3	*SMSA*	*City*	*Sub-urb*				*SMSA*	*City*	*Sub-urb*
Central cities scoring 100 or less on the intra-SMSA index	Greensboro, N.C.	5	1				Portland, Oreg.	4	3
	Phoenix	4	1				Dallas	5	3
	Salt Lake City	4	1				Ft. Lauderdale	5	3
	Omaha	5	2				Seattle	5	3
	San Diego	5	2				Allentown	5	4
	Houston	4	2						
	Norfolk	3	1						

[a] Rankings are on the basis of the quintile in which each city and suburb fell in the respective intercity and intersuburb hardship indexes. Cities and suburbs coded 1 are in the top quintile, evidencing the highest degree of social and economic hardship.

[b] Type 1 cases are characterized as "Significant Disparity." Either the central city or its suburbs ranked in the second or first quintile of the interarea hardship index, and there was a difference

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serious hardship cases in that both current social and economic conditions and the dynamics of growth in these regions are highly adverse for the central city. As indicated earlier, it is in these metropolitan areas that flight to the suburbs is likely to be exacerbated as out-migration from the central city causes a further deterioration in the social and economic conditions of the central city.

There are also nine Type 1 cases where the opposite occurs—relatively poor suburban areas adjoining relatively much better-off central cities. Two of these SMSA's (Indianapolis and Syracuse)[8] nevertheless scored above 100 on the intra-SMSA index. This can be explained by the fact that for the overall sample, suburbs on average evidenced a lower level of hardship conditions than cities. In the cases of Indianapolis and Syracuse, this served to offset the differences in city and suburban rankings reflected in the intercity and intersuburb indexes.

In terms of the dynamics of central city hardship, the seven Type 1 central cities scoring 100 or less on the intra-SMSA index can be said to be the best off central cities of those analyzed. Greensboro, North Carolina, heads this group with the lowest rating (43) on the intra-SMSA index. Its central city is in the bottom quintile among central cities and its suburbs (which include substantial rural area) are in the top quintile on the intersuburb index. Two of the seven SMSA's in this group—Houston and San Diego—are over 1 million poulation.

Type 2: Both High

The most interesting findings for the interarea comparisons pertain to what we have classified as Type 2 cases. Table 3 contains thirteen SMSA's where both the city and its suburbs are in the second or first quintiles of their respective interarea hardship indexes. These are cases of central cities, characterized by relatively extreme hardship conditions, adjoining suburbs with similar characteristics. Because of these similarities, the intra-SMSA index tends to understate, and even conceal, central city hardship. In eleven of these cases, a score of under 200 is registered on the intra-SMSA hardship index. Two of these SMSA's, Birmingham and New Orleans, have both their central city and suburban area in the top quintile of the intercity and intersuburb indexes. Even though the problems caused by city-suburban disparities would appear to be less serious in these cases, the fact of central city hardship remains.

The two Type 2 cases scoring above 200 on the intra-SMSA index are St. Louis

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of two quintiles or more between the rankings of the central city and its suburbs on the two interarea indexes.

[c] Type 2 cases are characterized as "Both High." Both the central city and its suburbs ranked in either the second or first quintile of the interarea hardship indexes, implying a relatively high level of hardship for both areas.

[d] Type 3 cases are characterized as "Both Middle Quintile or Below." Both the central city and its suburbs ranked relatively well on the interarea hardship indexes, each falling in either the third, fourth, or fifth quintile.

[8] The Indianapolis data here are postconsolidation. The central city, as shown in Table 1, accounts for 67.1 percent of the SMSA population.

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and Gary. In effect, while both city and suburb rank very poorly in their respective interarea indexes in these two cases, the extent of the hardship evidenced by the city dominates.

The thirteen Type 2 cases, with three exceptions, tie in closely to the generalization made earlier that problem cases tend to be located in the northeastern and north central regions. The three exceptions are Sacramento, Birmingham, and New Orleans.

Type 3: Both Middle Quintile or Below

There are twenty-four Type 3 SMSA's, where both the central city and its suburbs are in the middle quintile or below on the two interarea indexes. This does not mean that disparities are absent. To the contrary, five of the SMSA's in this group are 200 or above on the intra-SMSA index, including New York and Chicago. These two SMSA's, plus Dayton and Rochester, have central cities in the middle quintile on the intercity index and suburbs in the bottom quintile on the intersuburb index. We would expect their central city hardship to be less severe than that of Newark and Cleveland, yet the fact and dynamics of disparity exist in all four cases.

Fourteen Type 3 cases scored between 100 and 200 on the intra-SMSA index. Among these, Boston is the standout case, scoring 198 on the intra-SMSA index. Its central city is in the third quintile on the intercity index and its suburbs are in the fourth quintile on the intersuburban index. Milwaukee is a close second on this basis, scoring 195 on the intra-SMSA index.

Summary Observations

It is difficult to draw a sharp line between cases with and those without high levels of hardship. Clearly in the hardship group are the seven Type 1 (*Significant Disparity*) cases scoring above 200 on the intra-SMSA index. Buffalo and Miami probably should be added to this group. For these nine cases, the existence of a relatively high level of hardship is shown by the intercity index, and at the same time the dynamics of disparities as revealed by the intra-SMSA index signal a potential worsening of the central city hardship level over time.

All of the Type 2 (*Both High*) case central cities evidence a high degree of relative hardship when compared to other central cities. However, because their adjoining suburbs evidence similarly high levels of hardship, the dynamics of hardship are less clear for these cases.

The five Type 3 (*Both Middle Quintile or Below*) cases scoring over 200 on the intra-SMSA index, and to a lesser extent Boston and Milwaukee, evidence significant hardship disparities between the central city and its adjoining suburbs. While the level of relative hardship revealed by the intercity index may be characterized as moderate, the dynamics of hardship revealed by the intra-SMSA index are nevertheless unfavorable for these seven cases.

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The net result is that well over half of the central cities in the SMSA's included in this analysis (in fact, twenty-nine cases) appear to face some measure of relative hardship.

Moreover, from the population data provided in Table 1 it can be observed that the twenty-nine central cities included in the hardship group are politically more isolated than the remaining twenty-six central cities studied. Only ten of the twenty-nine hardship cities, or approximately 35 percent, account for 40 percent or more of their SMSA total population. This compares to sixteen out of twenty-six, or 62 percent of the other cities studied. On average, the percent of SMSA population accounted for by the central city is 35.9 percent for the hardship group versus 42.5 percent for the others.

It should be reiterated that the term "hardship" does denote only relative hardship as revealed by comparative data. Furthermore, comparisons among areas on the basis of a specific set of hardship indicators as presented here do not necessarily reflect differences in actual levels of distress. The performance of city government and the roles played by adjoining local governments, regional organizations, and state governments all have a bearing on how well specific "hardship" situations are handled. Two cities or suburbs which rank closely in the interarea hardship index may exhibit significant differences in terms of the actual level of distress resulting from these conditions.

Concluding Comments

At the height of the New York City fiscal crisis, it was important to point out, as these data show, that a number of central cities face much more serious social and economic problems than New York. This distinction between social, economic, and fiscal distress is an important one. Newark, New Jersey, ranks highest in social and economic distress, both in relation to its adjoining suburbs and to the other cities included in our analysis, yet Newark has a reputation for conservative fiscal practices.

To a significant degree, the social and economic hardship conditions of central cities which we have focused on in this article are a function of governmental structure. Ofen regarded as a dull subject and relegated to the academic sidelines, the examination of governmental structure in relation to economic and social conditions is essential for understanding and dealing with urban needs. There are, in fact, increasing signs that the issue of whether the national government should intervene in matters of local structure will become the central question of domestic policy in the next decade. Reasons why this debate is likely to intensify are not hard to find. Unless the federal government intervenes in some way in structural matters, it is hard to see how national policy can on an equitable basis, and on a significant scale, deal with the social and economic problems of central cities. Federal grant policy, assuming for the moment that a sizable amount of new resources was available, may not be a good instrument for aiding central cities on any kind of a general basis.

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The major barrier to federal action in this area is the dilemma of rewarding laggards. In relation to the kinds of reforms advocated for decades by "good-government" groups (consolidation, annexation, and various other plans for regional cooperation), a program aiding the central cities that are the worst off would in many cases be detrimental to precisely those metropolitan regions which have done the most on their own to reform their governmental structure. Hence, the question arises: If Jacksonville or Indianapolis *de*consolidated and separately incorporated their poverty-impacted core area, would they be able to receive aid, or more aid, under a special federal program of grants to poverty-impacted core cities? The nature of American federalism, with so many different governmental constellations, greatly complicates the task of designing a federal policy to deal directly with cities on a generalized basis. Since our purpose is descriptive, not prescriptive, we leave open the question of whether there should be a new federal aid policy, or any other kind of policy, to aid central cities facing serious social and economic hardship conditions.*

Methodological Appendix

Table 1

The ratios in column A, Table 1 have been standardized to avoid giving undue weight to any of the six characteristics. This was done by assigning a value of 100 to the range of variation in each of the six sets of ratios. For instance, for the crowded-housing ratio, the highest and lowest cities are: Newark, 3.40, and Salt Lake City, 0.52. A value of 100 was assigned to 3.40 and a value of 0 to 0.52. The ratios in between these two are assigned values from 0 to 100 using the following formula:

$$X = \left(\frac{Y - Y_{min}}{Y_{max} - Y_{min}}\right) 100$$

where: X = standardized ratio to be created
Y = ratios calculated from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1972*, tables 3 and 6
Y_{max} = maximum value of Y
Y_{min} = minimum value of Y

To continue with the Newark example: its six separate standardized ratios were calculated with the above formula; the ratios were then summed and the total divided by 6. This yielded the figure of 94.8. (If Newark had scored the highest on all six ratios, this number would have been 100 by definition.) This operation was repeated for all of the cities, ending up with a composite index with values ranging from 94.8 for Newark to 9.6 for Greensboro.

* The authors are indebted to Allen D. Manvel, Robert D. Reischauer, Dan Crippen, and Handy Hevener for invaluable help in developing the framework and originally assembling statistical material presented in this article.

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For purposes of clarity, however, we wished to display the disadvantage index so that cities could be easily identified as to whether they were worse off or better off than their suburbs. To accomplish this, the composite index was adjusted to a base level of 100. The value, 100, would be in this new set the disadvantage index of a city whose statistics are the same as its suburbs. On a standardized basis (from 0 to 100), such a city would score 22.44. (This is the mean of the standardized index obtained for a city with a ratio of 1.00 on each of the six separate measures.) The central-city disadvantage index of Newark thus becomes the ratio of 94.8 to 22.44 (times 100): 422.

Table 2

The adjustment to the per capita income variable is based on the BLS index of annual budgets at the "intermediate level" of living for a four-person urban family. The family unit around which this budget is constructed consists of an employed husband, aged thirty-eight, a wife not employed outside the home, and two children, ages eight and thirteen. The types of consumption reflected in the budget include food, housing, transportation, clothing, and medical care.

This adjustment was made by dividing the income variable for each city by its specific budget index. (For twenty-five of the cities in our sample, direct budget indexes were available from the BLS compilation. For the remaining thirty cities, estimates of budget indexes were made on the basis of proximity to cities included in the BLS compilation.) As a result, cities with a higher than average budget have their per capita income measure reduced; the opposite occurs for cities with a below-average budget. Comparable adjustments were made to the suburban per capita income variable in computing the intersuburb index. (The underlying assumption is that, while differences in city and suburban budget size may exist, differences among suburban areas will correspond closely with differences among cities.)

For the variable percent of families below 125 percent of the low-income level, the BLS index of annual budgets at the "lower level" of living for a four-person urban family was used. There are important differences between the lower and intermediate budget levels in terms of the composition of spending as well as in the level of total spending. For example, families in the lower-level budget group are all assumed to be renters.

Using the lower-level budget index, the percent of low-income families variable was adjusted for both the city and suburban indexes by multiplying that variable by the lower-level budget index. The result was that cities and suburbs in which the lower consumption standard could be financed at relatively less cost had the percent of low-income families variable reduced, whereas for areas where it cost relatively more, an upward adjustment was made to the percent of low-income families variable.

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Is United States Foreign Policy "Imperialist" or "Imperial"?

JEROME SLATER

For most of the postwar period the dominant scholarly consensus on the United States role in international politics closely paralleled the image that policy makers themselves held: the United States was a defensive, status-quo power seeking to contain the revolutionary or simply imperialist expansionism of Soviet-led communism. The dominant critique of United States foreign policy operated well within this framework of assumptions; one common argument was that the United States had a tendency to overreach itself, to undertake commitments that excessively taxed its military and economic capabilities. The focus was on the *limits* of American power; critics never tired of quoting Sir Denis Brogan on "the illusions of American omnipotence."

Radical "Imperialist" Theories

In a remarkably short time, this dominant image of the role the United States has played since World War II has shifted, at first only among radicals, but more recently—and more importantly—among a growing number of mainstream historians and political scientists. Since the early 1960s radical critics have seen the American role as imperialistic rather than defensive: a deliberate, planned, and generally quite successful effort at world domination under the pretext of the "containment" of a largely nonexistent communist military or political threat. The central goal of this domination usually is described in terms of the open-door

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policy—maintaining access on favorable terms to overseas raw materials, markets, and investment outlets for United States private capital. On behalf of the open-door policy the government, acting as an instrument of American corporate interests, has consistently sought to preserve a capitalist status quo around the world, covertly or overtly employing the vast range of power at its disposal to crush all incipient or actual threats. Even the policy makers, it is argued, do not "really" believe the threat to be communism per se—witness the growing normalization of relations with an increasingly status-quo Soviet Union and even China!—but rather revolution, socialism, or even simply nationalism, for truly socialist or nationalist regimes would close off their economies to United States penetration and domination. Radical critics, then, see economic self-aggrandizement at the heart of American imperialism, although some point to the Wilsonian crusading idealist tradition—the mission to bring the blessings of capitalist freedom and democracy to the rest of the world—as a separate but complementary historical force that only serves to deepen and legitimize the American expansionist drive.[1]

Implicitly or explicitly, United States expansionism is seen as analogous in both motivation and consequences to nineteenth-century European colonialism. Outright military invasion and occupation (except as a last resort) is no longer feasible in the era of modern nationalism, countervailing Soviet power, and potential domestic opposition, the argument runs, so neoimperialism has developed new, more subtle methods. Through its vast economic power—the billions of dollars invested in the Third World by American-controlled multinational corporations; United States government control of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, either directly in its bilateral programs or indirectly through its domination of the major international financial institutions; the dependence of Third World countries on American markets for their exports of raw materials and commodities and imports of manufactured goods and modern technology; the centrality of the dollar in the world monetary system, etc.—the United States works to keep the rest of the world conservative, capitalist, and docile. As Harry Magdoff, one of the most influential theorists of neoimperialism puts it: "Colonialism, considered as the direct application of military and political force, was essential to reshape the social and economic institutions of many of the dependent countries to the needs of the metropolitan centres. Once this reshaping had been

[1] See especially William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962); William A. Williams, *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (New York, 1969); and N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics* (New York, 1968). Levin summarizes his argument in this manner: "The needs of America's expanding capitalism were joined ideologically with a more universal vision of American service to suffering humanity and to world stability" (p. 148).

Other radicals point also to bureaucratic expansionism or the irresistible temptations to expansionism inherent in the "Imperial Presidency," but even when the thesis is broadened in these ways the core of the argument remains that of economic self-aggrandizement. See especially Richard J. Barnet, *The Roots of War* (New York, 1972), and Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York, 1974).

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accomplished economic forces—the international price, marketing, and financial systems—were by themselves sufficient to perpetuate and indeed intensify the relationship of dominance. . . ."[2]

In any case, economic power is supplemented by close American ties with conservative local elites, whose own continued status and power is dependent on United States support—the politicians; the bureaucrats; and especially the forces of repression, the military and the police, who are trained, financed, equipped, and frequently led by American "advisors." At a more subtle or insidious level, there is the power of "cultural imperialism," the central role of the United States in the world communications network and mass media, which provides the means to shape popular images and aspirations in ways consistent with the maintenance of world capitalism and United States domination.

If more forceful action is necessary to prevent undesirable change and shore up cooperative client governments, the argument continues, the CIA is always available to provide information, advice, propaganda, subsidies, bribes, weapons, private armies, and a whole repertoire of "dirty tricks," including coups d'etats and/or the murder of particularly stubborn recalcitrants. And if all else fails, direct military action, facilitated by the worldwide network of United States bases and troop deployments, can shore up the empire at its weakest points, as in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Indochina.

Such is the power of neoimperialism, then, that outright colonial occupation and rule is not merely impractical, but it is unnecessary, for the same ends can be attained equally if not even more effectively, precisely because of the more subtle, insidious, unrecognized nature of the new methods of domination and exploitation: "*only imperfect amateurish imperialism needs weapons; professional imperialism is based on structural rather than direct violence.*"[3] Indeed, not only are the methods of neoimperialism more effective, but the scope of its domain is greater than even the most extensive of the territorial empires of the past, for modern imperialism "knows no frontiers," "extends its net over the whole planet"; "the empire is everywhere."[4] So goes the radical, neo-Marxist critique of United States foreign policy.

Nonradical "Imperial" Theories

Somewhat unexpectedly, in the last decade or so important aspects of this radical analysis have been accepted by an increasing number of nonradical, non-Marxist students of United States foreign policy, and even by some conservatives. Though it is not accurate to describe the overall United States world role as *imperialist* or *imperialistic*, they argue, it is accurate to describe it as *imperial*. No analyst thus

[2] In Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London, 1972), p. 164.

[3] Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 2 (1971), p. 91 (italics in original).

[4] Claude Julien, *America's Empire* (New York, 1971), pp. 218, 262.

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far has thoroughly and systematically contrasted the concept of an "imperial" role with an "imperialist" one, but it seems clear that at least four important distinctions usually are implied. First, imperial policies are seen to be primarily a function of the structure of the *international* rather than the *domestic* system, in particular, of course, the absence of international institutions capable of maintaining peace and performing other critical governmental functions. Second, an imperial policy or posture is not fundamentally economic in nature: it is neither motivated by economic gain, nor (as already suggested) is it structurally rooted in any particular socioeconomic system, such as "capitalism." Imperial relationships are concerned with power, either for its own sake or as an instrument of some larger, primarily noneconomic objective, such as "world order." For example, Robert W. Tucker argues that although United States postwar policy was initially motivated by a concern for national security defined in limited, defensive, traditional terms—the containment of Soviet expansionism and the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe—it later became generalized and diffused into the much broader objective of maintaining a world environment congenial to American values and institutions, which in turn required an activist, interventionist projection of American power overseas on a scale that could only be termed imperial.[5]

Third, writers describing the United States as an "imperial" power are usually less inclined (although they are often somewhat ambiguous on the matter) to attribute to policy makers a *conscious intent* to dominate, whatever their motivations, than those preferring the "imperialist" label. That is, the United States may play an imperial *role* without having an imperial *policy*. The focus is primarily on consequences, not intentions or motivations. The root cause of the American imperial role, or, alternatively, a conception of security so broad as to require imperial policies de facto, is simply power itself. *Any* great power in the present world system is irresistibly drawn toward imperial policies, argues Raymond Aron; only weak states with no alternatives adopt a conception of the national interest restricted to mere political survival.[6] In effect, goes the argument, interests and commitments of states naturally and inevitably expand as their power expands.[7]

The final significant distinction is that terms "imperialist" or "imperialistic" are invariably condemnatory and indicative of a radical disaffection with United States foreign policy, whereas this is not necessarily the case for "imperial." In-

[5] For the most complete statement of Tucker's views, see his *Nation or Empire?* (Baltimore, 1968). For a similar view see Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1974).

[6] Aron, *The Imperial Republic.* Other important analysts seeing the United States as playing an unconscious, unintended imperial role include Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston, 1973), and Graham Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1970–71.

[7] For an explicit statement of this position, see Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1971), p. 73.

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deed, if imperial policies are seen as deriving fundamentally from an anarchic international system, the emphasis is far more likely to be on the "responsibilities" than the "abuses" of power. For example, Aron argues that even if the American role in Europe during the postwar period could be accurately described as imperial, it was both right and desired by the people of Western Europe; and relatively conservative writers like George Liska and John Spanier call for a more open, self-conscious, unapologetic imperial role for the United States as the only alternative to global chaos.[8] Even Tucker, who until very recently has been a most forceful critic of the American imperial conception of its national interest, has now (because of the growing power of the Third World) begun to worry about who will maintain a semblance of world order.[9]

The distinctions between "imperialist" and "imperial" conceptions or models are important ones, but it is also of critical importance to take note of what they have in common: both are—indeed, *must*—be based on the premise, implied or explicit, that in the postwar era the extent of United States power and the nature of its behavior—whatever the causes, motivation, intentions, or effects—warrants comparison with the undoubted empires of the past, in particular the European colonial empires of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even the mildest, least condemnatory, and most qualified conception of an American imperial, let alone imperialist role, cannot escape that connotation and still remain meaningful. Imperial implies *great* power, not merely unequal power; it implies the capacity to dominate or control other states, not merely to influence them; it implies an empire, not merely a sphere of influence.

How accurately does this central image of American hegemony or control fit the reality of postwar international politics? The remainder of this article will be devoted to examining the validity of the theories that have thus far been briefly summarized. The focus will be on American relations with the Third World, where surely the argument of American imperialism, if valid, must have its greatest force. The discussion will distinguish between radical, neo-Marxist, and nonradical, non-Marxist analyses of (a) the motivation or causes and (b) the consequences or effects of United States foreign policy.

Motivations for "Imperial" or "Imperialist" Policy

We shall begin with a discussion of radical, neo-Marxist theories of the causes or motivations of American policy.[10] Is the open-door policy—unrestricted access

[8] See Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (New York, 1973), p. 238; Liska, *Imperial America* (Baltimore, 1967), and Liska, *War and Order* (Baltimore, 1968), *passim*.

[9] See Tucker's recent series of articles in *Commentary*, especially "A New International Order," February 1975.

[10] Some of the analysis of the radical, neo-Marxist theories in the ensuing section is not original, but simply a summary of what this author believes to be the most persuasive scholarship on the subject. It is included as a necessary part of the overall effort to systematically list, classify, and analyze the full range of arguments on the United States imperialist or imperial role.

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to the economies of the Third World—structurally necessary to the survival of United States capitalism, or, more generally, to the health of the economy? Some contemporary neo-Marxists, most notably Gabriel Kolko,[11] do in fact so argue, following Lenin's earlier arguments about the crucial dependence of late monopoly capitalism on overseas economic imperialism. Consider first direct overseas investment. Although the figures vary, all recent analyses demonstrate that private overseas direct investment is only about 5 percent of total investment (i.e., 95 percent of United States direct investment is domestic), and the vast majority of that overseas investment is not in the Third World but in the advanced industrial societies of Western Europe, Japan, Canada, and Australia. The proportion of overseas investment in the Third World, then, is less than 2 percent of all United States investment, which would hardly seem critical.[12] Looked at from a different perspective, as of 1968 the income from corporate investment in the Third World was only 3–4 percent of the total income of United States corporations, and it was declining relative to income from investments in the industrial world.[13]

The figures for trade reveal the same nonessentiality of the Third World to the United States economy. Total American trade with the rest of the world is only about 7–8 percent of GNP and, once again, by far the largest and most rapidly growing proportion of that trade is not with the Third World but with the advanced countries.[14] Only in the case of strategic raw materials is the Third World *possibly* of critical importance to the American economy, and even here the situation is far from clear. For the moment the United States is increasingly dependent on overseas oil as well as other important raw materials such as copper, tin, and bauxite found in Third World countries. But (1) it is still the case that *most* of these raw materials are produced not in the Third World but in the developed countries; (2) mining the deep seabed is likely to soon further reduce United States dependence on Third World countries; and (3) pending that development most economists still argue that substitutes and alternatives to Third World raw materials, even oil, are now or soon will be available, at costs which are higher, but not so much higher as to make Third World importations more of a necessity than essentially a convenience.[15] In any case, it is only very recently that the United States has become dependent on strategic raw materials imports from the Third World countries to any significant degree, whatever the exact magnitude of that dependence might be now and in the future, and thus the matter is entirely irrelevant to the alleged structural necessity of the open-door policy in the past.

[11] See especially Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War* (New York, 1968), and Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York, 1972).

[12] Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *In Search of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1974), p. 37.

[13] S. M. Miller et al., "Does the U.S. Economy Require Imperialism?" *Social Policy*, September/October 1970.

[14] Aron, *The Imperial Republic*, p. 164; Bloomfield, *In Search of American Foreign Policy*, p. 37.

[15] For a summary of some arguments see Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism* (New York, 1973), chap. 4.

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Even if the United States economy *was* structurally dependent on access to Third World markets, raw materials, or sources of investment, would it follow that imperial *control* of the Third World is a necessity? The radical argument depends on that assumption, although it is nearly always left implicit; that is, that the choice is the stark, all-or-nothing one of imperial domination or no access at all. When made explicit, though, the assumption is demonstratively preposterous. Indeed, there seems to be a clear *inverse* relationship between "imperialism" and prosperity in the postwar period. Though of course other factors have also played important roles, it is interesting to note that the least imperial countries have had the highest overall growth rates (Japan, West Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries—all dependent in varying degrees on interstate trade and investment), while the most imperial have done least well (France and Britain in the 1940s and 1950s; Portugal, with the lowest per capita income in Europe for the entire postwar period). Nor should this be unexpected: it is not just that the maintenance of political and military imperial control is extremely costly when there is serious indigenous opposition, but also that states perceived by the nationalist and sensitive Third World countries as imperialist, whether accurately or not, are much more likely to suffer economic retaliation than those seen as quite harmless. In case of renewed Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, the Arabs are probably more likely to cut off oil shipments to the United States than to Japan. The radical assumption is best stood on its head: *only* efforts to gain imperialist economic control, to push against a door that is already open, would be likely to provoke nationalistic resentments intense enough to override economic rationality and close off American access to Third World products.

All this may be true, implicitly or explicitly concede some radical analysts, but policy makers, however inaccurately, *believe* that the health of the United States capitalist system requires an open door to the Third World economies and therefore direct political or economic control over them, and act accordingly, i.e., imperialistically.[16] While this is certainly a logical possibility and a neat theory-saver, the evidence is overwhelming that it is a wholly inaccurate description of how policy makers in fact have perceived American interests in the Third World. There is, after all, an enormous body of available material in the form of memoirs, official documents, and scholarly analyses on how American policy makers have defined the "external challenges" to the United States, in the Third World and elsewhere. It rather conclusively shows that genuine security fears; ideological anticommunism; expansionist idealism; or other political, strategic, or psychological factors have been at the roots of the United States postwar policies, including interventionist or, if you will, "imperial" behavior.[17]

[16] See Julien, *America's Empire:* "There is a basic and complete agreement among U. S. [political and economic elites] . . . that the growing of the empire is indispensable to the preservation of American way of life" (p. 379). See Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, for the most complete statement of this point of view.

[17] For example, see the recently declassified famous "NSC-68", a top-secret, intergovernment-

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Still another variant of the neo-Marxist argument is that open-door imperialism in the Third World, while neither structurally necessary to the United States economy nor genuinely believed to be so by policy makers, *is* necessary to the largest, most powerful banks and corporations which in turn control foreign policy.[18] Both parts of this argument are quite unpersuasive. A number of scholars have demonstrated that, with the exception of the seven oil majors (to be examined below), the largest United States foreign banks and corporations are among those that are *least* dependent on the Third World, as the overwhelming proportion of their investment, sales, and profits come from the American domestic market, Europe, Japan, and Canada. And, more importantly, while it would be beyond the scope of this article to go into detail, no serious scholarship on the foreign policy-making process in the United States government supports the notion that it is controlled or in most cases even substantially influenced by the desires of "big business." Indeed, even in the case of those American-based multinational corporations which *do* have major investments in the Third World, most recent scholarship establishes that the distance between the corporations and the United States government is increasing, as both the policy makers and the corporations are coming to realize that, faced with growing nationalism, *no* interests—economic or political, private or public—are served by government involvement in corporate disputes with indigenous governments.[19]

The final variation of the neo-Marxist argument is at once the most sophisticated but also the least subject to empirical confirmation or refutation. It is not that corporations control foreign policy or that political leaders consciously seek to promote and protect corporate economic interests, but rather that all United States elites are products of American history, institutions, and class structures, and as such have internalized an overall ideology or *weltanschauung* that equates the maintenance of capitalism at home and its extension overseas—i.e., the open-door policy—with the preservation of the entire "American way of life."[20] The problem with this formulation, "sophisticated" as it may be, is that it is so broad

al document prepared by the secretarys of state and defense in 1950 to set forth the overall rationale for the United States containment policy. Throughout the report the emphasis is on the communist threat to democracy and freedom and the fundamental principles of Western civilization; no word is to be found about an "open door," the maintenance of capitalism, or, indeed, economic matters at all, except as related to the building of military and political strength. NSC-68 was published in full in *The Naval War College Review*, May/June 1975.

[18] The most complete statement of this view (which derives directly from Hobson's famous analysis of nineteenth-century European colonialism), is in Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York, 1969). See also the essays by James O'Connor and Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy in K. T. Fann and D. C. Hodges (eds.), *Readings in U.S. Imperialism* (Boston, 1971).

[19] The best evidence of this, of course, is the rapidly growing wave of nationalization of American private investments around the world, with the United States government reaction rarely going beyond rather *pro forma* protest. This will be discussed in greater detail below.

[20] See Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, for the most complete statement of this point of view.

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as to be quite immune from normal tests of evidence. It is quite easy to show that American foreign policy makers since World War II have not usually defined their objectives in terms of the open-door policy, the preservation of capitalism, or, indeed, in economic terms of any kind, either in their public rhetoric or in their private correspondence, memoirs, or intragovernmental communications, but then it can be claimed that the policy makers were either concealing their "real" objectives or that their anticommunism and security fears were "ultimately," perhaps even unconsciously, rooted in the desire to preserve capitalism as an economic system.[21] Similarly, instances in which United States policy has been oriented toward the protection or promotion of American economic interests overseas are seized upon as irrefutable proof of the theory, whereas the far more numerous instances of United States passivity when confronted with economic nationalism are treated as signs of the growing subtlety of corporate capitalism, which is willing to let minor infractions on its imperial control go unchallenged in the interest of preserving "the system" as a whole.[22] Or, in another version, even intervention which is overwhelmingly counterproductive in economic terms, such as in Vietnam, is explained in terms of "the empire's" need to preserve the system as a whole by supporting even "the weakest links in the chain."[23] As others have pointed out, both in the context of examining this variant of neo-Marxist theory and in discussing the nature of scientific inquiry in general, a theory so broad that it is capable of "explaining" both A and its opposite B (intervention and nonintervention, intervention that is economically productive and intervention that is economically costly), a theory that rests not

[21] See Bernard S. Morris, *Imperialism and Revolution* (Bloomington, Ind., 1973), who writes that where one cannot find evidence of economic motivations, as in Vietnam, "the governing class may well have concealed its economic interests behind a cloud of ideological verbiage" (p. 36).

[22] For one among many examples of this approach see Anibal Quijano Obregon's essay in Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen (eds.), *Latin America and the United States* (Palo Alto, Calif., 1974). Quijano accounts for the recent examples of United States government nonintervention after American corporations in Latin America have been nationalized in these terms: "Since the principal imperialist state's policy is constrained by the new forces conditioning international politics, this state must now face situations in which the mere defense of the interests of each North American imperialist firm operating in these countries could aggravate the contradictions and the political-social conflicts within these countries. This, in turn, could threaten the very existence of capitalism as a mode of production in these countries, owing either to the flaring up of nationalism that derives from these readjustments of imperialist domination, or to the triumph of revolutionary, socialist social forces. In the face of these conditions, the principal imperialist state in the hemisphere finds itself obligated to accept, or at least tolerate and adjust to, the political currents that under the banner of nationalism seek to reduce the internal social tensions of some countries, and obligated, as well, to maintain capitalism by readjusting its methods of operation and the very conditions of imperialist exploitation" (pp. 81–82).

[23] Timothy Harding in Fann and Hodges, *U. S. Imperialism*, p. 14. Harry Magdoff also makes use of the "weakest link" metaphor to argue that even in Vietnam economic considerations ultimately underlay United States policy (in Owen and Sutcliffe, *Theory of Imperialism*, p. 170).

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on the empirical evidence considered in its entirety but on assertion buttressed only by the selected evidence that fits, is no theory at all, but simply dogma.[24]

It is not the contention of this article that economic considerations, including if you will the maintenance of an open-door for products and investment capital, do not play a significant role in United States foreign policy, but only that such economic considerations have not been the central, dominant ones. Certainly it is obvious that the government has sought to promote trade and investment around the world and has often used its economic and political influence on behalf of such objectives. In so acting, political officials have been motivated by several factors: the belief that an open economic world is genuinely in the best interests of all states; the belief that it is beneficial to the United States economy; and the belief that one of the obligations of the government is to protect and promote the legitimate activities of its citizens abroad, at least as long as those activities do not conflict with larger policy objectives. But what is crucial are the *means* used on behalf of the open-door policy, that is, the *intensity* of the government's commitment to it or the *priority* that policy has relative to other foreign policy objectives.[25] Normally, the government has promoted the interests of private corporations by diplomacy only: verbal representations, exhortation, and bargaining. On some, but increasingly exceptional occasions, the government has gone further, making use of both positive and negative economic sanctions, through its bilateral assistance programs and its influence in international financial institutions, on behalf of private economic interests. On most occasions where the government has resorted to economic pressures, though, larger issues than mere nationalization of American property are preceived to be at stake, as in the case of economic and other actions by the United States against Cuba and the Allende government in Chile. Finally, there is *no* case in which it can persuasively be argued that Washington resorted to serious covert political action or the use of armed force on behalf of private economic interests as such. Apparent exceptions to this assertion, such as the CIA's role in the overthrow of Iran's Mossadegh following his nationalization of oil corporations in 1953, on closer inspection do not undermine the argument, for oil is the *one* foreign economic commodity perceived to be absolutely vital, not to private interests but to the United States economy as a whole. Indeed, what is particularly striking about the case of oil is that even *given* its critical importance, the government nonetheless has consistently subordinated easy and favorable access to it to other, noneconomic objectives: as many observers have pointed out, if economic rather than cold-war, ideological/moral, or domestic considerations dominated foreign policy, the United States stance in the Arab-Israeli crisis would have been very different

[24] For similar conclusions about the neo-Marxist analyses see Tucker, *The Radical Left;* Cohen, *Question of Imperialism;* Robert Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton, N. J., 1973); James Kurth in Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth (eds.), *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism* (Lexington, Mass., 1974); Ole R. Holsti, "The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows," *American Political Science Review,* March 1974.

[25] See Tucker, *The Radical Left,* for a similar argument.

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over the last three decades.[26] So even in the single case in which one might *expect* to find economic considerations to be dominant, the reality has been different. That being so, it is hardly credible that the United States interventions in Guatemala in 1954 and the Dominican Republic in 1965 were motivated by, respectively, banana and sugar interests, rather than by ideological, cold-war, and even strategic considerations genuinely believed—whether accurately or not is irrelevant—by policy makers to be at stake in those countries.[27]

To summarize, while it is true that in a general way the United States seeks an open-door policy around the world, it is usually quite restrained—i.e., nonimperialistic—in the methods used to attain this goal. The more clearly it is that purely private rather than national economic interests are involved, the less likely it is that the government will take punitive actions against other states. To go even further, to the extent that *only* economic interests are involved, even where those interests are national rather than private in scope, the less likely it is that the government will resort to serious economic coercion, let alone armed force. Put differently, the more important the issue for the United States as a whole, as seen by policy makers, the more likely it is that economic considerations will be subordinated to noneconomic ones whenever they conflict, as in the past they have in the Middle East.

The argument that United States policy is motivated by noneconomic but still imperial pretensions is a far more serious one than the neo-Marxist theories. It is at once more sophisticated and less of an affront to common sense, and it does not suffer from the shoddy scholarship and ideological dogmatism that so frequently mar much of the radical literature. Quite the contrary; scholars of the deserved stature of Robert Tucker, Stanley Hoffmann, Richard Falk, and others have all described United States foreign policy in terms of its imperial nature. Certainly there can be no doubt that policy makers have often, even typically, described their objectives and policies in *rhetoric* that can fairly be called "imperial": the Truman Doctrine's universalist declaration that it was the policy of the United States "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," Kennedy on the United

[26] Also, Peter Odell in *Oil and World Power* (London, 1970) has shown that in the late 1950s and early 1960s the United States government prevailed upon American oil corporations not to plot with Venezualan rightists against the Betancourt regime, even though Betancourt had put into effect substantially higher taxation of oil profits; of greater apparent importance to the government was that the Betancourt regime was considered as a possible liberal alternative to Castroism and a model for the kind of government envisioned by the Alliance for Progress. Moreover, the United States government today is *discouraging* exploitation by American oil companies of the apparently oil-rich coastal waters between China and Taiwan and South Asia, in order to avoid political conflict with the Peking government. See *The New York Times*, September 5, 1975, and Selig S. Harrison, "Time Bomb in East Asia," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1975.

[27] For discussion of the Guatemalan and Dominican interventions, see, respectively, Jerome Slater, *The OAS and United States Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio, 1967), and Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation; The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (New York, 1970).

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States as "the watchman on the wall of world freedom," Johnson on history "thrusting" the "responsibility" on the United States "to be guardians at the gate," and so on. Still, it is doubtful that this rhetoric accurately reflected the real, operational purposes of policy makers, for the more plausible interpretation of foreign policies since World War II suggests that the guiding motivation was to meet what was perceived as the quite specific challenge by communist forces in quite specific places. The United States has not in fact sought to preserve world freedom; it has not tried to suppress all revolution, let alone all social change; it has not even tried very hard to create or maintain an environment congenial to American institutions and values; and it has certainly not deliberately set out to dominate other nations; it has simply tried to prevent the spread of communism (whether wisely or not is not relevant here) to areas where communism was not already in power. It cannot be denied that the broadening of the goal of the containment of communism from Western Europe to the entire world, combined with the continuing strain of Wilsonian universalism in American thinking, made the United States (in Stanley Hoffmann's words) at least "*implicitly* imperialistic,"[28] but the weight of evidence suggests that the concrete day-to-day policies of the government were considerably more limited. Put differently, we may concede that America's ideological universalism was at least potentially imperial and at some level accurately reflected the genuine long-term hopes and aspirations of the postwar political leadership, but yet deny that such sweeping conceptions of the United States "responsibility," requiring a conscious or unconscious effort at benevolent world domination, were at the root of operational policies.

Yet, one hesitates to make too much of this argument. Even if it is correct that anticommunist security fears rather than broader aspirations lie at the root of United States policies, the globalization of those policies might still produce imperialism. Certainly it is hard to avoid the conclusion that meddling in the internal politics of far-away, relatively unimportant states such as Greece, the Congo, and Chile—not to mention Indochina!—reflects what might justly be labeled as an imperial mentality or conception of American security interests. So the more important argument of this article is that the notion of the United States as an imperial power exaggerates its actual *capacities* to control events around the world.

Consequences of United States Foreign Policy

What, then, of the *consequences* or *effects* of the postwar policies, whatever their causes, motivations, or intentions? Has the impact of United States power on the rest of the world, especially on the Third World where surely the impact must be greatest, been sufficiently extensive to justify describing it as "imperialism," "neoimperialism," "indirect imperialism," or "informal imperialism"? At least

[28] In Lynn H. Miller and Ronald W. Pruessen (eds.), *Reflection on the Cold War* (Philadelphia, 1974), p. 18 (italics added).

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implicit in such descriptions and often quite explicit is the argument that the extension of American economic, political, and military power into the Third World has been on such a scale as to reduce those countries to a position not substantially different from the past when they were actually under military occupation and direct political rule. The consequences for the Third World, it is argued, are both economic exploitation and political subordination, just as in the past.

In the last decade or so, particularly in the literature on United States–Latin American relations, the theory (or theories) of "dependence" has become the dominant theme in radical writings. In their more sophisticated versions, dependence theories hold that Third World countries have become inextricably integrated in the world capitalist system, dominated in turn by United States capitalism, as producers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured products. Because they are weak and economically undiversified, however, Third World countries are relegated to the "periphery" of the system, kept underdeveloped or impoverished by the low prices they receive for their exports, the high prices they must pay for their imports, and the onerous conditions which they are forced to accept in order to have access to foreign capital through either loans or investment. Although dependence may be partially a consequence of the deliberate exercise of power, it is more fundamentally a function of the capitalist structure. As long as world capitalism continues in its present form, the Third World cannot escape underdevelopment, for its "surplus production" will continue to be in effect appropriated for the benefit of the advanced capitalist societies. Under capitalism, then, underdevelopment is not a transitional stage to development but a permanent condition: "economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin."[29]

Why do more Third World countries not rebel against this structural exploitation? Because, according to the dependence theorists, although Third World *people* as a whole suffer, the local political, business, and military *elites* benefit: their power, status, and wealth are directly linked to the preservation of the existing "system," i.e., investment and production by local subsidiaries of the giant multinational corporations; military assistance programs; CIA advice, support, and financing; and so on. Without this alliance between the elites of the center and the periphery, the entire structure of indirect capitalist control over the Third World would be impossible. Put differently, it is this mutually symbiotic alliance that is the functional equivalent of the direct military, political, and bureaucratic control structures of the older, colonialist versions of imperialism.[30]

Economic Exploitation?

Let us examine this theory or argument, looking first at the question of whether the United States economically exploits the Third World. To begin with, what

[29] Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, 1967), p. 9.

[30] The most complete and sophisticated statements of the dependence model are to be found in

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does the term "exploitation" at the nation-state level mean? It is remarkable how little effort has been made to systematically define the term in either the classical literature on imperialism or the more recent literature on neoimperialism. Standard dictionary definitions provide some clues, but do not take us too far. For example, *Webster's Third International* defines exploitation as "an unjust or improper use of another person for one's own profit or advantage"; *The American College Dictionary* defines the term as "to use selfishly for one's own ends." In the literature on imperialism, three possible usages seem most common. First, there is the deliberate use of power by one state to attain economic advantage *at the expense* of the victimized state. In this case there is *absolute* deprivation, or a zero-sum game, in which the exploiter's gains are the exploitee's losses; thus, in the absence of the exploitative relationship, the exploited state would be economically better off. There are, of course, many historical examples of imperialism as pure exploitation in the sense discussed here: the ancient slave empires, the plundering of the New World by the Spanish, and perhaps some of the more single-mindedly avaricious and brutal instances of nineteenth-century imperialism, such as Belgium's exploitation of the Congo. A number of radical writers today consider "neoimperialism" to be exploitative in this extreme sense.

Second, exploitation may be understood to mean the deliberate use of power by one state simply to maximize its economic advantages in exchange relationships with weaker states. In this case there is relative rather than absolute deprivation; it is a nonzero-sum game, for each side is economically better off than it would be in the absence of the relationship. However, we are justified in calling it exploitation since one side gains much more than the other as a direct result of the deliberate use of its power. Thus, there is a clear quality of "unfairness" about the relationship, however difficult it may be to give an operational meaning to that notion.[31] It will be noted that this usage includes the key concepts of "selfishness" (and therefore necessarily of "deliberateness") and "injustice," common to most dictionary definitions. Probably most nineteenth-century imperialism approximated this kind of exploitation. The colonies were better off in a purely economic sense than they would have been had they never been colonized, but the asymmetries of advantage were so great as to be justly characterized as exploitation; one thinks, for example, of the relative pittances given to the oil-producing states by the oil majors backed by their governments in the Middle East in the early decades of the twentieth-century. It is important to reemphasize here that if we wish to distinguish "exploitation" from mere "inequality," surely a useful distinction to maintain, the asymmetries of advantage

ibid.; Galtung, "*A Structural Theory of Imperialism*"; Magdoff, *Age of Imperialism;* Osvaldo Sunkel in Yale H. Ferguson and Walter F. Weiker (eds.), *Continuing Issues in International Politics* (Los Angeles, 1973); Dale Johnson in James D. Cockroft et al., *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (New York, 1972).

[31] For discussions of exploitation in this sense, see Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth* (New York, 1973), p. 12, and Barrington Moore, Jr., *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery* (Boston, 1970), pp. 53–54.

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(a) must be *very* great, not merely somewhat unequal, and (b) must stem from the deliberate use of power by the stronger party.

Yet, it may be objected, what of cases in which the asymmetries of advantage are very great as a result of unconscious, unintended, but yet very real asymmetries of power? For example, it is often contended that the prices received by underdeveloped societies for their exports are at a much lower level relative to the prices they pay for their imports from industrial countries than they would be in a genuinely free, competitive open market based on pure supply and demand, rather than one structured in a variety of oligopolistic ways in favor of the advanced countries. If indeed the structural constraints, the rules of the game, are loaded, however unconsciously, something more than mere inequality would seem to be involved; yet to call it "exploitation" would violate our common-sense (and dictionary) understanding of exploitation as involving the conscious, deliberate use of power. Perhaps the best solution to this essentially philosophic problem is to stipulate that major inequities stemming from "the system" (structures of power, international customs and rules) should initially be understood as inequality only, but that if the workings and consequences of that system are subsequently made clear to the advantaged powers and yet they (now consciously) continue to rely on their greater power to resist changes, then the relationship indeed becomes exploitative.

We can now proceed directly to examine the charge that the United States, as the leading contemporary neoimperialist power, economically exploits the Third World. According to classic economic theory, free trade in an open international market is of mutual and equal benefit to rich and poor nations alike, because of the familiar principles of comparative advantage based on specialization and division of labor. However, in the real world international trade may not be truly open and based strictly on supply and demand, and the benefits may be unequally distributed. Until quite recently, it was widely accepted, even by non-Marxist and nonradical economists, that in fact the terms of trade were weighted against the Third World countries as a result of the deliberately or unconsciously exercised political and financial power of the industrialized world, for it was generally thought that at least since 1940 the prices of raw materials and other commodities exported by the Third World had steadily fallen relative to the price of manufactured goods they had no choice but to import from the industrialized world. In actual operation the international "free trade" system, it was usually conceded, had the same disadvantages as the domestic "free enterprise" system: where not all participants have equal political and economic power, the rich do disproportionately better than the poor, or even in more extreme formulations, the poor are actually *further* impoverished. The open-door policy or economic liberalism became, in the words of two sophisticated writers, simply "the ideology of a continuing American hegemony."[32]

[32] David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, *America and the World Political Economy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1973), p. 242.

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In the last few years, however, the accuracy of this assessment has been called into question, as it has applied to the recent past, as well as to the present and the forseeable future. A recent study, for example, concluded that *even excluding oil from the calculation*, in the last twenty-five years the prices of raw materials exported by poor countries had risen at about the same rate as the prices of imported manufactures.[33] Steven Krasner has gone even further, arguing that the Third World countries have been the relative *beneficiaries* of restrictive schemes imposed by the consuming states or their multinational corporations: "For most primary commodities, the actual prices are higher than those that would prevail in a free market. In terms of neoclassical concepts of value, *consuming states have been exploited by producing areas.*"[34] As for the present and forseeable future, there is a growing consensus that as a result of the increasing scarceness of certain key raw materials and the ability of producing states to form successful cartels, not only in oil but also in other commodities (copper, tin, bauxite, and apparently more on the way), the terms of trade will increasingly shift in favor of the Third World, or at least that part of the Third World fortunate enough to control major commodities or raw materials.

Does the direct corporate investment of advanced countries in the Third World constitute exploitation, in either the absolute or relative senses of the word? According to radical critics, foreign-owned subsidiaries of multinational corporations "decapitalize" the underdeveloped countries by taking out more in profits than they put in through investment; further block local growth and industrialization by buying up smaller local firms or driving them out of business through cutthroat competition; create sudden unemployment by ruthlessly closing local subsidiaries whenever worldwide profit maximization so dictates; remove key sectors of the economy from local control; create a domestic bourgeoisie whose self-interests are tied to foreign industry rather than indigenous growth; disrupt local cultural patterns and institutions and substitute in their place the crass materialism of the West; and, in general, integrate the economies, social structure, and political institutions of Third World countries into permanently subordinate peripheral positions in the world capitalist structure.[35] Among themselves, critics may disagree on whether these alleged consequences of foreign investment are intended and stem from the deliberate governmental strategies of the advanced countries to gain political and economic domination over the Third World, or whether they are the unintended, uncoordinated by-product of private corporate greed. But there is no disagreement that the Third World is exploited by foreign investment.

Other students of foreign investment see the matter quite differently. Foreign

[33] As reported in *The New York Times*, May 29, 1975.

[34] "Trade in Raw Materials," in Rosen and Kurth, *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism*, p. 195 (italics added).

[35] For major criticisms of foreign investment see Frank, *Capitalism;* Sunkel in Ferguson and Weiker, *Continuing Issues in International Politics;* Crockroft et al., *Dependence and Underdevelopment;* Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach* (New York, 1974).

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investment is said to clearly bring with it many positive benefits. Foreign companies have the capital and the skills initially lacking in underdeveloped countries to explore for, develop, produce, and market raw materials that would otherwise lie dormant for decades. In the course of doing so, they build transportation networks; employ large numbers of local people, usually at wage rates much above host country norms; build housing, schools, and hospitals; and through taxation contribute much needed foreign currency. In the manufacturing area, multinational corporations provide the managerial skills, the infusion of advanced technology, and the access to world markets that the underdeveloped countries lack.

To be sure, the multinational corporations usually make profits, sometimes very high profits, but they also take risks—the political risks of nationalization, the economic risks of failure—and without the promise of high profits they simply would not invest at all. And it is wrong to conclude that a net economic loss—exploitation—has necessarily occurred at the point at which the outflow of profits exceeds the inflow of new capital investment, for the notion of "decapitalization" ignores the value of the economic infrastructure left in place and the transfer of technology, labor, and marketing skills which have or at least should have led to continuing, self-sustaining development.

Still, there are undoubtedly costs, as the critics have pointed out: the elimination of local competitors and the squeezing out of infant industries, the domination of key sectors of local economies by foreigners and the consequent difficulties of instituting national planning and economic controls when a substantial proportion of the economy is immune from such measures, the political and psychological resentments. Probably the balance of cost and advantage cannot be determined in general, but only on a case-by-case basis, depending on the indigenous context and the precise terms of the agreements negotiated between foreign investors and the host governments.[36]

What certainly is clear is that although there is considerable nationalistic rhetoric about the evils of foreign investment, most Third World countries continue to actively seek it. Nor can it be argued, *á la* the dependence theorists, that this simply reflects an alliance between local reactionaries and foreign exploiters, for in recent years even the most radical, nationalistic states (such as Cuba, Algeria, Peru, and even to some extent China) have sought increased foreign investment. To be sure, they have insisted on terms that do not unduly compromise national independence, but the fact that they can successfully do so certainly suggests a rather more evenly distributed balance of power between the multi-

[36] For the most balanced, sophisticated treatments of the impact of foreign investment in the Third World, see Louis Turner, *Multinational Companies and the Third World* (New York, 1973); Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay* (New York, 1971); A. Kapoor and Phillip D. Grub (eds.), *The Multinational Enterprise in Transition* (Princeton, N. J., 1972); Charles P. Kindleberger, *American Business Abroad* (New Haven, Conn., 1969); Alfred D. Hirschman, *How to Divest in Latin America and Why* (Princeton, N. J., 1969).

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national corporations and the Third World countries than the literature on "exploitation" implies.

Finally, even foreign aid is seen by many radicals as nothing more than another instrument of control and exploitation of the Third World by the capitalist countries, particularly the United States. Here the argument is that economically the aid eventually comes to be a net burden on Third World economies: repayments on past loans mount higher and higher, until they exceed new inflows of assistance. Politically, it is argued, aid serves mainly to support reactionary dictatorships and local oligarchies who block real social change and balanced economic growth, and who serve as agents of United States imperial control in the Third World.

There is no doubt that for a number of Third World countries the annual inflow of new capital assistance is less than the outflow in the form of interest on past debts, but it is clearly fallacious to conclude that this *necessarily* demonstrates that aid is harmful, for if the previous aid has been used productively it will have generated new sources of wealth out of which interest on previous debt can be repayed. And it cannot be doubted that a number of countries have in fact achieved self-sustained growth in good part because of the infusion of major amounts of foreign aid; examples are Western Europe following the Marshall Plan, Turkey, Taiwan, Brazil, and South Korea. To be sure, most of the latter countries are indeed conservative and authoritarian, but it cannot be seriously argued that United States assistance created those conditions, as opposed to the quite different proposition that aid is more likely to go to safely pro-American and therefore usually conservative regimes. Aid, we may conclude, if efficiently used, promotes overall economic growth and thus cannot be considered exploitative; economic growth, however, by no means assures democracy, social change, or even equitable distribution of the fruits of growth, but these are matters determined by indigenous policies and practices only slightly or not at all subject to outside influence.[37]

We may now sum up. Taken as a whole, have the economic ties between the United States and the Third World been economically exploitative? It is obvious that the United States has enormous economic power; that this power has consequences for other, weaker states; that the consequences are sometimes though hardly invariably detrimental; and that while these detrimental consequences may frequently be the unintended result of sheer United States power, they are sometimes undeniably the result of deliberate, self-seeking policies on the part of the United States government. If by exploitation one means absolute deprivation, though, it is clear that the United States has not economically exploited the Third World, for the underdeveloped world as a whole has grown at a rate of 2 percent per annum *per capita* since 1945, and over 5 percent per annum per capita since 1960, rates which are historically very high, higher for example than

[37] On the question of the effects of foreign aid and more generally, the relationship between economic power and political influence, see Knorr, *Power and Wealth*.

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the growth rates of the United States or the European countries during any comparable length of time prior to World War I.[38] To a substantial degree, this relatively high growth rate is attributable to the sharp increase of foreign aid, investment, and trade between the developing countries and the advanced industrial ones, primarily (at least until fairly recently) the United States.

Has there nonetheless been exploitation in the sense of *relative* deprivation? For most of the postwar period, it is true, the rich got richer faster than the poor got "richer" and thus the gap between them was growing (although it is likely that this trend has ended in the last few years). The most persuasive evidence, though, is that the growth rates of the rich had little or nothing to do with their "exploitation" of the Third World: the righ got richer because of an increase of both domestic productivity and of trade and investment among themselves, while the poor did not develop at higher rates because of their essentially indigenous problems: one-crop economies, high population rates, political instability, etc. To be sure, there can be absolutely no doubt that the rich countries, particularly the United States, *could* and (according to my values) *should* have done more, much more, to help the Third World countries develop. That is, the United States and other developed countries in their total economic relations with the Third World have been guided primarily by self-interest rather than by the desire to help the poor; had their priorities been different the Third World would be substantially better off today. Take the case of foreign aid as an illustration. Radicals have pointed out the variety of ways in which foreign aid is at least in part structured to promote access for private investment, subsidize American shipowners, promote American export industries, and so on. The total effect of the various restrictions on the uses to which recipients may put bilateral United States assistance clearly lowers the real value of that assistance, but equally clearly it does not reduce that value to zero or even less. Foreign aid thus benefits, not exploits the recipients, although the benefits are not as great as they would be if the amounts were larger and unconstrained by restrictions designed to assist American industries. One may still conclude that the economic relationship between the United States and the Third World is deplorable but the problem is not exploitation, at least if understood in a reasonable sense, but rather neglect, indifference, and moral callousness. What the Third World needs from the United States and the rest of the developed countries is not less but more aid, trade, and private investment, though undoubtedly on better terms than in the past.[39]

Political Control?

None of this analysis denies, of course, that economic power carries with it political leverage. But is this political leverage sufficient to give it political control

[38] Richard N. Cooper, "Trade Policy," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1972–73.

[39] For similar views, see Michael Harrington, "America Power in the Twentieth Century," in Irving Howe (ed.), *A Dissenter's Guide to Foreign Policy* (New York, 1968), and Peter F. Drucker, "Multinationals and Developing Countries, *Foreign Affairs*, October 1974.

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over the Third World, as the "neoimperialist" or even simply "imperial" argument implies? The evidence from events in the real world, particularly during but not limited to the past few years, hardly suggests that this is the case.

If economic power carried with it considerable political control, one would expect that *at a minimum* such control would be sufficient for the imperial power to protect its major economic interests, particularly in areas of the world where its economic power is greatest. That is, the imperialist (or imperial) model would predict—*must* predict—that the United States could exert sufficient political control to at least preserve the position of its major multinational corporations in Latin America. And yet over the past decade there has been a wave of nationalization of United States corporations around the world in general—e.g., in Ceylon, Egypt, Indonesia, Algeria, Libya—but *particularly* in Latin America. The United States government has been nearly helpless to prevent these actions against its corporations and, with only several partial exceptions, has all but ceased to try. The International Petroleum Corporation (IPC) case in Peru is particularly instructive and historically significant. During the mid-1960s the liberal Peruvian government of Fernando Belaunde Terry began taking steps looking toward the nationalization of IPC, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. IPC, backed by the U.S. Embassy in Lima, strongly resisted, and from 1964–1966 Washington withheld economic assistance from Peru in an effort to force the Belaunde government to back down. In early 1968 Belaunde and IPC reached a compromise settlement, involving gradual nationalization, compensation, and a continued role for IPC in managing the oil fields, but the compromise outraged Peruvian nationalistic opinion, and shortly afterward a nationalist military coup overthrew Belaunde, and the new government immediately seized all properties of IPC. IPC, it will be noted, had annual revenues three times as large as Peru's entire GNP, and its payroll was 25 percent larger than that of the Peruvian government,[40] the sort of figures frequently cited to demonstrate the helplessness of Third World governments before the awesome economic power of multinational corporations. And yet, the Peruvian government simply marched several hundred troops into IPC properties and expropriated them without compensation! The Nixon administration subsequently tried to help the IPC gain compensation and apparently for a while informally slowed down assistance to Peru, although it refused to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment, which by law clearly applied to the case and would have required the immediate cessation of all economic assistance until IPC had been "promptly and effectively" compensated. In the face of Peruvian adamance, after a while even the half-hearted efforts of the Nixon government were dropped. The Peruvian government subsequently nationalized the huge and "powerful" Grace and Cerro de Pasco United States-owned multinational corporations, as well as a number of smaller ones, and dramatically in-

[40] Adalberto Pinelo, *The Multinational Corporation as a Force in Latin American Politics* (New York, 1973). For other discussions of the IPC affair see Richard Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," *New Yorker*, May 17, 1969, and Charles T. Goodsell, *Americans Corporations and Peruvian Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974).

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creased taxation and in other ways imposed restrictions on many others. Relatively little compensation has been forthcoming, and the United States government has remained on the sidelines.

The lesson of the Peruvian experience and the helplessness of both the corporations and the United States government has not been lost on other nationalistic Latin American regimes. In 1969 a Bolivian military regime abruptly expropriated the United States-owned Gulf Oil Corporation and "forced or frightened almost every sizable U.S. firm out of the country."[41] In 1971, the Allende regime in Chile expropriated without compensation the huge, American-owned Anaconda Companies; as in Peru "The efforts of the U.S. government to influence the process of providing compensation only strengthened Chilean intransigence,"[42] and once again the Nixon administration stopped short of applying the Hickenlooper Amendment.[43]

In the last few years, the wave of nationalization has rapidly spread. The Peronist regime in Argentina took a number of steps against United States corporations; even conservative regimes (such as Brazil) who otherwise welcome foreign investment are responding to popular nationalism and anti-Americanism by tightening controls over United States enterprises; and, most significantly of all, the Venezuelan government, which has been gradually gaining control over the oil industry in the past twenty years, will fully nationalize all foreign (mostly United States) oil corporations by 1976. Though the economic interests involved are enormous, and Venezuela is still the largest foreign supplier of imported oil, neither the affected corporations nor the United States government have sought to apply any pressure, but rather are passively accepting the inevitable.

It is now increasingly recognized that as the host countries gain in knowledge, confidence, and experience, and as European and Japanese multinational corporations seek to compete with American business for access to the Third World, the bargaining relationship between multinational corporations and indigenous governments is rapidly shifting in favor of the latter, with the United States government relatively powerless and increasingly disinclined to try to resist. The "dependencia" pattern, under which local elites collaborate with foreign investors against their own national interests, is rapidly disappearing and was probably always exaggerated anyway.[44] Without local allies, more direct action on the part of the "metropolitan" countries would be required; yet, armed force on

[41] Goodsell, *American Corporations*, pp. 8–9.

[42] Theodore H. Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence* (Princeton, N. J., 1974), p. 215.

[43] Later United States economic pressures on the Allende government and other covert efforts against it were clearly motivated primarily by general ideological disapproval of an overtly radical Marxist regime in the Western Hemisphere and concern about its potential "domino" effects elsewhere in Latin America, rather than by the relatively narrow issue of expropriation of United States corporations.

[44] For example, Moran shows that the United States copper industry never had much of a stable alliance with the Chilean "oligarchy," since even the elites resented foreign control. He concludes that "the Chilean experience suggests that foreign investors in prominent natural-

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behalf of private interests is practically out of the question in this day and age, and economic pressures can be relatively easily resisted by proud nationalist regimes and only worsen the situation for the multinational corporations. In the past few years it is clear that most corporations have come to grips with the new realities, seeking to adapt to rising nationalism as best they can, with no recourse to threats of economic retaliation or United States governmental assistance.[45]

Even short of outright nationalization, the terms of both trade and investment between the Third World and the advanced industrial world are rapidly shifting. The rise of OPEC in the Middle East is the most dramatic example, of course: in the 1920s host oil-producing countries received in taxation only about 10–15 percent of oil corporation profits on production; by the mid-1970s the general figure was over 80 percent and that of a far larger pie. Other raw materials producers are now seeking to form price cartels in emulation of OPEC, and while it is doubtful that any will achieve quite the fantastic success of the oil producers, the fact is that collaborative action to restrict production has led to dramatic price rises for Third World producers of bauxite, tin, copper, and other raw materials. Once again, the government has been powerless to prevent these developments, even though they inflict varying degrees of damage not only on United States-based multinational corporations but on the economy as a whole, and there are increasing indications that adaptation rather than coercive resistance will be the general American response.

Aside from the rapidly spreading adverse economic developments that the United States has been powerless to prevent, American political and military influence in the Third World has markedly declined in the last decade, no where more so than in Latin America, supposedly the stronghold of United States "neo-imperialism," "hegemony," or "domination." Anti-American nationalism is at a peak, and the Latin American bloc is no longer a reliable ally of the United States in the United Nations or in other international organizations. In general Latin American support for overall United States international policies is at a postwar low. Most important, the United States has proven to be, perhaps if not quite powerless, then at least decreasingly powerful in preventing revolutionary social change in Latin America. The Cuban and Peruvian regimes have successfully resisted all pressures (serious and sustained in the former, half-hearted and transient in the latter), and other states "are advancing frankly towards socialization."[46]

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resource industries in developing countries have few permanent allies." (Moran, *Multinational Corporations*, p. 247.)

[45] For discussions of the shifting balance of power between multinational corporations and Third World countries see Raymond Vernon, "The Role of U.S. Enterprises Abroad," *Daedalus*, Winter 1969; C. Fred Bergsten, "Coming Investment Wars?" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1974; C. Fred Bergsten, "The Response to Third World," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1974–75; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Multinational Corporations in World Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1974; Moran, *Multinational Corporations*; Turner, *Multinational Companies*.

[46] Osvaldo Sunkel, in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America and the United States*, p. 126. See

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Conclusion: If the United States Is an "Imperial" Power, Where Is Its Empire?

Obviously no one would wish to deny that the United States has enormous economic, political, and military power, and that this power must have a significant impact on other states, both intended and unintended. The question, however, is whether this power is so great as to warrant calling it either "imperialist" or "imperial." Even if these terms, or the notion of a United States "empire," are meant to be understood metaphorically rather than literally, we still must decide whether the metaphors are insightful and enlightening rather than misleading.

It seems reasonable to insist that the term "imperialism" (and all its usual variants) not be used as if it were synonymous with power and wealth as such, or alternatively as a mere name for the observable fact of the global expansion of American influence since World War II. Nor should imperialism be equated with *inequality* of power, per se, as some radical writers implicitly or even explicitly do. To define imperialism in such broad terms, or to treat such concepts as power, control, domination, and influence as if they were synonymous and all equal to imperialism, is simply to obscure highly significant distinctions that would only have to be reinvented if we wish to understand the real world.

Benjamin Cohen's definition of imperialism seems reasonably appropriate: "any relationship of effective domination or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one nation over another."[47] Such a definition clearly implies that great power is involved, not merely inequalities of power, and that the relationship is nearly wholly one-sided. However, it is possible to distinguish three different dimensions of power: *control*, defined as the invariable capacity to achieve objectives even in the face of opposition; *domination*, implying great power but falling somewhat short of outright control; and *influence*, meaning the capacity to *affect*, to a greater or lesser degree, the policies and behavior of other states. The term "imperialism" and all its usual variants should be limited to cases in which the power of one state over another is sufficient to establish control or at least a high degree of domination; it has no place where the relationship is simply one of influence, even of asymmetrical influence. Given the invariable connotation of the term "imperialism," the scope and degree of control must approximate the kind of control exercised by nineteenth-century European powers over their colonies. This should not prove objectionable, since most analysts describing the United States role as either "imperialist" or "imperial" in fact do equate, implicitly or explicitly, American power today—i.e., its capacity to control—with that of the nineteenth-century colonial powers.

Where in the world, even in the Third World, does the United States actually enjoy *control?* In Asia? In Africa? In the Middle East? A moment's reflection, without further argument, should suffice to reveal the very suggestion as being

below for a discussion of the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile, which at first glance might appear to contradict the argument.

[47] Ibid., p. 61.

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without foundation. Perhaps in Latin America, then? In which Latin American countries does the United States exercise control or domination: Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico? Hardly, for the United States has clearly been opposed to many significant policies and actions of those states and has been unable to affect them. What about Brazil and Chile since Allende, where the general drift of affairs is apparently pleasing to Washington? Even though covert actions did play *some* role in the establishment of military dictatorships in those countries, especially in Chile, the bulk of the evidence as well as plain common sense suggests that indigenous forces in such large and complex societies were surely far more important. What, then, about the Caribbean area? Here, indubitably, the United States has considerable leverage, though not control and only doubtfully even domination, except for some extreme cases, such as Cuba before Castro and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s. Certainly countries like Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua *are* economically dependent on the United States and make it a practice to support American foreign policies; on the other hand, even leaving aside the rather dramatic Cuban case, other Caribbean countries (such as Panama, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago) have charted a clearly independent economic and political course and throughout the entire area anti-American nationalism is on the rise.

The growing acceptance of the "imperial" model or metaphor to the contrary notwithstanding, we may boldly but confidently conclude that the United States today does not "control" *any* country *anywhere*, and in only a slightly more qualified manner we may also reject the notion of United States "domination." That the United States has varying degrees of *influence* in the Third World is of course undeniable, but it is a declining influence, and limited in scope and effectiveness to only certain matters. As noted earlier, the United States has been all but powerless to stop rising nationalism and radicalism, as well as attacks on its interests and policies around the world. How does the United States today typically react to the nationalization of property, to dramatic increases in the prices of critical raw materials, to demands that it remove its military bases, to anti-American riots, to insults and contempt? On increasingly rare occasions with suspension of economic *assistance* to the offending state, more typically with mere diplomatic protest, and, increasingly, simply with silence—a sullen silence borne of futility, perhaps, but significant precisely for that reason. "Imperialism" should be made of sterner stuff—and certainly it used to be.

Thanks to its growing wealth; the rapidly increasing availability of external aid, trade, and investment from sources other than the United States (Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union); and the increased domestic and external constraints on the use of military force, the Third World today is less vulnerable to United States power of any kind than at any time since World War II. The relationship cannot be plausibly described as "imperialist" or "imperial" at all, and only doubtfully and decreasingly as "dependent." It would be more accurate to see the relationship between the United States and the Third World in terms of *mutual* dependence, *mutual* power, and *mutual* vulnerability. To be sure, there

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are still considerable asymmetries of power—the United States has more *potential* power than the Third World, but it has become increasingly costly for it to actually employ that power. Still, so long as inequalities remain, we may expect the attacks on United States "imperialism" to continue, however inaccurate and misleading they in fact are, both because the shibboleth of "imperialism" provides a convenient myth to deflect attention from the indigenous problems of Third World countries and because inequality per se has become the real focus of Third World resentment of the advanced industrial societies.[48]

[48] I am indebted to Edward Kolodziej for the point about the convenience of the myth of imperialism; for discussions of the new importance of inequality per se, see Robert Tucker's recent writings, especially his "A New International Order?" *Commentary*, February 1975, and "Egalitarianism and International Politics," *Commentary*, September 1975.

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Cleavages, Decisions, and Legitimation: The Democrats' Mid-Term Conference, 1974

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN
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Party conventions are richly deserving of scholarly attention, both because of the role that they play in the political system and because of the analytical insights they can give us about political behavior in general. But there has been little systematic work on how decisions are made, legitimated, or perceived by the delegates to those conventions. This gap in the literature seems particularly unfortunate at a time in which there is much public debate about the efficacy and equity of the American political process itself.

Observers have frequently pointed out that nominating conventions are often more important than the general elections that follow them; after all, such conventions frame the choice that will confront the voters. Party conventions also ratify a party platform and may vote on a range of other issues, including delegate selection rules and future convention practices. In 1974, the Democrats held an unusual mid-term convention for the express purpose of approving a party charter.

Patterns of behavior observed at party conventions can shed light on a number of larger analytical issues. For example, because conventions bring together many important party activists, they provide us with an opportunity to study the structure of cleavages within the party and the extent to which those cleavages

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are being narrowed or widened. Furthermore, the study of conventions gives us an insight into the processes of collective decision making among large groups of people. Given a short period of time, a large degree of uncertainty, and a generally hectic atmosphere, how do people come together to make decisions? Which groups are most important in the process of bargaining that takes place? And how do these groups organize themselves at the convention?

Finally, conventions provide us with a view of the ways in which a party does or does not manage to bind up its wounds and unite behind the final outcome of the meeting. If the various segments of the party believe that the procedures and decisions were fair and proper, and that the final result should be supported, then we may say that "legitimation" has taken place. But legitimation is by no means automatic, as the divisive Republican convention of 1964 and the Democratic conventions of 1968 and 1972 have clearly shown. Therefore, we must search for the conditions under which legitimation can take place, and under which an organization made up of diverse groups can integrate its various parts in order to achieve a common purpose. By studying the ways in which convention groups react to victory, defeat, and each other, we can shed some light on this set of problems.

Democratic Party Reforms and Convention Behavior

The turbulent changes that have taken place in the Democratic party's convention processes since 1968 provide new dimensions, and increased importance, to these analytical issues. In studying party cleavages, for example, we are now confronted with a major rift in the Democratic party—between party "regulars" and the amateur activists whose participation grew out of concern about the Vietnam war and whose entrance into party conventions was facilitated by the post-1968 reforms. Have the party cleavages persisted, or are the different groups within the party growing closer together?

When we turn to collective decision making, we will be particularly interested in the ways in which newly active groups—minorities, women, young people—have organized themselves to participate at party conventions. According to the traditional model of convention decision making, state delegations have been thought to be the key units for bargaining. Operating under the unit rule[1] they bargain with each other and with candidate organizations. The rank-and-file delegates are manipulated by hierarchical leaders holding important roles in national, state, or local party organizations.[2]

[1] The Democratic unit rule required that the entire vote of a state delegation be cast as the majority of the delegation desired, if the state delegation had been so instructed by the state convention.

[2] For further discussion of this model, see Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, D. C., 1959); Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, "Uncertainty and Decision-Making at the National Conventions," in

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But certain rules changes made prior to the 1972 Democratic convention appeared to falsify some of the assumptions of the classic model. Because of the abolition of the unit rule and the requirements for opening up the delegate-selection process,[3] it could be expected that hierarchical party leaders would have a harder time controlling the votes of a state delegation. Thus, the importance of such leaders in the bargaining process would be reduced. With decision-making power at the convention more widely dispersed, there would be a need to develop new kinds of bargaining units to facilitate negotiation and communication among delegates. And this need appeared to coincide with new forms of group representation at the convention. In 1972, in response to new rules mandating guidelines for group representation, it was clear that there would be increased convention participation by women, young people, and blacks. And in the spring of that year, there were calls for black caucuses, women's caucuses, and youth caucuses—the formation of new arenas for bargaining. Thus, starting with the 1972 convention, it appeared that decision making might conform to a somewhat different model in which the importance of state delegations as arenas of decision would lessen, and the need for new bargaining units would be met by the emergence of the new group caucuses. In any event, the changed environment adds new interest to the study of collective decision making at conventions.

Our final analytical focus—legitimation—is also a matter of particular concern to both academics and party activists in the contemporary period. For the intensity of conflict within the Democratic party poses obvious problems for legitimation and party unification. Under what conditions do delegates come to feel that convention results are fair and worthy of support? How can convention losers come to support the results of the meeting?

We hear much about "brokered" political conventions, at which delegates sit through multiple ballots to select a nominee. But, in order to understand what the dynamics of a "brokered" convention would be under current conditions, we must look more closely at important political groups, the ways in which they organize themselves, and the ways in which they relate to each other. This study, which focuses on convention behavior in the contemporary Democratic party, attempts to increase understanding of what actually goes on at party conventions and conferences. Although both parties have altered their convention rules since the late 1960s, the strongest demands for change, the most pronounced alterations in the nomination system, and the greatest degree of internal turbulence have been found in the Democratic party. That is why our focus will be on the Democrats.

Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston, 1963); and Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections* (New York, 1971).

[3] For an enumeration of the Democrats' new rules for 1972, see Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, D. C., April 1970), p. 52.

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The 1972 Experience

In a previous article in this journal, we have reported some of the results of our study of the 1972 Democratic convention.[4] At that convention, not surprisingly, we found substantial cleavages between supporters of the "insurgent" candidate, Senator George McGovern, and backers of the "regular" candidates, Senators Hubert Humphrey, Edmund Muskie, and Henry Jackson. Not only did these groups differ on policy preferences, but they also differed with respect to political style. A majority of McGovern supporters could be classified as political "purists," while a majority of the Humphrey-Muskie-Jackson supporters could be classified as "professionals."[5]

With respect to decision making, we found that the new group caucuses were not able to supplant candidate organizations and state delegations as prime arenas of decision at the convention. The efforts of the new groups to become autonomous powers were seriously undercut by their inexperience in convention politics; the hostility of the more traditional groups; the organization of the convention, which favored traditional modes of participation; and the cross-cutting cleavages that forced those most loyal to the new caucus groups to subordinate that loyalty to ensure George McGovern's nomination.[6]

In terms of legitimation, we discovered that the convention was not very successful. The shift in power toward the new groups brought about by McGovern's nomination neither made the McGovern supporters less purist nor the regulars more supportive. Rather, the supposedly "professional" regulars—seeing their preferred candidates defeated—adopted a decidedly more purist stance during the convention and, as a consequence, nullified the potentially legitimating effects of McGovern's move toward the center. Thus, the convention failed to rally the supporters of the defeated candidates around the winner.[7]

These results did not offer final answers, of course, to the more general problems of party conventions in a time of great social change. Was the McGovern movement, and the rules which aided it, an aberration soon to be forgotten in a return to "normal" convention behavior, or was it a point somewhere along an evolutionary path of party convention change? The new caucus groups were

[4] See Jeffrey L. Pressman and Denis G. Sullivan, "Convention Reform and Conventional Wisdom: An Empirical Assessment," *Political Science Quarterly*, 89, no. 3 (Fall 1974), 539–562. For the complete report of our study, see Denis G. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Pressman, Benjamin I. Page, and John J. Lyons, *The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention, 1972* (New York, 1974).

[5] See Sullivan et al., *The Politics of Representation*, chap. 5. The distinction between ideologically motivated "purists" and pragmatic, party victory-motivated "professionals" has been discussed most prominently by James Q. Wilson and Aaron Wildavsky. See Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago, 1966) and Wildavsky, "The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians, and the Two-Party System," *Review of Politics*, 27 (July 1965), 386–413.

[6] See Sullivan et al., *The Politics of Representation*, chap. 3.

[7] See ibid., chap. 5.

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clearly not sufficiently strong in 1972 to deal a death blow to the classic model of decision making, but would they develop effectiveness over time? Finally, given different conditions in the environment of conventions, could legitimation be achieved?

The 1974 Mid-Term Conference as an Experiment in Convention Behavior

In 1974, we were presented with a unique opportunity to extend the analysis developed from the 1972 study. The Democratic party's mid-term charter conference, held at Kansas City, Mo., presented us with a natural experimental variation of some of the conditions we thought decisive in explaining the 1972 outcome. The absence of the presidential nominating contest that imposes order upon election-year conventions made the mid-term meeting an excellent laboratory for the study of a fluid, dispersed bargaining situation.[8]

A strange mixture of the old and new would be present at Kansas City; some factors appeared to us to promote the resurgence of the classic model of convention bargaining, while others seemed to enhance the power of caucus groups. In terms of the makeup of the conference, we anticipated the composition of the delegates at Kansas City to differ substantially from that in Miami Beach two years earlier. A party charter conference is an internal party affair and thus should attract those most strongly identified with the party and active officeholders in the party organization. Because of the conference's concern with organizational issues, many of the reformers attracted to Kansas City would, we thought, be susceptible to party unity appeals. We expected these factors, together with the passage of time and the ending of United States involvement in Vietnam, to reduce the cleavages between reformers and regulars in the Democratic party.

Our 1972 research had indicated, with respect to decision-making arenas, that the weaker the candidate organizations were, the stronger was the influence of the group caucuses. Thus, in the absence of a presidential nominating contest in 1974, we expected to see more effective caucus efforts.

There were other differences between 1972 and 1974 which might be expected to influence the outcome of the party meeting. In 1972, the prospects for a Democratic victory were uncertain at best. But by December 1974, when the mid-term conference was held, a number of events had occurred to boost the Democrats' optimism about the 1976 elections: the Watergate scandal and forced resignation of President Nixon; the decline of the economy; and the Democratic landslide in the 1974 congressional and gubernatorial elections. The prospect of electoral victory would, we thought, increase the willingness on the part of dele-

[8] A more extensive report on our study of this conference is part of our book on contemporary convention behavior. See Denis G. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Pressman, and F. Christopher Arterton, *Explorations in Convention Decision-Making: The Democratic Party in the 1970s* (San Francisco, 1976). We are grateful to the Ford Foundation for supporting our research effort.

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gates to compromise their differences in the interests of party unity. And this would increase the possibilities for legitimation to take place.

As to research design, in 1972 we had limited ourselves to interviewing delegates over the course of the convention; in 1974 we decided to supplement our interviews over the three-day period with a mailed preconference and postconference questionnaire. Thus we would have three points in time for the examination of changes in perceptions and attitudes.[9] Our questionnaires, as well as our interview form, were designed to explore the delegates' conceptions of (1) their roles at Kansas City, (2) where the important decisional arenas would be, (3) which groups or institutions would be (or had been) most powerful at the conference, and (4) their attitudes toward the charter issues and major participants. We tried, as much as possible, to phrase preconference and postconference questions in the same words. For the most part, our questions carried on the kind of inquiry we had begun in our work on the 1972 Democratic convention. To supplement the questionnaires as a way of studying the conference, members of our research team observed meetings of state delegations and group caucuses (of women, blacks, labor delegates, and so forth). We also made use of access to the floor of the conference to talk to delegates and observe the activities of various groups. Thus our data consist of written questionnaires, oral interviews, and observations of convention activity itself.

Before turning to the empirical results in our three main areas of concern—cleavages, decision making, and legitimation—let us briefly consider the genesis of this conference, the substantive issues considered there, and the composition of the delegates.

The Making of a Charter Conference

The Democrats' 1974 charter conference was a unique event in American political history. It was the first time that a United States political party had held a midterm meeting of this kind. And the charter ratified at the conference represented the first formal constitution ever adopted by a major American party.

In the year before the 1972 convention, two commissions of the national Democratic party—the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Rules and the

[9] Our research process went as follows: As soon as delegates lists became available to us in November 1974, we mailed out our preconference questionnaire to a random sample of 460 delegates; 284 (62 percent) returned the questionnaire before the convening of the conference. At the conference, we interviewed a random sample of delegates whose names were drawn from the original list of 460 delegates. There were 165 delegates in this sample, and we were able to complete interviews with 142 (85 percent) of them. Finally, after the conference, we drew an additional sample including all those who had completed the oral interview at the convention plus most of those who had completed the preconvention questionnaires. Of the 344 questionnaires mailed out, 182 (53 percent) were returned. The response seemed a bit low, so we checked the composition of the preconvention sample against that of the postconvention. The only statistically significant difference concerned representation of blacks. It dropped substantially in the postconvention sample.

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Commission on Convention Rules—met in joint session to draft a proposed charter for the party to be submitted to the 1972 national convention. Just prior to that convention, in an accommodation reached between Senator McGovern and congressional leaders troubled by many of the proposed articles, a substitute resolution was offered in place of the charter. That resolution, which was passed on the hectic last night of the convention, established a new commission to hold hearings and write another charter draft and mandated a national conference to ratify the document.

During 1973 and 1974, the charter commission met under the chairmanship of Terry Sanford, former governor of North Carolina. The most important of the provisions contained in the charter's twelve articles can be grouped into three broad categories. First, the document distributed power between the various national institutions of the party; here, the charter provisions did little more than enshrine existing procedures. A second set of provisions contained the possibility of constructing strong new centralized party structures which, if passed in the form desired by the more ardent "reformers," would have represented substantial political change. Four new organizational units were established by the final document: a Judicial Council, a National Finance Council, a National Education and Training Council, and the possibility of holding future conferences at the midpoint of the presidential term. For each of these, the independence, flexibility, and breadth of the mandate provided by the charter enacted at Kansas City fell short of the goals of those who had initially proposed such institutions.

The third major area legislated in Kansas City, and the issue which drew most of the energies of the participants, concerned rules for group representation in party processes. Since 1968, the subject of group representation—for blacks, women, and young people—has been at the heart of many party debates. At the 1974 conference, controversy centered on Article 10, Section 6 of the charter, which set procedures for challenging future convention delegations on the basis of inadequate representation of these groups. Because that section of the charter appeared to place the burden of proof on the challenging group, the Black and Women's Caucuses vowed to fight for the elimination of Article 10, Section 6 at Kansas City. Although they were not able to achieve that goal, the two group caucuses—ultimately aided by Democratic governors, liberal labor leaders, and National Chairman Robert Strauss—were able to modify the language so as to make challenges easier.

The analysis of delegate composition at Kansas City yields some interesting findings. (Delegates were selected for the charter conference through formal procedures and institutions similar to those for national conventions: caucus systems, state conventions, state committees, and primaries.) Table 1 shows that the increase from 1972 to 1974 in the number of party professionals was startling. Although we expected the charter conference to attract those involved in party affairs, we were somewhat surprised to discover the percentage of party officeholders to be five times as high in 1974 as in either 1968 or 1972. And consistent with this finding, Table 1 shows a sharp increase in the percentage of strong party

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TABLE 1

Changes in Political Experience of Convention Delegates from the 1968 to the 1974 Kansas City Convention[a]

	Entry is Percent of Delegates Who:			
	Hold Party Office	*Hold Effective Office*	*Were Delegates at Prior Conventions*	*Identify Strongly with Democratic Party*
1968	14	18	34	–
1972	14	17	16	63
1974	70	31	31	88

[a]The 1968 data are from John E. Schofield, *1968 Presidential Nominating Convention*, Project IMPRESS. The 1972 data are from CBS and D. Sullivan et al., *The Politics of Representation* (New York, 1974). The 1974 data are from our questionnaires. The Kansas City project is based on a sample of elected, not ex-officio, delegates.

The party identification question is almost identical to the standard University of Michigan Survey Research Center question. In 1972 it was asked orally; in 1974 it was on mailed preconvention and postconvention questionnaires.

identifiers (63 to 88 percent) as well as a substantial increase in the percentage of delegates with prior convention experience.

If selection as a delegate in 1974 is an indicator of political strength, then the results are mixed for the groups that scored representational breakthroughs in 1972. Table 2 shows that the women retained in 1974 the level they had achieved two years earlier, while nonwhites and young people dropped back to a level midway between 1972 and 1974. The Kansas City meeting certainly did nothing to dispel the belief that party elites are essentially middle to upper class in social background. In fact, the percentage of delegates who had completed college rose from 58 percent in 1972 to 70 percent in 1974, a level exceeding 1968 (61 percent). Still, those who feel that lawyers are overrepresented in party elites will find some small satisfaction in their continued decline.

A final point of interest in terms of delegate composition is the extent to which insurgents appear to be moving into party and elective positions. At the 1974 conference, delegates who had supported McGovern in 1972 were just as likely to be party officeholders as were Humphrey supporters and were just slightly less likely to hold elective office.

Persistent Cleavages

As Lipset has pointed out in a different context, a developmental crisis will occur in any political system when sharp differences in policy orientation are coupled with challenges to the legitimacy of the rules under which decisions are made.[10] Within the Democratic party since 1968, attitudes toward party reform have been closely related to attitudes toward candidates, issues, and groups. The Lip-

[10] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960), pp. 64–86.

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TABLE 2

Changes in Social Background of Convention Delegates from the Democratic 1968 to the 1974 Kansas City Convention[a]

	Percent of Delegates				
	Age: > = 35	*Race: White*	*Sex: Male*	*Education: > = College*	*Law Degree*
1968	88	94	86	61	31
1972	62	80	64	58	28
1974	73	87	64	70	21

[a]For sources see note to Table 1.

set model suggests that stability will be restored when attitudes toward reform groups, reform issues, and reform candidates are no longer correlated with attitudes toward the legitimacy of the party organization within which conflict takes place.

At first glance, it might seem impossible for a party as sharply divided as the Democrats have been to hold a convention without suffering an outbreak of sustained hostility. But at the charter conference, the delegates did not engage in the hostile behavior that some observers had predicted.[11] Indeed, party leaders were so insistent on the appearance of unity that one might be tempted to conclude that the basic conflict between old and new elements in the party was a thing of the past. And if support for the conference as a whole is a good indicator, then the Kansas City meeting was as successful as those leaders have advertised. Eighty-four percent of the delegates sampled in our postconvention questionnaire responded to a query on how much the charter conference had helped or hurt the party (on a +3 to −3 scale) with either a +2 or +3. And of particular importance is the fact that those who preferred McGovern in 1972 and those who supported one of the "regular" candidates (Humphrey, Muskie, or Jackson) in that year, were equally supportive in their evaluation of the 1974 meeting.

But other evidence shows a continuation of the cleavages that plagued the party in 1972 and that threaten to reappear in the future. For example, those 1974 delegates who had supported McGovern prior to the 1972 convention still differed markedly in political style from those delegates who had supported Humphrey, Muskie, or Jackson. In 1972, 83 percent of McGovernites and 45 percent of the "regular" candidates' supporters had exhibited "purist" styles, according to our measurement.[12] And in 1974 this difference persisted; 70 percent of former McGovernites, but only 39 percent of the "regular" candidates' supporters, were classified as "purists."

[11] See, for example, Christopher Lydon, "Divided Democrats Face Major Fight at Charter Convention in Kansas City," *The New York Times*, October 16, 1974, and Alan L. Otten, "Squabbling Democrats May Widen Their Rifts at Charter Session," *Wall Street Journal*, December 2, 1974.

[12] See Sullivan et al., *The Politics of Representation*, chap. 5.

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TABLE 3

Differences in Rating of Democratic Party among McGovernites and Regulars from 1972–1974

	Attitude Toward Democratic Party		
	McGovern Supporters in 1972	*Supporters of HHH-Jackson-Muskie in 1972*	*Difference*
1972	+1.70	+2.37	−.67
1974	+1.44	+2.34	−.90

NOTE: Entries are average (mean) ratings on a +3 to −3 scale.

Additional evidence for the maintenance of old cleavages comes when we examine attitudes toward party among McGovernites and the supporters of "regular" candidates. In both 1972 and 1974 we asked our delegates to rate the Democratic party on a +3 to −3 scale. Table 3 reports average support scores for our delegate sample at the 1972 convention and for 1974 delegates who told us they had supported either McGovern or a "regular" candidate prior to the 1972 convention.

Two conclusions emerge from an examination of Table 3. First, the average level of support for the Democratic party is far weaker among McGovernites than among regulars in both 1972 and 1974. Second, there is little change from 1972 to 1974; if anything, the differences in support are more pronounced in 1974 than in 1972.

Thus, groups who have disagreed about candidates continue to disagree in their evaluations of the party itself. (We have made use elsewhere[13] of a factor analysis to compare the cleavage structures in the 1972 convention with our 1974 conference data. Although there is some evidence of change, substantial persistence in internal party cleavages remains.)

Some viewed the basic cleavage at Kansas City as being between those who wanted a strong, national issue-oriented party and those who were content to see the party exist as a collection of fragmented, decentralized bodies. For example, just before the charter conference, political scientist James MacGregor Burns published his thoughts on the relationship between the business of the conference and a reversal of the historical decline in party structures:

> So the real issue at the mini-convention will not be between regulars and reformers, nor between liberals and conservatives nor between blacks and whites. It will be between those who believe in party organization in the best old-fashioned sense and those who don't care if the parties die because they will be happy in a non-party politics of powerful personal campaign organizations . . . a politics that plays up campaign celebrities and plays down campaign issues.[14]

[13] See Sullivan et al., *Explorations in Convention Decision-Making*, chap. 3.

[14] James MacGregor Burns, "Kansas City Scenario," *Washington Post*, December 5, 1974. Burns's outlook is similar to those of "responsible party" advocates, who have traditionally

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An examination of delegate attitudes and behavior, however, shows that it would be misleading to think of the conference as a battle between proponents and opponents of powerful centralized parties. For one thing, our research showed that the attention of most delegates was focused on specific charter provisions rather than on broad organizational issues. And the issue that evoked most interest was affirmative action for group representation; the charter provisions on centralization of the party evoked very little interest among most delegates.

Furthermore, those who favored strong national party institutions were themselves split into two groups: those (like James MacGregor Burns and Representative Donald Fraser) who saw a strong national party as an important goal in itself and those (like many Black and Women's Caucus activists) who saw national party organizations as a vehicle for ensuring more adequate representation of certain social groups in state and local party affairs. The fact that a number of people in this latter group seemed willing to give up their party identification when it did not serve their groups' interests heightened the doubts of state and local party leaders about the desirability of strengthening national party institutions.

If party centralization did not become a major issue at the conference, the question of group representation certainly did. And this was an indication of the increased power of the Black and Women's Caucuses, our next topic of analysis.

Decision Making: The Institutionalization of Group Caucuses

In 1972, the experience of the group caucuses was not a happy one. Although there were meetings during convention week of a Black Caucus, Women's Caucus, and Youth Caucus (as well as a Latin Caucus, Senior Citizens' Caucus, and Jewish Caucus), none of these groups was able to become a major arena of decision making at the convention, and most could not even make a sustained claim on the attention of their potential members.

The group caucuses' failure to meet expectations in 1972 can be explained by reference to a number of recurring organizational problems. One of these was the problem of time; because of the fast pace and heavy workload of the convention itself, delegates could not afford the time to attend special caucus meetings. Another problem was that of self-definition; it proved difficult for these groups to set and maintain their own boundaries. For example, the Black Caucus tried to restrict its membership to delegates and alternates, but found it impossible to enforce this restriction. A final and crucial problem for the special caucuses was that other organizations, notably candidate organizations, felt their own goals might

called for the creation of strong, centralized, issue-oriented parties in America. See, in particular, E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942); and "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties," American Political Science Association, *American Political Science Review*, Supplement, 44, no. 3 (September 1950), part 2.

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be threatened by the existence of strong, independent group caucuses. And those who had a stake in the nomination of a particular candidate proved to be unwilling to drop their commitment to that candidate in favor of loyalty to a group caucus.

Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that the 1972 delegates were not impressed by the caucuses' importance as decisional arenas. Our research on that convention showed that, as convention week progressed, delegates decreased their estimates of the importance of group caucuses. Although the caucuses seemed clearly to have fallen short of their initial goals (drawing up issue platforms and then bargaining with candidates to secure their support for those platforms), the perception of failure was far more pronounced among nonmembers than members. In fact, in the cases of young people and blacks, there developed over the course of the convention a rather peculiar phenomenon in which the perception of one's own group as a potentially important decisional arena increased while the nonmember's perception went in the opposite direction. In the *Politics of Representation*[15] we cited this as evidence of the growing insulation of the caucus movement.

In 1974, the results were quite different. As we had done in 1972, we developed a questionnaire instrument allowing us to assess change in delegates' perceptions of important decisional arenas. Because a short three-day convention offered neither observer nor participant sufficient time to do much observing or participating, we examined the perceived importance of arenas by comparing answers to preconvention and postconvention questionnaires. The results, shown in Figure 1, indicate that the perception of caucus importance at Kansas City grew equally among caucus members and nonmembers. As befits a convention in which caucus groups were remarkably effective, there was a growing belief in their importance as arenas.

From the beginning of the conference, the Black and Women's Caucuses concentrated their attention on Article 10, Section 6 of the proposed party charter—which spelled out the guidelines for challenging delegations on affirmative action grounds. Ultimately, these two group caucuses were able to persuade a number of other important actors—first some liberal union leaders, then Democratic governors, then party chairman Robert Strauss, and finally a majority of the delegates—to support them in altering Article 10, Section 6 to make affirmative action challenges easier to sustain. In their analyses of the convention, journalists credited the Black and Women's Caucuses with having won a significant victory.[16]

[15] See chap. 3.

[16] See, for example, Jules Witcover and Austin Scott, " 'Unity' Hailed by Strauss," *Washington Post*, December 9, 1974; and R. W. Apple, Jr., "Recasting McGovern Reforms," *The New York Times*, December 9, 1974. The following indicates the text of Article 10, Section 6, as adopted. The part of the wording that is crossed out indicates what was deleted from the original proposal and the italicized words were those added as part of the final compromise:

"Performance under an approved affirmative action plan and composition of the convention

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FIGURE 1

Changes in Perception of Caucus Importance among Caucus Members and Nonmembers[a]



[a]The wording of the question was as follows: "Where do you expect the most important decisions at the conference to be made?" A list of arenas followed and the delegate was asked to circle one name. A caucus member was a delegate who described his role at Kansas City as a member of one of the caucus groups.

Why were the group caucuses, after having been so frustrated in 1972, able to exert substantial influence on the outcome in 1974? To answer this question, we

delegation shall be considered relevant evidence in the challenge, ~~but composition alone shall not constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination, nor shall it shift the burden of proof to the challenged party~~. *of any state delegation.* If a state party has adopted and implemented an approved *and monitored* affirmative action program, the party shall not be subject to challenge based solely on delegation composition or *solely on* primary results."

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must look at changes both in the outside environment and within the caucuses themselves.

Perhaps the most crucial difference in the external environment in 1974, as opposed to 1972, was the absence of active candidate organizations which could compete with the caucuses for delegates' time and loyalty. There were presidential candidates—both announced and unannounced—at the Kansas City meeting, but candidate organizations did not take an active role in the struggles over the charter. The caucuses were also aided by a convention schedule that was more relaxed than the hectic pace of 1972; delegates had more time to attend group caucus meetings.

A further environmental factor that aided the Black and Women's Caucuses was the split that existed among the labor delegates at the convention. Although AFL-CIO President George Meany and his chief political aide, Al Barkan (director of the Committee on Political Education) had been the chief antagonists of the black and women's caucuses in party struggles over group representation and affirmative action, it soon became clear at Kansas City that Meany and Barkan did not speak for all of labor. Indeed, liberal unions—American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Communications Workers of America, United Auto Workers, and Machinists—offered crucial support to the demands of women and minorities. Finally, the Democratic governors at the conference, by agreeing to work for changes in the language of Article 10, Section 6, provided legitimacy to the position of the women and minorities.

Besides being helped by certain external factors, the Black and Women's Caucuses also were aided in achieving their objectives by the internal institutionalization they were able to develop. In his study of organizational development in the House of Representatives, Polsby includes the following characteristics among his indices of "institutionalization":

> (1) [An institutionalized organization] is relatively well-bounded, that is to say, differentiated from its environment.
>
> (2) The organization is relatively complex, that is, its functions are internally separated on some regular and explicit basis. . . .[17]

One important difference between the group caucus experiences in 1972 and 1974 was that, in the latter year, the caucuses were better able to define their membership, to set boundaries between themselves and the outside environment. In 1972, the Black Caucus had found it impossible to limit its own membership. But in 1974, that caucus carefully excluded all but delegates and alternates from its deliberations, even going so far as to rope off a special section for observers.

A second difference between the caucuses in 1972 and 1974 was the increased internal complexity and organization that could be observed at Kansas City. In 1972, both the Black and Women's Caucuses had existed largely as forums to hear

[17] Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U. S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March 1968), 144–168.

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presidential candidates and to listen to speeches by their own members. Neither group had developed a communication system for the convention floor or a stable leadership structure. But in 1974, both caucuses had more sophisticated operations. Each developed a detailed communication network, dividing the convention floor into sectors and appointing coordinators for each sector. And in both the Black and Women's Caucuses at Kansas City, small groups of prominent delegates were selected to serve as steering committees. After having observed the relatively formless and chaotic group meetings at the 1972 convention, we were struck by the degree to which caucus leaders in 1974 were able to hold caucus members' attention and direct their energies.

Although the members of the Black and Women's Caucuses had reason to feel satisfaction about the outcome of the conference, we might expect other delegates to express less pleasure with the outcome (particularly since one strategy used by the caucuses was the threat of a black walkout). How did the delegates end up viewing the conference and the legitimacy of its decisions? What were the forces working for conciliation at Kansas City, and how did various groups of delegates come to terms with the outcome? It is to this set of questions that we now turn.

Legitimation

Political scientists have often commented upon the unifying and legitimating functions of conventions.[18] But, as recent convention experiences have shown, conventions are not automatically unifying occasions and their results are not necessarily perceived as legitimate by all segments of the party. Given this background, the degree of harmony that prevailed at the charter conference was remarkable. We take the delegates' rating (+3 to −3) of how much the conference helped or hurt the party as our basic measure of legitimation. And the fact that 84 percent of the delegates at Kansas City answered either +2 or +3 is impressive testimony to the solidarity-building function of the conference.

The degree of delegates' satisfaction with the outcome can be explained by reference to the following factors: the nature of a charter conference; conditions in the larger political environment; and the existence of mechanisms by which a variety of groups could come to terms with the result.

At a presidential nominating convention, it is often difficult for the losing faction to reconcile itself to the outcome, for the stakes are large and not divisible. The presidency is a large prize indeed, and there is little solace for those who back a losing candidate. Because winners and losers are so clearly defined, it is hard for all delegates to imagine themselves winners.

Party charter conferences, on the other hand, resemble legislative bodies in that they offer a variety of ways for their members to see themselves as winners.

[18] See, for example, V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York, 1964), p. 430 ff.

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First, instead of one big prize—the nomination for president—there are a number of charter provisions. Thus, it is possible for a delegate to lose on one provision and win on another. Second, the ambiguity of each provision and the uncertainty as to its consequences allow delegates to interpret the adoption of a plan as being in their own interest. Third, compromise can be achieved by simply changing a few words or altering the punctuation.

A charter provides substantial resources for arranging compromises of this sort. Enterprising leaders can come together to arrange compromises so that each can report to his or her followers that the group has won on the essential points, or that the word changes do not really mean anything. In Kansas City, there was considerable uncertainty about the precise meaning of Article 10, Section 6, and about the impact that various wording alterations would have. This enabled caucus and party leaders to explain the final compromise to their followers in different ways. Black and women activists told their groups that the word changes were significant, while governors assured members of their own delegations that the changes would not have much of an impact.

Conditions in the broader political environment also facilitated unity and legitimation at Kansas City. As we suggested in *The Politics of Representation*,[19] the energy that fuels the process of mutual adjustment and eventual legitimation is the prospect of winning office. And at Kansas City, the events of 1973 and 1974 had created an expectation among delegates that a united party could easily take the White House in 1976. For a variety of reasons—the prospect of election victory in 1976, the realization that the state of the economy was an issue that could unify the party, the sense that the divisive effects of the Vietnam war issue were past—the desire for party unity was strong.

A final factor facilitating legitimation was the ability of a wide range of delegates to come to terms with the final result. This was facilitated by the nature of the affirmative action compromise, which was sufficiently ambiguous to allow a variety of groups to see themselves as "winning," or, in a minimal sense, "not losing." But how were diverse groups able to reconcile themselves with the outcome? For the group caucus members, the answer was relatively easy: the charter changes favored them and they accepted the arguments of their leaders that they had won a victory. But what about delegates who were not members of, or supporters of, the caucuses? Here, the answer appears to be that such people could identify with the "party regular" participants in the compromise—the governors, the Democratic National Committee, the Charter Commission, and national chairman Robert Strauss. (It should be remembered that even so "regular" a party leader as Mayor Richard Daley supported the compromise.) By imputing power to groups he or she supported, a delegate could experience a sense of power and satisfaction as well.

We can see how this process worked by focusing on the women delegates. Women at the conference were by no means united behind the Women's Caucus.

[19] See chap. 5.

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In fact, a little less than one-third of the women delegates identified themselves as caucus members. Women nonmembers tended to identify themselves with regular party leaders and channels. Each delegate was asked in both the pre- and postconvention questionnaire which group would be (or was) most powerful in determining the conference outcome. While both female members and nonmembers of the Women's Caucus increased their estimates of that caucus' power, the increase among members was far greater than that among female nonmembers. In the preconvention period, 11 percent of the caucus members and 2 percent of female nonmembers saw the Women's Caucus as the most powerful group; in the postconvention questionnaire, 32 percent of caucus members and 5 percent of female nonmembers saw the caucus as most powerful. On the other hand, women who were not Women's Caucus members greatly increased their estimation of the power of party regulars at the conference, while Women's Caucus members decreased their assessment of the regulars' power. In the preconference period, 9 percent of the female nonmembers thought of the party regulars as the most powerful group, while 19 percent of the Women's Caucus members had this perception. But in the postconference questionnaire, 53 percent of the female nonmembers—as opposed to 6 percent of the caucus members—saw the regulars as the most powerful group.

Thus, each faction—female caucus members and nonmembers—attributes power to the group with which it is most clearly identified. This facilitates, in turn, the sense of most delegates that their own groups got what they wanted. (A similar phenomenon was observed in the case of labor delegates, who also attributed increasing power to party regular groups with whom they identified.)[20]

Toward Further Change?

Given the recent turbulent history of party conventions, the persistence of internal cleavages, and the difficulty of creating the conditions facilitating legitimation, it is no wonder that observers have continued to search for ways to change the nominating system. For if conventions cannot, in V. O. Key's words, provide "a means for the contending candidates, factions, and interests within a party to consult and agree upon the terms on which they will work together,"[21] then their usefulness is severely limited.

Faced with the prospect of future nonunifying conventions and further arguments over the application of reform rules, some critics of the recent Democratic party reforms have urged a return to pre-Reform Commission procedures.[22] With party professionals once again in charge of conventions, it is argued, the potential for controversy and for party splits would be reduced. But it is far from clear

[20] See Sullivan et al., *Explorations in Convention Decision-Making*, chap. 5.

[21] Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, p. 431.

[22] See, for example, Coalition for a Democratic Majority, *Towards Fairness and Unity for 1976* (Washington, D. C., 1973).

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that the Democrats would be able to return to the old ways of doing things. As the Kansas City conference demonstrated, blacks and women activists have substantially solidified their organizational positions since 1972 and will strongly resist any attempt at what they feel is a move to dilute their strength at future conventions. Furthermore, we should be careful not to romanticize the prereform era; there were serious problems of timeliness, inadequate rules, and secrecy at various stages of the process.

Another response to the complex problems of party conventions might be to abolish these meetings and go to a national primary system for selecting nominees. But there are a number of problems with a national primary. First, some difficult procedural questions must be answered: Would a majority be necessary for nomination or only a plurality? Would there be a provision for a runoff in the event that no candidate achieved a specified percentage of the vote? Also, the introduction of a national primary would raise particularly serious problems for candidates who lack the necessary resources to mount campaigns in all fifty states. In the present system, candidates who start with relatively few resources can parlay early primary victories into increased support as the nomination process goes on. Finally, the introduction of a national primary would take away one of the incentives for party work—the chance to go to a convention—and thus further the trend toward the atrophy of political parties.[23]

Another possible choice for the future, of course, is to keep the present system, perhaps with some incremental changes in response to particular demands of a changing political environment. Under the post-1968 reforms, the Democratic party's nominating process has been made considerably more open and previously underrepresented groups have increased their participation. But the 1972 convention did not have the legitimating and unifying effects that political scientists have celebrated, and our 1974 data provide evidence of a continuation of the cleavages which have plagued the party in its recent past. Thus, we must ask if there is a way to increase the unity and legitimation orientation of delegates. Some solutions to this problem have a *deus ex machina* quality—the emergence of a presidential candidate acceptable to all party factions or the emergence of an issue that greatly increases the party's chances of victory. In the absence of such solutions, it might be worthwhile for the party to try to build a strong set of agreed-upon procedures before the convention to resolve delegate selection disputes. If party judicial institutions could be formed that were made up of widely respected (and candidate-neutral) party figures, perhaps some of the factional wrangling could be dissipated in the months before the convention.

Unfortunately for those who would like to solve a party's problems by writing a new set of rules, convention behavior is closely linked to broader forces. No set of rules can make the issue and style polarization in the Democratic party

[23] For a good discussion of the implications of a national primary, see Polsby and Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, pp. 234–253.

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disappear, or arrest the decline in party identification, or erase the tension between special group caucuses and traditional party organizations. Rules changes can alter the distribution of power within a party, but they cannot abolish the realities of underlying political trends.

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Television Coverage of Presidential Conventions: Now You See It, Now You Don't

DAVID L. PALETZ
MARTHA ELSON

Just prior to the opening of the 1972 Democratic convention in Miami Beach, NBC anchorman John Chancellor declared: "Convention coverage is the most important thing we do. The conventions are not just political theater, but really serious stuff, and that's why all the networks have an obligation to give gavel-to-gavel coverage. It's a time when we all ought to be doing our duty."[1] This same "duty-conscious" anchorman, giving a nod toward the podium reluctantly suggested at 1:34 A.M. during the first session of the convention, while the speeches on the Illinois challenge were being delivered: "Maybe we should go listen. Frankly, it's not the most interesting stuff in the world."[2] Later, perhaps in an effort to inject a bit of seasoning into the convention "stuff," Chancellor brought NBC coverage of the third session

[1] *The New York Times*, July 6, 1972, p. 75.

[2] All quotations from NBC's coverage of the 1972 Democratic National Convention are taken from the Vanderbilt Television Archive videotapes of the convention. We are deeply indebted to this organization and especially to Mr. James Pilkington for providing the facilities and tapes which enabled us to watch the networks' coverage. By videotaping and preserving the three networks' evening news shows and other politically relevant programs, and by making them available for analysis, the Archive provides a valuable service which scholars should cherish and protect.

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to a jarring conclusion with the remark that the Democrats had just nominated "George McGovern, a man who was called by one of his associates earlier this year, a humble, self-effacing, ego maniac" (12 midnight, July 12).

These three comments by Chancellor suggest why television coverage of the Democratic and Republican National Presidential Nominating Conventions has been subject to sometime vigorous, albeit not always intelligent or disinterested criticism. Yet scholarly analyses of the coverage are sparse.[3] We shall therefore begin by considering the criticisms of television convention coverage. Then we will very briefly compare the experiences of North Carolina delegates who participated in the 1972 Democratic gathering with the reactions of their friends and acquaintances who watched events on television back home. We next quantitatively content analyze NBC's coverage of the convention in terms of the critics' comments and delegates' experiences. A theoretical, qualitative analysis follows in which we suggest (among other things) that coverage is a sort of shell game because of the television production processes, techniques followed by television newspersons, inattention and intermittent viewing by the audience, and the protean quality of the convention itself. We shall conclude by developing the political implications of our data and analysis.

Criticisms of Television Coverage of Conventions

A prominent issue is whether the networks should provide gavel-to-gavel coverage or resort to selective airing of the most significant portions of the conventions mainly during prime time. ABC has offered such abbreviated coverage during recent conventions. Those who endorse limited coverage contend that much of what happens at conventions is boring and unimportant to viewers and should therefore be skipped.

More important than this issue is the question of the content television should offer in its coverage, irrespective of how long that coverage lasts. A primary point of contention is whether networks should keep their television cameras trained almost exclusively on the podium throughout the convention (as PBS did at the 1972 Democratic convention) or mix podium coverage with coverage of outside events, delegates on the floor, interviews, and analysis and commentary. Critics of the latter type of coverage insist that it is irritating, extraneous, and unfair to those

[3] Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang pioneered convention research with their study of events in 1952; see their *Politics and Television* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 78–211. Less sophisticated is Herbert Waltzer, "In the Magic Lantern: Television Coverage of the 1964 National Conventions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (Spring 1966), 35–53. Also see David L. Paletz, "Delegates' Views of TV Coverage of the 1968 Democratic Convention," *Journal of Broadcasting*, 16 (Fall 1972), 441–451.

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who want to watch all the "convention proper." They contend that podium events are the most important aspect of the convention and should therefore receive comprehensive coverage.[4] Comparing the convention to a football game, Edwin L. Dale writes: "Strangely, the football fan wants to watch even the dull moments like penalties, just to be sure what happened." And he complains: "If we wanted to know how New Mexico voted at 5 A.M. on abortion, we heard useless gabble by Cronkite, Chancellor or Brinkley. If we wanted to hear at least a snatch of the debate on the proposed Wallace amendments to the platform, we could not. Instead, we heard endless interviews with Gary Hart, or Dolph Briscoe or I. W. Abel or God knows who else." In short, he claims, "We were not allowed to watch and listen to the *convention*."[5]

In defense of their policy, the networks counter that there is more to the convention than just podium events. As NBC president Reuven Frank said before the Democratic convention: "We will cut away from the podium as we see fit. We are there not to *carry* the convention. We are there to *report* the convention."[6] NBC anchorman David Brinkley also argued that: "The convention essentially is not on the rostrum. The delegates on the floor *are* the convention, and it is impossible to report a convention without reporting on them. It may well be that some of us talk too much, but it is also true that at a convention, there are long periods—a half hour, or longer—when absolutely no business is being done and when, in fact, the rostrum is empty and quiet. And we do have to put something on the air. And so we do the only thing we can do—we interview delegates and others."[7] And: "If we kept the cameras on the rostrum continuously, never looking elsewhere for news, insights, sidebars, explanations and background, the television audience would hear a vast Niagara of speeches and partisan rhetoric. It would know who was nominated but not much else."[8]

Although some of the criticism of network strategy is directed strictly at the policy of covering extra-podium events, much more seems to be aimed at the value of this coverage. Thus, the implication of Dale's use of such phrases as "useless gabble" from commentators and "endless interviews" is that if commentary were "useful" and interviews short and enlightening, the extra-podium coverage would be at least more acceptable to its critics. Marvin Barrett accuses the networks of ignoring

[4] William Shannon, *The New York Times*, August 15, 1972, p. 35.

[5] Edwin L. Dale, "But We Wanted to See the Convention," *Columbia Journalism Review*, 11 (September–October 1972), 49–50.

[6] Quoted in Marvin Barrett (ed.), *The Politics of Broadcasting* (New York, 1973), p. 120. We assume the emphases are Frank's not Barrett's.

[7] *The New York Times*, August 23, 1972, p. 41.

[8] Ibid.

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the significant "in favor of the inconsequential or inscrutable."[9] And Judith Parris, in a book published before the 1972 conventions, comments on the undesirable repercussions of this allegedly "hit or miss" strategy in interviewing and covering speeches: "Not only may the frivolous or irrelevant get as much time as the significant; they may be made thereby to appear equally important."[10]

Other criticisms of the manner in which coverage is conducted are that it emphasizes the sensational, the controversial, and the unusual. Parris writes that one way television shapes or distorts a convention is "that reporters try to make the conventions and other political events more dramatic than they actually are."[11] All this leads to the general criticism made primarily by politicians, more often privately than publicly, that television convention coverage is sometimes biased in favor of or against particular candidates, issues, or groups.

We have adumbrated the main criticisms directed at television coverage of national conventions in general and the 1972 Democratic affair in particular. Most emanated from journalists, political scientists, and other professional observers. The criticisms acquire additional weight if corroborated or lose some of their cogency if denied by the delegates. Accordingly, before analyzing the actual television content, we will very briefly discuss the impressions and reactions to the convention of a sample of delegates and their nondelegate friends.

The Delegates' Views

Fifty-seven of the sixty-four North Carolina delegates were asked a series of questions concerning their experiences at the 1972 Democratic convention, television coverage, and the relationship of the two.[12] The main objectives of the questions were to ascertain in what ways, if any, television's portrayal of the convention was different from the actual convention as the delegates observed and experienced it.

Two different approaches were used to ascertain how the live convention differed from the image presented on television. The first was to ask the delegates, "How was the reality of the 1972 convention different from what you've seen on television in the past?" Over 83 percent indicated that there were differences, the most pronounced of which were order-

[9] Barrett, *Politics of Broadcasting*, p. 123.

[10] Judith H. Parris, *The Convention Problem* (Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 169.

[11] Ibid., p. 146.

[12] We are deeply indebted to the North Carolina delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention who submitted to lengthy personal interviews on a variety of convention-related subjects. Without their generous cooperation this portion of the study would have been impossible. Figures given in the text refer to the percentage of delegates responding.

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liness of proceedings (47.2 percent) and behavior of delegates (31.4 percent). The convention had been more orderly than they had expected. For example, one said that on television the convention "seemed more chaotic" (43) than it was in reality.[13] Another observed: "There was a vast difference between viewing it and being there" (8). A third pointed out that television had not shown campaigning strategies by the rank-and-file delegates and that there was less "back room" (more "open") campaigning than she had expected (62).

It is possible that delegates at the 1972 Democratic affair simply were more orderly, diligent, serious, and conscientious than their Democratic and Republican predecessors. To test such a possibility the delegates' perceptions of the 1972 convention were compared with the impressions of their friends who had viewed the convention on television and subsequently discussed it with the delegates.[14] When asked "Did friends at home who watched the 1972 Democratic convention on television have different impressions of the convention from your own?" over 63 percent answered "yes." The responses to the question, "How were they different?" consistently revealed that friends thought the convention was more conflictual and disorderly, excessively populated by "kooks." Some typical responses on "orderliness" were that friends:

> "thought it [the convention] was mass confusion when it wasn't." (24)
>
> "thought there were many riots and demonstrations." (27)
>
> "thought the convention was a circus." (39)
>
> "didn't think anything was accomplished or that anybody knew what they were doing." (23)

Regarding the type of delegates at the convention, delegates said friends:

> "told me it looked like it was a conglomeration of hippies, yippies, social rejects, reprobates, misfits, criminals." (35)
>
> "they thought it was dominated by gay liberation and other such factions, while I thought everybody had a say." (18)
>
> "thought it was a disorderly mass of liberals." (58)

Other comments were that television coverage specifically emphasized McGovern, did not devote sufficient attention to the activities of the delegates, and failed to keep viewers informed about the issues being debated at the convention. On party divisiveness, one said friends "thought the left took over more than it did and perceived a greater

[13] The number in parentheses is the delegate's confidential identification. A promise of anonymity was one way cooperation and candor from the delegates were facilitated.

[14] Given the natural proclivity of friends to avoid antagonizing each other, the most likely tendency of the data is to understate the differences between the delegates' experiences and their friends' television-derived images.

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division in the Party than really existed. The media's emphasis on party division was a prime cause of the division by the time of the election" (5). Another delegate said that for his friends, dissatisfaction with McGovern and disunity were emphasized rather than McGovern's widespread support among the delegates (7).

Obviously the data from this small sample of delegates do not constitute definitive evidence of the nature of television depiction of the convention. They do, however, corroborate the critics' accusations. Accordingly, trying to operationalize these charges, we started simply by attempting to analyze NBC television coverage of the 1972 Democratic convention quantitatively for (1) length of time devoted to podium events, analysis and commentary, interviews, and events outside the hall; (2) emphasis upon the "odd" or "important" elements among convention participants; (3) bias for or against McGovern; (4) emphasis upon disorder.[15]

Quantitative Analysis of NBC Television Coverage

Content was classified as "Interviews," "Analysis," "Outside," "Podium," and "Advertisements." "Interviews" consisted of question and answer segments conducted between network correspondents and convention participants inside the hall. "Analysis" included all commentary from the booth while the camera was focused on the booth, and any explanations or views expressed by reporters or Edwin Newman (located in his own booth) that were not part of an interview. "Outside" comprised segments shot anywhere outside the hall—reports from correspondents at campaign headquarters, shots of candidates leaving and arriving, etc. "Podium" included all segments of coverage in which the camera was directed at the podium or the hall (for instance, to show the parades), including those in which there was commentary in the background. The party films which were shown on television fell into this category. "Advertisements" consisted of the commercals. The amount of time devoted to each different segment of the coverage was noted. The names of those interviewed, the content of the questions from interviewers, and the remarks of anchormen and analysts also were written down, frequently as reasonably accurate quotations. Because of the difficulty of keeping track of the precise length of time devoted to each segment of the coverage, the times were noted in whole minutes.

[15] We must confess that the content analysis presented us with some difficult problems which, for lack of space, we omit here. We are certainly willing, however, to share our problems, procedures, and bibliographic survey with any interested readers who care to contact us.

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Length of Time Devoted to Coverage Categories

If the roughly two hours of preconvention coverage is subtracted from the total non-podium time, the data show that NBC devoted approximately the same amount of time to non-podium coverage (analysis, interviews, outside events) as to formal podium events (see Table 1). In its podium coverage, NBC tried to show the "major" speeches, while eliminating some seconding speeches, credentials' challenges speeches, and routine announcements. The objective seemed to be to try to give examples of podium activity in connection with each major issue considered. At each session, the largest portion of the non-podium coverage time was devoted to interviews, with analysis next, and outside coverage taking up the least time. That NBC did not devote even a *majority* of its time to podium events is fuel for critics who claim that television networks devote too much time to non-podium coverage. The results would clearly refute, nonetheless, any charges that in 1972, NBC emphasized events outside the hall. Certainly one reason for this is that there were very few to cover.

Emphasis upon "Odd" or "Important" Convention Participants

Reflecting on his defeat, Senator George McGovern observed: "I thought the convention was great, but what came across on television, apparently, to many of these guys was they saw a lot of aggressive women, they saw a lot of militant blacks, they saw long-haired kids, and I think that combination, which helped win the nomination for me, I think it offended a lot of them."[16] NBC coverage did frequently focus, in scanning shots, on blacks, "hippies," and young people, but just as often it showed middle-aged white delegates. The most common shot was that of different types seated in a group together. NBC's aim seemed merely to show the interesting mix of delegates. Of course the contrast of the variety of Democratic delegates with previous conventions and with delegates at the Republican affair might have been sufficient to give viewers the impression that the 1972 Democratic event was excessively peopled by unconventional types.

A less impressionistic test is to look at those interviewed. Approximately fifty-three individuals were interviewed twice or more by NBC, with McGovern campaign directors Gary Hart, nine times, and Frank Mankiewicz, six times, in the lead. More important, the general distinguishing characteristic of those interviewed more than once was a leadership role—all but eight were officeholders in either national, state,

[16] Hunter S. Thompson, *Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail* (San Francisco, 1973), pp. 470–471.

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TABLE 1

Length of Time Devoted to Coverage Categories

Session	*Ads*	*Interviews*	*Analysis*	*Outside*	*Total Non-Podium (excluding ads)*	*Podium*	*Total Coverage (excluding ads)*
First session 7/10–7/11	19 m.	2 hr. 17 m.	1 hr. 57 m.	10 m.	4 hr. 24 m.	4 hr. 44 m.	9 hr. 08 m.
Second session 7/11–7/12	37 m.	3 hr. 18 m.	2 hr. 06 m.	12 m.	5 hr. 36 m.	4 hr. 11 m.	9 hr. 47 m.
Third session 7/12–7/13	19 m.	1 hr. 19 m.	35 m.	35 m.	2 hr. 29 m.	2 hr. 39 m.	5 hr. 08 m.
Fourth session 7/13–7/14	39 m.	2 hr. 38 m.	1 hr. 24 m.	21 m.	4 hr. 23 m.	3 hr. 03 m.	7 hr. 26 m.
Total	1 hr. 54 m.	9 hr. 32 m.	6 hr. 02 m.	1 hr. 18 m.	16 hr. 52 m.	14 hr. 37 m.	31 hr. 29 m.

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TABLE 2

"Important" and "Rank-and-File" Participants Interviewed

Session	*Important*	*Rank-and-File*	*Total*
First session	58	3	61
Second session	69	18	87
Third session	39	5	44
Fourth session	69	6	75
Total	235	32	267

or local governing bodies, national organizations, or national presidential campaign organizations. And nearly all represented organizations or interest groups at odds at the convention. The only possible "kook" of the group was Chicago black "militant" Jesse Jackson. Only five were women, only one was under thirty, and only five were blacks.

A list of all the people interviewed each day was analyzed to determine the number of "rank and file" versus the number of "important" participants interviewed, and the number of "odd" participants versus the number of "normal" participants. For the first tally, those classed as "important" were: delegation chairmen, vice-chairmen, candidate campaign staff members or floor managers, governors, congressmen, candidates for governor, state legislators, national committeemen and women, leaders of credentials' challenges, and plank sponsors. All others were classed as "rank and file." The results are shown in Table 2.

The data show that, at least in interviewing, NBC did concentrate on the important participants. An individual who was not notable in some respect rarely was asked for his views on a convention issue. Only during the second session were more than a very few rank-and-file participants interviewed: Governor Wallace spoke that evening and members of his family and some of his supporters swell the rank-and-file.

For the next tally, those counted as "odd" convention participants were women, blacks, those under thirty, and "obvious kooks" (e.g., Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman). The results are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

"Odd" and "Normal" Participants Interviewed

Session	*Odd*	*Normal*	*Total*
First session	11	50	61
Second session	35	52	87
Third session	8	36	44
Fourth session	16	53	69
Total	70	191	261

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Even including women in the "odd" category, the number of interviews with such participants is far less than with the so-called normal type. Incidence, however, may have been as important as prevalence. Periodically showing the unusual delegates (unusual in terms of traditional convention norms) on the floor, interviewing some of them intermittently but regularly during the entire convention, commenting occasionally about their presence; all these actions on the part of NBC, journalistically valid as they may have been, provided a critical mass of information which disturbed some of the North Carolina delegates and their television-watching friends. Like some Americans, it made them look askance both at a convention peopled by such types and at the convention's nominees. Viewers may remember the "odd" types more often; nonetheless, the charge that NBC emphasized the unusual elements at the convention does not seem to be justified.

Bias For or Against McGovern

To test for bias for or against McGovern, interviewees were categorized according to their allegiance to candidates at the convention. The assumptions behind the allegiance method were, first, that in selecting the supporter of a certain candidate, the reporter is opening up the possibility that the interviewee will manage to work in some flattering remarks about the candidate or defense of him, no matter how derogatory the phrasing of the question; and second, that every time a supporter of a candidate is designated as such and then interviewed, the general support for the candidate is thereby emphasized. A "neutral" was a respondent who was not *clearly identified* in the interview as a supporter of a certain candidate and was not given the opportunity to express support or preference for a candidate. A special category dubbed "hostile" was established for those who were designated as opponents of McGovern.[17] The results appear in Table 4.

In general, the number of interviews with clearly identified candidate supporters decreased as McGovern's nomination became increasingly more assured. Also, the number of times the other candidates' supporters were interviewed seemed to be determined by the importance of the candidate on each particular day.

This pattern of interviewing is of the type that is generally considered "fair" and "objective"—that is, covering the events and people that have naturally emerged as the most important because of the course run by the convention, rather than covering "network favorites" who may not play an important role in the convention. Thus, as far as we could determine,

[17] Many labor leaders were aligned with Senator Jackson and identified, through their own comments or the introductory remarks of interviewers, as anti-McGovern.

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TABLE 4

Supporters of Candidates Interviewed during the Convention

Candidates	*First Session*	*Second Session*	*Third Session*	*Fourth Session*	*Total*
McGovern	19	21	11	12	63
Anti-Daley	3	1	2	none	6
Humphrey	10	1	2	1	14
Wallace	4	14	3	4	25
Muskie	4	2	none	3	9
Jackson (or Labor)	1	4	9	2	16
Daley	5	none	2	none	7
Chisolm	none	1	none	1	2
Hostile	3	none	none	1	4
Total Pro-McGovern (McGovern + Anti-Daley)	22	22	13	12	69
Anti-McGovern	27	22	16	12	77
Neutrals	12	43	10	45	110
Total Interviews	61	87	39	69	256

choices of whom to interview, for how long, what to ask them, and so on, did *not* appear to be made on the basis of the personal and political predispositions of anchormen and reporters.

Finally, if there were actual scenes of conflict and controversy at the convention NBC did not emphasize them. Only once or twice were interviews broadcast from sites where there was more than the usual commotion. David Brinkley even commented at one point, "A delegate notified us he would lead a group out when Wallace spoke. We did not put him on, and he did not walk out" (July 11, 10:22 P.M.).

Qualitative Analysis of NBC Television Coverage

Television personnel from all the networks strove at considerable expense and with extraordinary effort to capture the protean nature of the 1972 Democratic National Convention. Certainly NBC's coverage was *not deliberately* biased or distorted. The correspondents and anchormen appeared to do their best to be honest but fair in their descriptions and appraisals of events. Our data convince us, at least, that NBC's coverage of the convention did not ignore significant events in favor of the inconsequential, did not give the frivolous equal time with the important, did not feature "kooks" at the expense of important convention participants, and was not *deliberately* slanted either in favor of or against Senator George McGovern. Network executives and personnel can well contend that, given the sometime obduracy of convention organizers; the occasional deviousness and evasions of the candidates, their staffs,

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and many of their supporters; the exigencies of time; and the other obstacles to adequate coverage too numerous to mention; they did a reasonable job informing viewers of what was going on at the convention as it transpired.[18]

And yet, we are convinced of the authenticity, justifiability, and accuracy of the delegates' and critics' reactions to the television coverage. Their critique may have been faulty and misdirected, but their intuition seems correct. We too received the overwhelming impression that conflict, division, confusion, and disorder were rampant at the 1972 Democratic convention. The impression resulted from several factors, most of which could not be adequately captured and conveyed by a quantitative analysis. These factors are primarily a function of the journalistic and production norms and techniques which television news departments use to depict a national presidential convention.[19] They include the thematic approach inherent in the statements of anchormen and imperative in the questions posed by floor reporters; the tendency of those responsible for the coverage to juxtapose opposing views on the themes and issues with which the convention was concerned; reporters' interviewing techniques; access (what television can and cannot, or does not, show); visual techniques (including image switching, camera angles, brevity of scenes); and the activities, attitudes, and location of anchormen. Our examples and analysis follow.

Network news personnel no doubt approached the convention, as did most newsmen, with some ideas in mind of the important stories. These themes were raised and pursued through correspondents' questions and the summaries and analysis of anchormen. But such thematic emphases have effects; as Alfred North Whitehead observed: "Each mode of consideration is a sort of searchlight elucidating some of the facts and retreating the remainder into an omitted background."[20]

[18] With the conspicuous exception of the strategy and tactics involved in the defeat of the challenge to the credentials of the South Carolina delegation. NBC got the story earlier and more accurately than its rivals. Television coverage may also have created the impression that the platform was more extreme than it actually was. In our view, the platform was well within the tradition of its Democratic predecessor.

[19] On the general nature and organization of television news departments see especially Edward J. Epstein, *News from Nowhere* (New York, 1974).

[20] Alfred N. Whitehead, *Adventures in Ideas* (New York, 1933), p. 54. Paul T. Weaver applies the theme approach to television news coverage of the 1968 presidential election campaign between Humphrey and Nixon. See his "Is Television News Biased?" *The Public Interest*, 26 (Winter 1972), 57–74. The "theme" explanation appears susceptible to the criticism that the themes selected to organize and structure the events occurring were indeed the most appropriate and did convey the reality of the convention. In response we would argue that, no matter how appropriate, a theme inherently exaggerates and distorts the nature of an event. This is especially prevalent on the television small screen and in coverage of such a protean, complex phenomenon as a national convention.

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The initial major question was "Will McGovern win the nomination?" Subsidiary stories such as challenges to the credentials of the California and Illinois delegations, and the activities of other candidates were all related to the overarching theme of the prospects for a McGovern victory. Consequently, until the nomination was decided, many interviewees were supporters of particular candidates. In most cases, the topics of the interview were McGovern's chances (for his supporters) or the possibility of stopping him (for McGovern's opponents).

Although McGovern supporters were interviewed more than twice as many times as those of any other single candidate, the combined total for "anti-McGovern" interviewees exceeded the total for "pro-McGovern" forces. But the continued attention to "anti-McGovern" forces (who were interviewed as many times or more than McGovern supporters on each day) suggests that after McGovern had secured the nomination, the major theme-question concerned his efforts and ability to unify the party and their relationship to his chances of victory against President Nixon. Other stories, such as the selection of a vice-presidential nominee, new rules, and future activities of Governor Wallace, tended to be related to the main theme. Many of these interviews were neither pro- nor anti-McGovern per se, but their effect may have been to emphasize the opposition to McGovern and perpetuate the acrimony and disunity in the party —portraying the convention as divided into irreconcilable camps.

In contrast, there is a compensating theme which, we suspect, was less in evidence at the 1972 Democratic convention than in most of its predecessors. The theme is unity around an inspirational candidate. The nominee's family, friends, managers, supporters, and running mate are all interviewed and permitted, even encouraged, to extol the brilliance with which his campaign for the nomination was pursued, his political virtues, and his statesmanship. No wonder a candidate's support in the polls normally rises significantly after he has been nominated.

In one of its infrequent slips, NBC failed to cut out from Tom Pettit's interview with Wallace supporter Hall Timanus in time to miss Timanus' remark, "You've been reading up on me, ain't you?" (July 12, 12:27 A.M.). This is the point exactly—the reporters know whom they are interviewing and what their views are before they interview most of the time. The interview statistics clearly demonstrate that reporters did not seek out "kooks" to interview. Rather their aim seemed to be to find people who would present opposing views on the major themes with which the coverage was concerned. This process, however, tended to emphasize divisiveness in the Democratic party. It was most apparent in the way NBC interviewed people who opposed McGovern, alternating them with McGovern supporters. The juxtaposition of their comments and classifications (i.e., as McGovern supporters, Humphrey supporters, members of the "Stop McGovern Movement," etc.) created the impres-

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sion of hostility and disunity among the participants. One example occurred during the first session when NBC carried an interview with Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia (identified as a leader of the "Stop McGovern Movement") followed consecutively by ones with Senator Harold Hugues (Iowa) a Muskie floor leader, Humphrey's California campaign leader, and Gary Hart (McGovern's national campaign director). In one sense, this traditional getting all sides method seems to be the fairest format for interviewing. But it can make the "Stop McGovern Movement," seem as strong as the "Elect McGovern Movement" whether it is or not. Moreover the technique may actually create the impression of sides that do not really exist to a substantial degree among the delegates as a whole. It certainly increases the elements of conflict and drama.

The questions reporters asked the people they interviewed, and many of the remarks of anchormen and analysts, emphasized divisiveness, disunity, and general trouble (present and future) for McGovern and the Democratic party. The following quotes provide the flavor of this coverage; then we will try to explain its occurrence.[21]

On July 10, 1972—

Catherine Mackin to Governor Reubin Askew (Fla.): "Why do you think the Democrats are so divided?" (6:50 P.M.).

Mackin to Congressman Walter Fauntroy (D.C.): "Some say black support for McGovern is eroding" (8:12 P.M.).

On July 11—

Tom Pettit to Governor Marvin Mandel (Md.): "Don't you feel McGovern delegates would like to get even with Mayor Daley for '68?" (1:15 A.M.).

John Chancellor: "The platform has divisive, contentious, abrasive sections in it that affect the lives of all the people here tonight" (6:59 P.M.).

Garrick Utley to House of Representatives Speaker Carl Albert (Okla.): "It's been said McGovern's nomination will be a disaster for the party . . ." (7:21 P.M.).

Chancellor: "a platform which will cause a great deal of argument" (8:51 P.M.).

On July 12—

Douglas Kiker to McGovern aide Frank Mankiewicz: "Some say Daley will not have any part of you" (3:47 A.M.).

Floyd Kalber to Democratic Party Counsel Joseph Califano: "Young people want it [the new charter] and old people don't, isn't that what it really is?" (6:50 P.M.).

[21] The NBC newsfolk are listed first.

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Chancellor: "The chances are now stronger he [Wallace] will bolt the party" (7:13 P.M.).

Mackin to McGovern aide Gary Hart: "Rumors are that you have defectors on the Left, and trouble on the Right . . ." (7:56 P.M.).

Utley to Senator Jackson aide Ben Wattenberg: "Some say McGovern's nomination would be very bad for the party" (11:21 P.M.).

Mackin to Governor Warren Hearnes (Mo.): "You haven't thought much of McGovern in the past—what do you think now?" (11:31 P.M.).

On July 13—

Chancellor: "Democrats will fight about things even when there aren't things to fight about. . . . It's characteristic of the party" (6:57 P.M.).

Kiker to Humphrey campaign adviser Lloyd Hand: "Some are saying that rather than a united party, the Democratic party is a confused party" (8:42 P.M.).

Newman to Edmund Muskie: "How divided is the Democratic party?" (8:44 P.M.).

Pettit to McGovern strategist Eli Segal: "You've spent a lot of time putting out fires. Someone said there were so many arms bent out of shape they couldn't measure it" (9:03 P.M.).

Kiker to gubernatorial candidate (W. Va.) John D. Rockefeller, IV: "Do you think McGovern's policies are too radical for West Virginia?" (9:09 P.M.).

Newman to Senator Stuart Symington (Mo.): "How divided is the party?" (9:35 P.M.).

Utley to Senator Adlai Stevenson, Jr. (Ill.): "I've heard Eagleton may not get it on the first ballot" (10:31 P.M.).

As the quotations show, a popular interviewing technique employed by the reporters was to lead off with: "Some say . . . ," "I've heard that . . . ," etc., followed by a statement that remained unattributed and unsubstantiated. This approach enabled the reporter to suggest in some manner that the party was divided and McGovern was in trouble, regardless of whether such was the case.

A focus upon conflict and divisiveness may be appropriate if a convention is in fact rife with conflict and the party divided. In this instance, however, the questions and comments also reflected a view of these things as unfortunate and even irreparable. Some campaign managers and delegates might see divisiveness as natural and the sign of "democracy at work," competition showing the Democratic party as active and vital. But the commentators tended to portray divisiveness in terms of bitterness, hard feelings, bickering, arguing for the sake of arguing, and a severe impediment to victory after the convention. It cannot be

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denied that there was conflict at the convention; but it was given greater emphasis and viewed as unalloyedly negative by the commentators and reporters.

One reason this occurred, we suggest, has to do with the imperatives of television convention reporting. Reporters are competing with each other and with anchormen for scarce and valuable air time. Their network is competing with other networks for the audience. To get on the air, a reporter cannot be boring. He needs to have something newsworthy if not provocative to say, or at least someone to say it. And it has to be said succinctly and with dispatch. Reporters know, moreover, that many interviewees are likely to be evasive, especially on such subjects as divisiveness and disunity which may be perceived as potentially inimical to their party's, their candidate's and their own fortunes. Consequently, the inducement is for reporters to focus upon conflict, to pose leading questions, and to resist, in a way that oscillates from comical to merciless, attempts by respondents to avoid or evade questions. This need to get immediately at what is perceived as the nitty-gritty imbues most interviews with a sense of tension, if not drama, and, combined with the techniques of juxtaposing interviews with people holding opposing views, heightens the impression for television viewers of divisiveness and conflict.[22]

The convention appeared disorderly and confused on television. And the delegates appeared more disorderly, confused, and ineffectual than they thought they were. One obvious reason is that NBC newsmen, especially the anchormen, frequently referred to these characteristics. A few examples follow:

On July 10—

David Brinkley: "The floor is almost the worst place on earth to keep track of what's going on. You can't see very well and you can't hear very well" (10:39 P.M.).

On July 11—

Brinkley: "The people on the podium can't hear who's voting. They all shout. You can't tell who's voting and who isn't" (12:33 A.M.).

Chancellor after Chairman O'Brien asked delegates to clear the aisles: "Now it's, 'Come on, will you, gang?' In about another hour it'll be, 'Sit down you bums' " (1:00 A.M.).

Chancellor: "Many of the delegates have gone home" (2:38 A.M.).

[22] For obvious reasons, courtesy is not abundant and chitchat infrequent in the television interviews. Were a more casual interaction possible, however, we suspect it would considerably reduce the pervasive feeling of drama and conflict we received in watching the television coverage.

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Chancellor: "with a lot of delegates falling asleep on the floor . . ." (3:15 A.M.).

Brinkley, after the announcement that the rest of the challenges had been withdrawn: "They're too tired to fight" (3:47 A.M.).

Kalber: "We'll possibly have as much confusion and debate as last night" (6:34 P.M.).

Chancellor: "The platform speeches are not reaching the delegates. There's an awful lot of milling around. Everyone is waiting for his own particular enterprise to come up. In the meantime, they don't listen to the speeches" (11:50 P.M.).

On July 12—

Chancellor: "the turtlelike pace of events" (12:02 P.M.).

Chancellor: "Many of the delegates have gone home" (2:31 A.M.).

Pettit to O'Brien: "are you asleep?" (3:24 A.M.).

Brinkley, after passage of the Indian lands plank: "No one knew what it meant, but the emotional sentimental mood was such that it passed anyway, overwhelmingly" (4:14 A.M.).

Brinkley: "The delegates usually don't pay any attention to requests to clear the aisles. . . . The Ohio delegates are late for everything. Frank King said, 'None of these people have been to a convention before—it takes them longer to count' " (7:00 P.M.).

Edwin Newman: "We know far more about what's going on than they do. Numberless delegates tell us the only way they can find out what's going on is to watch television or listen to the radio" (11:13 P.M.).

These comments may all have been accurate perceptions of the convention as the newsmen experienced it. And no doubt some of the delegates might have argued that there was disorder on the floor, although they might also have taken it in stride as an exciting, stimulating part of the convention process. For many delegates, however, including the overwhelming majority of our North Carolina sample, the convention was characterized by a lack of confusion. Our delegates felt that they had worked diligently to master the credentials, platform, rules, and nomination issues with which they were confronted. Many felt pleased with their efficacy at the convention. Yet television rarely conveyed this impression. Rather, the NBC anchormen and correspondents tended to give the impression that confusion was rampant and that it resulted from poor management and lack of cooperation among the delegates.

One reason for this difference between delegates' experiences and television content is that the television newsmen depicted the convention as they perceived it on the floor, in their encounters with delegates, and from their booths above the hall. Each network was limited in 1972 to

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four floor reporters and one floor cameraman who was there to film interviews. They were "supplemented by cameras in baskets hung around the wall."[23] The shots from cameras stationed above the floor were usually roving ones of large areas of the floor from a long distance away, or close-ups of individual delegates or groups of delegates. In nearly all cases the delegates were shown seated. The primary purpose of these shots seemed to be to show the different types that were present rather than depict their productive activity. And inevitably, during the late night and early morning hours, there were many shots of delegates sleeping, nodding, or leaving—"inevitably," because delegates were engaged in such activities and because television cameras were scanning the floor. For delegates, however, most of the satisfying and productive work came during the daily, or more frequent, off-the-floor delegation caucuses, and from the process of deciding how to vote after reading convention materials and interacting with other delegates. Some of these activities, such as the individual delegate's process of decision, are difficult if not impossible to depict on television. Cameras were excluded from others, including delegation off-the-floor caucuses. But television newsmen and cameras were also absent out of disinterest, because the work and satisfaction of individual rank-and-file delegates were peripheral to television's coverage of the convention. The result was to make delegates appear more disorderly, confused, and ineffectual than they felt. For how could constructive activity take place amid the confusion on the floor, among delegates who were sleeping or had departed?

There are several other reasons why the convention may have appeared more disorderly and confused on television than it was. There was the rapid switching of cameras from the booth, to the podium, to the floor, to a reporter, to a scene outside the hall, and back and forth among these. The camera rarely rested on any of these locations for more than five minutes (many NBC floor interviews lasted two minutes or less), and any one scene might be presented from a variety of different angles or depths. This method of coverage is consonant with the dictates of television journalism to avoid visual monotony. But it also creates an impression of many different activities occurring simultaneously in a rather confused, indistinct relation to each other. It must be stressed that the movement within and transition between scenes, while sometimes rapid, is rarely abrupt. Rhythm is achieved through a myriad of technical devices such as pulling out for a wide-wider shot, sound overlap, and intercutting. The objective is to achieve a smooth series and flow of images. Consequently, the viewer's impression is that the confusion is a function of the nature of the convention, not an artifact of television coverage.

[23] *Broadcasting Magazine*, 83 (July 17, 1972), 16.

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Another possible reason for the impression of disorder is the contrast in setting of each location. When a reporter is shown on the convention floor, he often is packed into a crowd of people precariously stretching out his microphone. Sometimes the reporter and interviewee seem to have trouble hearing each other. Politicians most often are viewed crammed in a crowd or orating from a platform. In contrast, the segments of coverage shot in the booth exhibit the anchormen in a kind of "ivory tower" situation. One need only compare the different impressions made by Chicago Mayor Richard Daley when interviewed on the floor and subsequently in the anchorman's booth during the 1968 Democratic National Convention.

Related to setting are the function and attitudes adopted by the anchormen. NBC's Brinkley and Chancellor, more at ease on television than harried politicians, experienced in front of the cameras, apparently disinterested, sustained by the credibility acquired through years of bringing the news to viewers every evening, calmly surveyed and commented upon the seething mass of humanity in the arena below. Analysis occupied roughly 20 percent of NBC's coverage. Viewers began and ended each night's events with the anchormen and were returned to them intermittently throughout each session. For the audience, the anchormen are a visual and oral link: they strive to bring coherence and order out of the conflicting, often self-serving or candidate-serving statements of interviewees, and the apparent turmoil and confusion of the convention. In fulfilling this function, the anchormen sometimes adopted an attitude of bafflement or dismay at the convention's activities and especially at the operation of its paraphernalia of rules and procedures. This attitude may have contributed to viewer identification, but it also served to make the convention appear more confusing than it actually was. And it made the delegates appear more ineffectual than they were, because the anchormen, and through them the viewers, seemed to know so much more about convention events and trends than the rank-and-file delegates apparently pinioned on the floor.[24]

[24] There is also the argument omitted from our analysis that the television picture is inordinately powerful because of the use of close-ups, the small size of the screen, the way it emphasizes movement, and so on. See Henry Fairlie, "The Unreal World of Television News," in David Manning White and Richard Averson (eds.), *Sight, Sound, and Society* (Boston, 1968), pp. 127–135. As a possible example of the intensifying effects of television as compared to the distancing effects of the press, consider how in 1976 television might treat the decision by the Democratic presidential nominee to select George Wallace as his running mate. In addition to analyzing the bargaining between the candidates, showing the sometimes vehement opposition of some delegates on the convention floor, newsmen would also conduct interviews in which both candidates would be asked how they could reconcile running on the same ticket given their (enumerated) differences and the unpleasant things they had said about each other in the past. All this on live television to the obvious embarrassment and

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IMPLICATIONS

Direct casual links are virtually impossible to demonstrate but Gallup Poll data suggest that Senator McGovern suffered from the televising of the Democratic convention, while President Nixon (although not necessarily his party) benefited from coverage of the Republican convention. McGovern's authority was denigrated; Nixon's was enhanced.[25] Part of the negative effect obviously was a function of the Democratic convention itself. For the first time in the history of televised conventions, viewers saw and heard (or heard about) such issues as abortion and homosexuality debated on the floor. In prime time they witnessed Governor George C. Wallace (Ala.) present a platform disdained not always politely by the overwhelming majority of the convention. Viewers saw, even if they did not hear, a far more disparate conglomeration of delegates by sex, race, and age than usually graced televised conventions. Above all, viewers watched a vigorous, sometime brutal, battle for the presidential nomination in which George McGovern, the eventual winner, was sometimes accused of representing a vocal, radical minority of his party.

This explanation for McGovern's decline is necessary but not sufficient. It is our contention that the damage to McGovern's authority and perhaps to the Democratic party's image in the minds of voters also resulted from the very nature and processes of television coverage of the convention events.[26] In our discussion of NBC's coverage we have analyzed these causal factors.

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irritation of the candidates, followed by televising of the convention debate and vote. Events would appear so much more benign and orderly in print.

[25] According to the *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 87 (September 1972), the Gallup trial-heat poll conducted before the Democratic convention showed President Nixon with 53 percent, McGovern 34 percent, and the remainder undecided. Following the Democratic convention, both McGovern and Nixon increased by 3 percent. According to former Humphrey adviser Ben Wattenberg, however, "it was the only convention since the advent of public opinion polling in the United States where the nominee of the party lost ground." And, "even after the Chicago convention in '68, with blood in the streets, Hubert Humphrey gained five points." See Ernest R. May and Janet Fraser (eds.), *Campaign '72: The Managers Speak* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 182 and 183. After the Eagleton fiasco, Nixon's percentage increased by 1 to 57, but McGovern decreased by 6 to 31, while the remainder swelled the undecided vote to 12 percent. Following the Republican convention, Nixon rose to 64 percent (an increase of 7); McGovern declined by 1 to 30 percent; and the undecideds went down to 6 percent. In addition, the post-Republican convention poll revealed that President Nixon had gone from trailing Senator McGovern 48 to 41 percent among voters under thirty, to a 61 to 36 percent lead.

[26] It is our general view that to some extent a presidential nominating convention is relatively protean and can be portrayed as more or less conflictual, confused, and divided. By dint of the factors we have identified, we believe that television emphasized such politically negative characteristics. Thus, although we studiously tried to avoid the trap of discussing the reality of the 1972 Democratic convention, we should

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In recent years both parties have increasingly tried to "manage" their conventions in the best interests of the party and its nominees. Changes have been made in scheduling, agenda, and rules.[27] In 1972

> the Republicans relegated the housekeeping and parliamentary chores . . . to afternoon sessions or private caucuses and cut their total days from four to three. They revamped the podium, raising a three panel rear-projection screen, which they used for the four party movies they managed to get on NBC and CBS in their entirety. The screen was also used to project television coverage of outside events such as the arrival of President Nixon at the Miami airport, and his "spontaneous" appearance before a crowd of young people at the Marine Stadium after his nomination. When the screen was in use, the house lights were dimmed, and in most instances the television cameras cooperated by focusing on the front of the hall.[28]

As we viewed the coverage on television, the middle screen lay directly behind the speaker's podium. Network cameras stationed on the camera deck arising from the middle of the convention floor could not frame the speaker at the podium without including a portion of the image on the screen behind him. These images included Nixon campaigning with Eisenhower, on a beach with his wife Pat, embracing Agnew, and in talks with Chairman Mao and Soviet leader Brezhnev. Television, then, was a conduit for the display to the viewing audience of these achievements and moments in history of President Nixon and his associates. Partly because their convention lacked surprises, but also as a result of the effectiveness of these attempts to manipulate television coverage, "the network cameras [were] on the podium a remarkable two-thirds of the time."[29] This contrasts with the roughly 46 percent enjoyed by the Democrats. In 1972 the Democrats tried to eliminate floor demonstrations and drastically reduced the number and length of nominating and seconding speeches.[30] Nonetheless, they had mixed results in trying to exploit the presence of television covering the convention. The keynote addresses took place during prime time but so did the speech by George Wallace. Debate on the abortion and homosexuality amendments was relegated to the early morning hours, but so were both acceptance speeches.

The Republican 1972 convention provided a scenario which the Democrats may be increasingly tempted to try to follow. It was a convention which minimized confusion and which was carefully arranged to create

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note our view that, if some objective measures were available and applied, then television coverage of the convention would be revealed as depicting more conflict, confusion, and division than measurably occurred.

[27] For examples see Parris, *The Convention Problem*, pp. 150–151.

[28] Barrett, *The Politics of Broadcasting*, pp. 127–128.

[29] Ibid., p. 129.

[30] Ibid., pp. 119–120.

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an impression of harmony and unity. We suspect that the average convention watcher regards lengthy debate as a bore, finds procedural motions baffling, and sees no point in convention housekeeping. He wants or is at least attracted by efficiency and control. Peter Daily of the November Group, which handled advertising and media arrangements for the Nixon campaign, is probably correct in asserting that: "It was . . . very important that the Republican convention was run with a degree of precision and organization that added to the impression that the President was a man who was able to control his own destiny and therefore to control the destiny of the country."[31]

The problem with the scenario is that it appears to require a party which is renominating an incumbent president who is without significant opposition at the convention.[32] This is scarcely possible for a party nominating a challenger in a convention full of conflict over credentials, platform planks, rules, and candidates. Is it possible to structure these events in such a way as to minimize adverse voter (public) reaction, and indeed to benefit the party and its candidates? Particularly is this possible given the Democratic party's new rules which appear to encourage a plethora of candidates and representation of a wide range of issues and ideological perspectives? Given the possible conflicts of interest among and between convention managers, candidates, and issue groups, it is likely that the minority or deprived or outraged or defeated will take advantage of television coverage to publicize its position and cry injustice. And because of the nature of television coverage the convention will appear to contain far more conflict, division, and confusion than it actually does.

If a party cannot orchestrate its convention, then it might be preferable to organize it so as to have only selected segments televised—for example, nominating speeches, presidential candidate balloting, and acceptance speeches. More likely, the networks themselves may curtail their time-consuming and expensive, albeit prestige-garnering, coverage. The effects will depend upon the form the truncated coverage takes. There may be less sense of convention confusion and delegate ineffectualness generated because of a reduction in the number of interviews, shots of the floor, comments by anchormen, and so on. But any network inclination to deal more completely with the activities of individual delegates is likely to be stymied by lack of time. More important, it is

[31] May and Fraser, *Campaign '72*, p. 174.

[32] Any party which tries too obviously to control its convention and to exploit the presence of television may be quickly accused of stage managing. This happened to the managers of the 1972 Republican convention when they inadvertently distributed copies of their convention script to the media. The latter made it public without any apparent electoral damage to the convention, party, or its nominees.

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probable that greater emphasis will be placed on the functions of anchormen to link, synthesize, explain, and analyze convention activities and events. The temptation to place the party and its nominees under a microscope will be increased. And, if the nature and processes of television coverage are not changed, the nominees of contentious conventions will continue to be disadvantaged.

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The Academy of Political Science

Report of the President, 1966-75

As America enters its bicentennial year and the Academy approaches its centennial in 1980, members of the Academy may be interested in a report of its operations over the past decade. Originally founded in 1880 as an alumni group for the Columbia University Graduate School of Political Science, the Academy was incorporated as a general membership organization in 1910, open to all persons interested in scholarly, impartial investigations of political, economic, and social problems. During the last ten years the Academy has pursued its original aims with renewed energy.

At the risk of repeating what is well known to older members, one might cite the conferences held and the *Proceedings* published to indicate the Academy's concerns with major problems at home and abroad. In 1966, prior to the convening of the New York State Constitutional Convention, the Academy held a conference on *Modernizing State Government.* Then in succeeding years came conferences and *Proceedings* on *Urban Riots, The "Atlantic Community" Reappraised, Municipal Income Taxes, Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, Governing the City, Unionization of Municipal Employees, Changing Latin America, China's Developmental Experience,* the *National Energy Problem, Governing New York State, Inflation: Long-term Problems,* and *Congress Against the President.* In the fall of 1975 a conference on *Canada-United States Relations* was held in Washington, D. C.—the first such meeting outside of New York City—which will lead to a volume in March 1976. The research involved in these conferences was published in the *Proceedings,* each of which contained over 200 pages, sent to all members of the Academy and to some 3,000 libraries throughout the world. Later, major publishers reprinted these volumes for use in college classrooms.

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The *Political Science Quarterly* during the last three years has been under new editorial direction. Members may have noted the wide-ranging articles it contained and their relevance to current problems. The impact of Watergate, congressional elections, American world power, school desegregation, New York City's fiscal crisis, and events in China, Chile, and the Near East have been among the topics discussed in recent issues.

The new editorial advisory board is composed of distinguished political scientists and journalists who are leaders in their professions in the United States and Canada. The book reviews are notable because they deal with works published during the eighteen months preceding each issue. The *Quarterly*'s readable style combined with high scholarship has made it the nation's leading journal in its area.

Members of the Academy are divided in about equal proportions among academics, government officials, and business people. At the beginning of 1966 the Academy had 8,603 members; at the close of 1975 it had 10,665 members. Unlike many similar organizations, the Academy's membership declined only slightly during the current recession. It is particularly encouraging to report that nearly 700 individuals from all ranks of society are life members of the Academy and that another 1,000 individuals have chosen to be special members, contributing various amounts in addition to their regular membership dues.

Over the last ninety-five years the Academy has been fortunate in having some of the world's best-known public figures as honorary members. In the past, such men as Winston Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, David Ben-Gurion, Charles Evans Hughes, John Bassett Moore, Earl Warren, Montagu Norman, and Leo Rowe have honored the Academy with their membership. Today honorary members numbering more than a score, chosen for their contributions to the political and social advancement of their countries, constitute an outstanding group of men and women from the United States, Europe, Latin America, and the Far East.

In the past ten years the Academy has been able to enlarge the size of the *Quarterly* and of the *Proceedings* in the face of rapidly increasing costs of publication. Grants from various foundations and business organizations totaling $221,500 and gifts of $12,000 from various individuals made this possible. In 1965, expenditures of the Academy amounted to $67,506, and although every effort was made with considerable success to keep costs down, expenditures for 1975 totaled $199,123. Without the aid that the Academy received so generously from its members and from outside groups, it would have been impossible to continue activities at the level of the past decade.

The Academy is particularly indebted to the men and women who have served on the board of directors, who are elected by the members at the annual corporation meeting in January of each year. The officers of the Academy were especially helpful. Franz Schneider, an investment consultant, has been a member of the board for more than twenty-five years and chairman since 1971. Not only has he been active in planning the Academy's work, but he has also provided generous financial support. Emilio G. Collado, recently retired as executive vice president

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of the Exxon Corporation, was formerly chairman of the Committee for Economic Development. Robert H. Connery is professor of government in Columbia University. Grayson Kirk is president emeritus of Columbia University. Thomas M. Macioce is president of Allied Stores Corporation and a trustee of Columbia University. John V. Connorton is executive vice president of the Greater New York Hospital Association. Charles Preusse, the Academy's counsel, is a member of the law firm of Whitman and Ransom.

Douglas M. Black, now retired, was formerly chairman of the board of Doubleday & Company. Courtney C. Brown is dean emeritus of the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. Arthur F. Burns is chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Leland M. Goodrich is professor emeritus of international relations, Columbia University, and a trustee of Bowdoin College. Robert MacCrate, formerly counsel to the governor of New York, is a partner in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. George B. Munroe, a former Rhodes Scholar, is chairman of the board, Phelps Dodge Corporation. Alfred R. Neal is president of the Committee for Economic Development and a director of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Mary G. Roebling is chairman of the board of the National State Bank in Trenton, New Jersey. George T. Scharffenberger is chairman and president of City Investing Company and a trustee of Georgetown University. Harold A. Stevens is presiding justice, Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York. John R. Stevenson is counsel in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell and sometime ambassador and chief of the United States Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea. Alan H. Temple is vice president emeritus, First National City Bank. Aaron W. Warner is dean of the School of General Studies, Columbia University.

In 1972 the long formal relationship between Columbia University and the Academy was ended. While individual members of the Columbia faculty have continued to be actively involved in the management of the Academy, its independence has enabled it to take advantage of the rich resources of other universities throughout the nation.

The past decade gives every hope that the Academy can continue to contribute to the intellectual life of the nation and that it can look forward to its centennial in 1980 with confidence. In large measure this is because of the interest and support of its members and of its board of directors.

ROBERT H. CONNERY
President

December 31, 1975

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Book Reviews

Political Money: A Strategy for Campaign Financing in America *by David W. Adamany and George E. Agree. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.—x, 242 pp. $11.95.*

This book is pragmatic, temperate, lucid, and meticulously organized; it displays the thorough knowledge of campaign finance possessed by its authors. It offers their interpretation of recent experiences in regulating election finance in the United States. It includes sufficient historical perspective and world view to constitute a basic handbook for newcomers to the subject and a useful reference work for all. But the main purpose is advocacy. The authors advance a set of detailed reforms, the most important of which is a voucher plan.

A modified Federal Elections Commission would distribute one Presidential Election Voucher, one Senate Election Voucher, and one House of Representatives Election Voucher to every registered person eligible to vote in such general elections. The commission would make a formula distribution of funds to candidates based on the number of vouchers deposited by them with it. A major presidential candidate could receive over $25 million from this source, which funds would be held by the commission and disbursed for certain verifiable campaign expenditures. A matching program to aid candidates for nomination to federal office also is proposed, with thresholds of contributed funds to be met before matching monies become available, up to an aggregate limit of $100 per individual contributor. A system of direct proportional grants to political parties is envisioned.

The authors also propose nationwide, universal voter registration in federal elections, stringent limits on political contributions, protection against coercion in the solicitation of private contributions, abolition of most limits on campaign expenditures, and repeal of tax deduction or credit incentives for political contributions. They would vest powers of enforcement of all political finance regulations in the Federal Elections Commission, including special authority for the commission to prosecute violators itself rather than through the Department of Justice.

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The goals are several and familiar (e.g., an opportunity for citizens to participate nearly equally in financing politics and a system of funding that will provide enough money for vigorous, competitive campaigns) but do not include altering campaign finance practices as a means to larger changes, such as encouraging or inhibiting greater party discipline. Financial participation is viewed as a uniquely important form of political activity because it is a means of purchasing other forms of political activity. The authors acknowledge that nonfinancial factors affecting electoral success may capriciously favor one candidate over another—e.g., vocation, education, personality.

An attractive feature of the proposed voucher system is the means it gives private citizens to determine where public money goes. Hoary problems of defining minor parties, and of eligibility for public funding in nomination contests, are ingeniously met. The ramifications of the proposals are diligently considered, but the complexity of the voucher plan prevents its easy understanding, which fact may account in part for resistance to versions presented by Agree in earlier years. The authors estimate that administrative expenses might total $50 million in a presidential election year, a feature that is bound to stall enthusiasm. Moreover, some will feel that the authors dismiss too abruptly other approaches to some campaign finance problems. Nevertheless, the book is another welcome step in the accelerating volume and sophistication of the literature on campaign finance. Addressing the subject in the authors' disciplined, informed way is worth more in the long run than an encyclopedia of exhortation.

ALEXANDER HEARD
Vanderbilt University

The New Deal: *Vol. 1*, The National Level; *Vol. II*, The State and Local Levels *edited by John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1975.—xv, 341 pp., and xiv, 434 pp. $30 the set.*

These two useful volumes are curiously lacking in editorial explanation of their *raison d'être*. The editors confine themselves in the main to synopses of the essays, restricting their own comment to such indisputable but not especially helpful thoughts as that "the New Deal was a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that can not be summed up in any single and sweeping generalization" and that it must be placed "in the context not simply of its own time and place but of what had gone before and what would follow" (I, p. xv). One supposes, however, that they had a double purpose—to sum up the present state of New Deal scholarship and to suggest future lines of inquiry.

If this is so, Volume I—*The National Level*—does better in the first than in the second category. Experienced old hands—Ellis Hawley, Richard S. Kirkendall, Milton Derber, and Raymond Wolters among others—write excellent papers in the areas of their expertise: the New Deal and business, the New Deal and agriculture, the New Deal and labor, the New Deal and the Negro, and so on. These pieces provide intelligent

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and judicious accounts of the existing state of scholarly knowledge and interpretation and are to be commended to all students of the New Deal.

Only two essays in the first volume break away from familiar patterns. A piece on "Fiction and the New Deal" is unfortunately pedestrian in its approach, ignoring, for example, the insights made available to historians by developments in the sociology and psychology of literature. The most original and interesting essay in this volume is Jerold S. Auerbach's "Lawyers and Social Change in the Depression Decade." Drawing on the papers of Felix Frankfurter, Karl Llewellyn, Thurman Arnold, Jerome Frank, Reed Powell, and others, Auerbach paints a fascinating portrait of the changes wrought in the legal profession by depression and an activist national government. One regrets the absence of similar essays on, say, newspapermen, social workers, economists, doctors and other professional groups as well as on such beleaguered minorities as women, Indians, and Spanish-speaking Americans.

Volume II—*The State and Local Levels*—follows the lead of J. T. Patterson in his influential *The New Deal and the States* (1969) and examines the impact of the New Deal on eleven states (not including, alas, New York or California) and two cities (Pittsburgh and Kansas City). The essays mostly conclude that the New Deal rescued state and local government in the short run but had little effect in the long run. This conclusion may be, however, somewhat myopic since it rests less on the analysis of substantive changes in the functions of state and local government than on the failure of the Democratic party to retain political power after 1938. None the less the essays, though rather old-fashioned by the standards of contemporary quantohistorians, are products of careful research and contain much useful information. They point to the need for more work on the New Deal away from Washington, and especially, as the editors point out, for a study of the New Deal and the cities comparable in scope to Patterson's important work.

In tone the book represents what might be called the third generation of New Deal scholarship. It avoids the excesses of both pro-New Deal historians and New Left revisionists, striving to draw a balance sheet rather than to argue a case. In general, the authors agree that the New Deal made a difference to American life, but a recurrent emphasis on what some of them see as the New Deal's fatal readiness to compromise suggests ground yielded to the New Left. The New Deal's concern for "the existing balance of power between competing interest groups," Auerbach thus writes, was responsible for "its opportunistic, shallow side and made it all too willing to capitulate to its opponents" (I, p. 163). "Accommodation," David Brody observes unhappily, "was the essential mode of New Deal operations. Roosevelt always sought . . . to win the approval and cooperation of the groups affected by his programs" (I, p. 271).

These strictures are no doubt valid. But is the impeachment all that devastating? There is a pre-Watergate air about these volumes. In an age that has had to deal with the Imperial Presidency in full flower, one wonders whether Roosevelt's solicitude for consent was so terribly misguided. If more attention had been given to constitutional standards, if an essay had considered where the New Deal relied on legislation and where on executive order (and what happened then), if an essay had dealt with the New Deal, say, and impoundment, on the New Deal and "executive privilege," the charges of shallow opportunism might have been placed in sounder perspective.

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The New Deal may well be, as the editors insist, a story of "limited aims and even more limited achievements" (I, p. ix). The serious question is how much more was politically and constitutionally possible within a regime of consent. Conceivably it was the views of the American people rather than the opportunism of the New Dealers that imposed limits on the New Deal. Roosevelt was convinced that enduring reform had to rest on a wide basis of popular and institutional acceptance and therefore had to emerge from the laborious and exasperating process of compromise. It may appear that, in the long term, he was everlastingly right in his commitment to accommodation and in his respect for the constitutional order. Had he followed the course urged by the revisionists and ignored the disciplines of consent, the precedents established might have done the most serious injury to the fragile fabric of American democracy.

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

The Hard Years: A Look at Contemporary America and American Institutions *by Eugene J. McCarthy. New York, Viking Press, 1975.—xxii, 229 pp. $8.95.*

As nonbooks go, *The Hard Years* is an inoffensive specimen. Its author, part-time politician and part-time poet, has collected his views, casually and briefly expressed, upon the presidency (it should be demythologized), the Supreme Court (if other institutions did their job its role would shrink), the two-party system (since both Democrats and Republicans have lost the affection of most Americans, there is a need for a third party presumably led by Mr. McCarthy), the missing American tradition of public resignation from office in defense of principle, the large American corporation (it should obey the law), and the vice-presidency (its holders should be available if something happens to the president). To flesh out rather few words to volume length, McCarthy has included some of his own poetry and his celebrated 1960 nominating speech on behalf of Adlai Stevenson. Sad to say, in cold print, that speech is far less moving and far more rhetorical than I remembered it to be through the mist of years.

On Watergate, McCarthy's views are those of the current fashion. We were lucky to escape with no worse damage than Nixon inflicted on us. We owe something to the bureaucrats in the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and even, more erratically, the Central Intelligence Agency who ignored, delayed obeying, or even rejected some of the more blatant and illegal White House requests. In general, our author is an old-style law-and-order man, a constitutional strict constructionist who thinks his country will jog along in acceptable fashion if we return to observance of the separation of powers, the distinct functions assigned to the Senate and the House of Representatives, and a Trumanite perception of the powers and limitations of presidential leadership. Of program there is little in *The Hard Years*. In approximately a page, McCarthy lists without analysis an eight-point economic program which features "limited" and "conditional" controls over wages and prices (p. 163), selective credit controls, the investment credit, and limitations upon the autonomy of the Federal Reserve Board. With most of this I agree, especially since McCarthy cites me approvingly,

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but like everything else in this volume, the program reads more like an outline than a finished piece of work.

As a former admirer of the author, I may be allowing disappointment at his decline in serious commitment to either politics or literature since 1968 to influence my judgment. Fairness requires that much of what now appears banal and platitudinous when scarecly a single defender of the Imperial Presidency cares to raise his voice, was in 1968 fresh and challenging. Tom Wicker's eloquent introduction reminds us of Gene McCarthy's services to political enlightenment eight years ago. But his tactful omission of any but casual comment on the contents of the present book implies in its way my central criticism: McCarthy has neither developed some of his earlier ideas, buttressed them with additional argument, nor moved on to new themes. As far as one can tell, the United States in 1976 faces the same issues and requires the same institutional responses as it did a decade ago. McCarthy had a great political talent; it is a pity he has wasted it.

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City University of New York

A Presidential Nation *by Joseph A. Califano, Jr. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975.—xii, 338 pp. $9.95.*

Joseph Califano writes that we have become a "Presidential Nation" in which all eyes turn to the presidency for solution to problems, the other major institutions of government suffer from atrophy, and the presidency is simultaneously overloaded and incapable of responding effectively.

White House staff, acting at presidential behest, overreach themselves in the affairs of the departments and usually fall short of effectiveness but must do so because the departments are not organized to be effective themselves. Congress cannot control the executive branch in large part because its members do not want to do so. There has been a progressive erosion of the responsibilities of state and local governments and an increase in presidential levers over these governments without any corresponding increase in the effectiveness of federal programs. Television has become an instrument for perpetuating presidential influence over mass publics. The president has leverage over many special interest groups, including business, through the tentacles of an increasingly corporatist state in which all varieties of private groups identify their welfare with public programs. Presidents do not need their political parties, and, in fact, have strong incentives to keep the national party weak. Politics must check undue assertions of presidential power rather than the courts which side with expanding executive power in the long run. Presidents are more similar in personality than different and the hallmark of every president is the human fact that he will seek to maximize his power. Therefore it is not enough to rely on "character" to restrain presidents. These themes are illustrated by many examples.

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The book has an integrity derived from personal experience. You know that he has been there and seen the face of the animal when he writes: "The pressures of incumbency and the seemingly insoluble problems presidents face tempt most of them to reach for and use all the powers at their disposal. To the extent they can use some of those powers secretly, they are not likely to have the political and moral grace to resist the temptation to use them improperly" (p. 263). Such conclusions reflect a Christian sense of human fallibility. Since man is not perfectable, institutions must check excesses.

A number of his prescriptions are original. For example, he thinks that the best way to curb the White House staff is to reorganize the domestic departments so that secretaries will be able to act as effective agents of the president. This requires congressional assent and a comparable reorganization of congressional committees along functional lines. He proposes that a president join the Ash Council and Bolling Committee themes by appointing an expert commission to study the organization of both the executive and legislature. Similarly, he calls for radical thinking about restructuring the lines and powers of state and local governments to permit them to cope with their responsibilities. He would also give presidents more authority to experiment with domestic programs and abolish ineffective ones. These prescriptions reflect Califano's personal experience that all the blood and thunder has gone into policy enactment with little attention to questions of implementation.

A skeptic may ask if either publics or politicians are interested in such a problem. The incentives of leaders run toward enactment and taking credit for short-run goals of reelection. Problems of organization and implementation are too difficult to yield political benefit. Many social groups have a stake in ineffective programs. The next big question of American politics may be that of how to change these incentives. If we do not find a way to address this question we may in fact get a gaullist presidency that is both overloaded and ineffective with corresponding public disillusionment. Califano warns of this danger with good reason.

The book would have been more effective as a concise essay. There is too much filler in it. But it is a good book nonetheless.

ERWIN C. HARGROVE
Brown University

Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America *by Austin Ranney. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975.—xi, 218 pp. $8.50.*

Americans treat their political parties much like men treat their mistresses—as objects of private ardor and public neglect. The voters cleave to their factional liaisons even while they disdain the baleful influence of party. Episodically, their love becomes a public desire to change the parties closer to a romantic ideal of political perfection.

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There is no better person to analyze this pattern than Austin Ranney, who now has published his Jefferson Memorial Lectures on the subject, delivered at the University of California in 1973. Ranney has been concerned with the subject since he wrote his dissertation on *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government*. Furthermore, he has the most relevant practical experience through his service on the McGovern-Fraser reform commission of the Democratic party. These credentials are evident in this illuminating and literate book.

Two themes run through the volume. The first is the ambivalence of American attitudes, both elite and mass, toward the parties. To resolve the ambivalence, Americans turn to reform "a handy escape from the dilemma of squaring the necessities of political organization and action with the principled distrust of political parties" (p. 30). The second stress is the ambiguity and uncertainty of reform itself, for "the actual consequences of party reform are, in the future as in the past, likely often to disappoint their advocates, relieve their opponents and surprise a lot of commentators" (p. 191).

In developing these themes, Ranney provides both a historical and a substantive review. He recounts the events of the three major epochs of party reform—the Jacksonian period, the Progressive era, and the past two decades. He then considers three important issues raised during these controversies: Are parties private associations or public agencies? What should the parties do and be prevented from doing? Who should control the parties? Although he presents the arguments of all contenders, his own preferences are clear. The nation would be best served if parties were considered private associations, largely able to structure their own affairs. Reform should be directed toward making parties representative of their members' preferences, not their demographic characteristics, and membership should mean more than self-identification on primary day. Above all, reformers should remember that "winning elections is a necessary if not sufficient condition for achieving whatever goals [a] party has" (p. 193).

As a review of the history and issues of party reform, this work serves well. It is marred, however, by the author's indecision on the book's organization. Originally planned as an historical treatment, the emphasis was shifted later to an analytical format. As a result, the historical material is presented repetitiously. There are three redundant accounts of the 1824 Congressional caucus (pp. 15, 67, 171) and the identical passage of McGovern's acceptance speech is quoted twice (pp. 73, 102).

A more basic weakness of the book is its final conclusions. Although somewhat chastened by events of the past two decades, Ranney returns to his optimism of the 1950s, still advocating the "politics of accommodation" that results in vague programs, ambiguous electoral choices, and unclear popular decisions. While few of us are yet nostalgic for the conflicts of the 1960s, the mindlessness of earlier politics is not the only, or likely, alternative. American voters are clearly more able today to respond to issue-oriented politics. Their discontent, real enough, is not with the ideology of the parties, but with the failure of the parties to raise the issues that

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trouble them. The nation's need today is not to disguise power, but to make politics a public concern. It is time to end the view of politics as a dirty and secret affair, and to make American democracy an open and liberating relationship.

GERALD M. POMPER
Rutgers University

Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment *by Kirkpatrick Sale. New York, Random House, 1975.—362 pp. $12.95.*

This book begins with a well-established proposition—that the South is different from the Northeast. It has a different climate. Its economic base is different. So are its historical tradition and many aspects of its culture. It has long had a higher proportion of segregationists, religious fundamentalists, and political conservatives than has the Northeast. Mr. Sale performs a useful service in defining a new region based on the spread westward of the southern culture through the Southwest to the Pacific, although some will question his extending his southern rim region of "cultural cohesiveness" (p. 9) all the way to northern California and thus finding a homogeneity of outlook between San Francisco and Houston or Charleston.

But on this base of known regional differences, Sale has erected a malign superstructure, loosely compounded from fact, gossip, innuendo, guilt-by-geographical-association, and a conspiracy theory of recent American history. The major political failures of our time—including Vietnam, Watergate, inflation, and recession—are attributed to the election of two southern rim presidents, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, and their manipulation of governmental policies in the interest of that region. They failed not because they were unwise or ill-advised but because they came from the southern rim and hence embodied or reflected the "cowboy" mentality of their region—"the aggressive, flamboyant, restless, swaggering, newfangled, open-collar, can-do, Southern-rooted Baptist culture of the Southern Rim" (p. 13)—and the region's "political character" of "rightism, racism, and repression" (chap. 4).

To make this intellectual leap, Sale pours everything he can find into his mold, whether it fits or not. He has done an assiduous muckraking job, and some of what he reports may be true. But it is difficult to know; footnotes are so imprecise and condensed that the accusations defy tracing. Grave charges of criminality rest on verbs like "were said to be" (p. 200), "is repeatedly reported to be" (p. 201) "was a partner . . . with . . . an acknowledged friend of at least one known associate of . . ." (p. 227). But it is easier to judge whether his interpretations are sound: Was Lyndon Johnson in fact a racist president who deserves no credit for the civil rights acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968? Were the Johnson and Nixon defense budgets motivated wholly by a desire to benefit southern rim contractors? Was the Russian wheat deal designed for the benefit of southern rim agri-business (when most wheat is grown in the North)? Were milk prices raised as a payoff to southern dairymen (when the

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largest milk producing states are, again, in the North)? Was the difference between Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski—one a "yankee," the other a "cowboy"—a stark contrast between hero and villain? To make his conspiracy theory stick, Sale finds it necessary not only to distort history beyond recognition and leave no Johnson or Nixon motive unimpugned, but also to lump all southerners together in his guilt-by-association network. Reuben Askew, Morris Udall, and even Julian Bond are joined with George Wallace as equally representative of that sinister force called "Rimian political power" (pp. 306–307). Fred Harris, Thomas Kuchel, and Albert Gore are seen as one with Richard Kleindienst as Rimian lobbyists (p. 306).

The subject of regional political cultures and their influence on the national polity deserves a scholarly study. Unfortunately, *Power Shift* is not it.

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST
The Brookings Institution

A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security *by Alton Frye. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company (for Council on Foreign Relations), 1975. —xii, 238 pp. $10.00.*

Alton Frye, an authority on national security matters in his own right, gained considerable insight into the workings of Congress while serving as a member of Massachusetts Senator Edward W. Brooke's staff (1968–1971). This experience is clearly evident in Frye's interesting and informed account of recent congressional actions concerning defense-related issues—in particular the antiballistic missile program, MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle) missile warhead policy, defense budget making, national science policy, and the War Powers Act of 1973. Frye's thesis, illustrated by these accounts, is that there is a transformation taking place in the role of Congress in national security policy, from a closed to an open process of dealing with these issues, from a prodefense to a more skeptical and antidefense attitude, from prospending to more frugality in defense budgets, and from relative deference to the executive to greater legislative assertiveness in military policies and programs.

In the wake of the failure of American policy in Southeast Asia as well as the demoralizing impact of Watergate upon the presidency, it has become popular in many quarters to applaud the new potency of Congress and to place hope and faith in that institution for "better" policy outcomes. This book fits into that genre. Frye detects a trend toward restoration of a balance of power in executive-congressional relations, one in which cooperation, harmony, and mutual respect can result. Indeed, he concluded his book with a curiously optimistic assessment of the conditions for cooperation, specifically in the approach President Gerald Ford has taken toward Congress.

Although Frye's description of the power of Congress may be overdrawn and his faith in better politics and wiser policies may be misplaced, the book is nevertheless well worth our attention. The author's treatment of the substantive policy issues

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and of the specific activities of individuals and committees in contributing to outcomes is informed and his evaluation of the policies and programs at stake is intelligent and balanced. The book is more likely to appeal to those concerned with defense policy than with congressional behavior, but it is likely also to be most instructive to those within the academic community who continue to understate the role of Congress in the foreign policy-making process.

Frye is at his best in his treatment of the ABM and MIRV issues. He brings to bear not only his own experience as a strategic policy analyst but also the special vantage of having served a key figure—Senator Brooke—and we suspect Brooke's influence was enhanced by Frye's expértise. The result may be an inadvertent exaggeration of the prominence of Brooke in the decision process, but that aspect is more than compensated by the richness of the account. Although the debate over the ABM gained wide attention, efforts within Congress to obtain a moratorium on MIRV deployment did not—probably because the latter issue is more complex and the technology has been less susceptible to criticism. Frye places both issues into focus, in terms of the participation of Congress in these crucial deliberations and of the inherent strategic considerations at stake.

While it is somewhat disconcerting to find Frye implicitly assuming that the United States is the *initiator* of weapons decisions and the Soviet Union the *responder*, thereby assigning Congress the role of restrainer of the executive, this particular bias is representative of a major segment of the arms-control elite within the United States, a group that has only recently begun to appreciate the inadequacies of the "action-reaction" theory of arms competition (viz., the assumption of rationality, the impact of bureaucratic politics, the factor of technological determinism, the influence of organizational parochialism, etc.). (See "Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control," *Daedalus*, Summer 1975.) For Frye, defense cuts by Congress are not only evidence of congressional reassertiveness, they are also good outcomes. So too are the efforts of Congress to pare down or defeat the ABM program and to stop the deployment of MIRV's. These values reflect currently fashionable post-Vietnam, post-Watergate attitudes.

Such conclusions may be subject to reexamination if either of two possible futures develop: (1) the Soviet Union aims not for strategic nuclear parity but for superiority (in which case Congress will be vulnerable to the charge of responsibility for American arms inferiority); (2) a strong and popular president is elected (in which case an assertive Congress may subsequently be regarded with less approval). With respect to the former possibility, Frye indicated that it was "amazing" that the Soviet Union failed to be receptive to the proposed moratorium on MIRV's (p. 64) and while he entertains some thoughts about Soviet motives in that case, he clings to the central theme—that arms control will work only if we reverse the action-reaction process, and in that context Congress can play an important restraining role by subjecting American arms decisions to intense critical scrutiny.

With respect to the second possibility (an energetic and popular president) Frye has no comment, for the issue is not directly raised, but one should recall that when

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we experienced a mirror image of that condition (conservative President Eisenhower and a deadlocked Congress) one popular solution was a more vigorous exercise of "presidential power" (Richard Neustadt).

Despite this reviewer's reservations about some of the author's views, *A Responsible Congress* is an excellent account of an important shift in congressional behavior in an issue area of the utmost consequence to our society.

DAVID W. TARR
University of Wisconsin

The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development, 2d ed. *edited by William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham. New York, Oxford University Press, 1975.—vii, 374 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $3.95.*

The first edition of this volume comprised a series of ten essays, five by political scientists and five by historians, that was the product of a conference on American political party development. The second edition is a reissue of these essays (by William Nisbet Chambers, Frank J. Sorauf, Paul Goodman, Richard P. McCormick, Erik L. McKitrick, Samuel P. Hays, Donald E. Stokes, Richard E. Dawson, Theodore J. Lowi, and Walter Dean Burnham), with a new concluding essay by Walter Dean Burnham. Some confusion is provided by the fact that the original Table of Contents was reused so there is no indication of this new concluding essay which appears on pages 308–357.

The first edition had a significant impact on subsequent writing about American political parties because it developed a classification of party systems that has become widely accepted. Each of the individual essays has been widely cited and influential for later scholarship. They represent an exceptional combination of the traditions of political science and history in a manner that is productive for the concerns of each discipline. They speak to the continuing debate about the policy significance of political parties and their future as viable social and political institutions. Thus the significance of these essays has been enhanced rather than diminished by time.

All of the original essays, particularly those by Richard E. Dawson, Theodore J. Lowi, and Walter Dean Burnham emphasized the policy irrelevance and decline of American political parties. Although they may have overstated the case against the future of parties in America, all of them represented important arguments and significant evidence on the issue. It is this intrinsic and enduring worth that provided the justification for a second edition of the book. However, during the years since the first edition appeared there have been extraordinary changes in the structure of American electoral politics which have outdated some of the materials and have raised a series of questions to which the original essays did not address themselves.

The new eleventh essay, entitled "American Politics in the 1970's: Beyond Party?" is an attempt to bring the volume up to date. In it, Burnham argues that his original analysis of the decline of political parties is being confirmed. He maintains

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that the American electorate is undergoing a critical realignment which is inseparably linked to party dissolution: "This is a realignment whose essence is the end of two-party politics in the traditional understanding: in short, it is a caesura in American political evolution . . ." (pp. 308–309). His point is persuasively argued but suffers from two defects. First, it is not as well organized in its presentation of evidence as might be wished. The author moves from systematic evidence to scattered examples in a manner that makes a set of points rather than a coherent exposition. Second, the author draws one conclusion from his data but they could support a second interpretation. A prolonged realignment period would provide similar data to that of a period of party decomposition. The author may be correct in his analysis, but he has not proven that the trends he is describing are irreversible. Therefore, at the end he has to hedge on the question of whether a new party system could develop. Thus, because the individual essays continue to have merit, it might have been just as well to have reprinted the original book. Perhaps a second edition with so little revision may have been premature.

DOROTHY BUCKTON JAMES
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Personality and Democratic Politics *by Paul M. Sniderman. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975.—xi, 367 pp. $13.75.*

This volume, which was awarded the American Political Science Association's 1972 Schattschneider Award, is a welcome relief from the all too frequently superficial and super-psychoanalytical literature in the field of personality and politics. It breaks new ground and does it with a thoroughness of analysis and lucidity of style which is admirable.

The book's goal is to establish a link between one specific personality characteristic, namely self-esteem, and democratic orientations. The main thesis is that (1) self-esteem does not operate directly on the dependent variable but rather is mediated through a variety of intervening variables associated with self-esteem (but not only with self-esteem), and (2) the "connection between personality and political beliefs . . . has as much to do with the impact of personality factors on an individual's capacity for social learning as with their impact on the satisfaction of particular personality needs and motives" (p. 4).

Covered under the rubric "democratic orientations" are not only purely political attitudes but also measures of social and interpersonal orientations. Political participation also is included. The data were collected by Herbert McCloskey, not by the author, in 1956 and 1958 in a Minnesota and two nationwide polls, the latter containing a subsample of leaders (delegates to the two national party conventions).

The book serves as a thoughtful antidote to all those who think that political attitudes can be easily explained by recourse to either clinical psychology or person-

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ality theory. It documents thoughtfully and convincingly the way in which certain personality traits enhance chances of an individual's exposing himself to information and thereby developing the requisite learning on which political orientations—democratic ones in our political culture—are based. In this way it offers explanations of why some people high in self-esteem become politically involved while others do not which are far more plausible than explanations offered in terms of damaged parent-child relations, compensation theory, etc.

The author shows thorough mastery of the theoretical framework in which the concept of self-esteem is embedded and thus does not fall prey to the error so frequently committed by students of psychology and politics, namely to borrow a scale here and another one there without much consideration for the theoretical implications this involves. In this respect alone the book can serve as a model for future dissertation writers bent on embarking on the slippery field of personality and politics.

The weakness of the book is one it has in common with many secondary analyses. The items and scales were not developed with his particular considerations in mind. Many of the scales therefore fit his questions very imperfectly. It is, for example, highly dubious that an anomie scale can serve as a measure of cognitive disorientation. Some of his so-called proofs therefore may leave the reader unconvinced. Another problem raised by the data is their very datedness. The participation items reflect the decade of the 1950s and omit items relating to the politics of confrontation, notably participation in demonstration, violence, etc. Yet these do relate particularly interestingly to self-esteem and to democratic orientations.

The book could also be faulted for being longer than necessary. There are many solid and intelligent discussions in it (such as the one on prejudice) which are not central to the presentation. It is also questionable as to whether the two chapters on leaders add much. The topic deserves separate treatment but is here not handled with the same thoroughness as is the rest of the book.

Finally there are sections—minor to be sure—where this reviewer would take issue with the author, such as in his handling of the work of Melvin Seeman, his ignoring of the contribution intelligence makes to self-esteem, etc. More debatable is his suggestion that in the Soviet Union high self-esteem might *not* lead to democratic orientations because social learning there points to other directions. *If* democracy refers to a concept broader than the United States system; if—as John Dewey suggests—it refers to a way in which humans relate to each other and to society and government, then self-esteem should relate similarly to certain democratic orientations(such as the dignity of man) regardless of the cultural setting.

All of these criticisms, however, are minor compared to the thoughtful, scholarly, and novel contribution Sniderman has made to a field badly in need of such qualities.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

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Women and the Power to Change *edited by Florence Howe. A Volume of Essays Sponsored by The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975.—xvii, 182 pp. $7.95.*

This book is a collection of essays by four feminist writers who are also social activists. All believe that the main thrust of the present feminist movement is not to equalize opportunity in a male-dominated culture, but to overthrow that culture and replace it with a new system of attitudes, habits, and beliefs that are based upon "feminine values." Despite differences in their programs for action, each contributor holds the conviction that institutions of higher education are the crucial staging ground for revolutionary change.

The writers represent two generations of academic women who came to intellectual maturity before, and during, the late 1960s, but were similarly affected by social activist trends in the university and in their particular disciplines: literature, sociology, and the law. Adrienne Rich, noted poet and professor of English at CUNY-City College, leads off the attack on universities as "a breeding ground . . . of masculine privilege" (p. 17) and as a microcosm of "the masculine order characterized by depersonalization, fragmentation, waste, artificial scarcity, and emotional shallowness, not to mention its suicidal obsession with power and technology as ends rather than as means" (p. 20). Arlie Hochschild, assistant professor of sociology at Berkeley, follows with an analysis of the way in which the academic career system is stacked against women. She argues that women are forced into unbalanced competition with men whose career productivity is enhanced by the support of their families.

Rich and Hochschild call for the profound reorganization of universities along lines that will serve both the career needs of women (part-time employment, extensive child-care facilities) and their allegedly distinctive values: cooperation, caretaking, social usefulness, and moral purpose—"doing good" as opposed to "doing well" (p. 77). Fundamentally, they claim that it is not women who are discriminated against, but feminist values. Aleta Wallach, member of the California bar, follows suit: merely increasing "the number of women law students will not be significant unless women who have discovered their feminism and militance are the majority of that number" (p. 123).

Florence Howe, professor of humanities at SUNY-Old Westbury, is more concerned with strategies for achieving political power. She assigns a key role to women's studies programs in raising the consciousness of women and recruiting leadership for the movement. Her thesis is that feminists must focus their energies in organization; her strategy is to build power bases in the universities and the traditional "female professions" where women are numerically dominant: teaching, nursing, and social work.

Two themes common to these essays are the corruption of the (male) meritocracy and the political influence of the universities. Both are reductionistic arguments. When one has accounted for the theoretical flaws and the practical failings of the meritocracy, one has still to find a better way to manage the world's work. Hoch-

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schild's idyllic picture of students and faculty at the University of Havana happily sowing coffee plants together in the summer is simply not credible; it is reminiscent of the Old Left's enthusiasm for similar tableaux in Stalin's Russia. As for the political influence of the universities, there is no small degree of hypocrisy involved in assaulting the university for its ties to government, and at the same time proposing to turn it to one's own political purposes. The need to challenge the tendency in universities (or, indeed, any institution) toward bureaucratism and insidership is a real and continuous one; but so too is the need to preserve the university as a center of excellence and (at least in theory) disinterested scholarship and teaching.

PHYLLIS KELLER
Harvard University

Newsmaking *by Bernard Roshco. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1975.—ix, 160 pp. $10.00.*

Countless events happen every day in the United States and the rest of the world. Only a small number of these become *The News* when they appear in the printed and electronic media. What determines which events are selected by mass media personnel for dissemination to mass audiences? Bernard Roshco, a practicing journalist, journalism teacher, and sociologist contends that dominant societal values and sociological factors, rather than the flow of events or psyches of editors and reporters, determine what becomes news in America. His slim volume marshals convincing and clearly presented data to support his thesis.

The book is divided into four parts. Part I argues that social conditions in the United States and other societies create needs for information about ongoing events which are exceptional by nature or involve people at the top of the social hierarchy. Mass media have developed structures and operational rules to gather the desired information, relate it to current concerns of the reading public, and disseminate it rapidly.

Explanation of the essence of newsworthiness is followed, in Part II, by a brief historical analysis of the norms of newsmaking in the United States. Roscho pays particular attention to the widely accepted idea that news presentation must be "objective." He contends that objective reporting, as it has developed in the United States, frees reporters from the responsibility of evaluating events independently, but makes them prisoners of the interpretations provided by their sources. "Neutral" reporters are used by news sources for peddling their versions of reality and their propaganda to an unsuspecting public which has no independent means to judge the truth or falsity of reported information.

"Newsmaking as a Social Process," Part III of the book, contains the core of the argument. Here Roshco explains with fascinating examples how the newsmaking process is shaped by institutional decisions about the stationing of reporters. The presidency, Congress, state legislatures, city hall, police stations, and similar haunts

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make news because they constitute "beats" which are routinely covered by news personnel. Likewise, social and political elites of various types become news subjects because they are constantly shadowed by reporters. Publicity for such established news sources has been institutionalized through techniques such as news conferences, regular columns or shows, and press releases of various kinds.

Once a society has determined whose activities it wishes to publicize and what types of information it wants to release, the main outlines of news are fixed. Activities and individuals which lie outside the field of established coverage remain invisible. Only extraordinary deviance or unusual combinations of chance factors will penetrate the cloak of invisibility. This routinization of news sources and beats explains the often tragic neglect of many important social developments and the frequently heavy emphasis on trivial occurrences.

Part IV puts the spotlight on such problems by examining the news product which emerges from the choice criteria which social forces have generated. Roschco claims that the pressures to report large numbers of occurrences merely because they are novel prevent news organizations from probing important stories which arise in places and institutions which are not ordinarily covered. Since news organizations lack the resources to venture into new territories and explore them in depth, it is incumbent upon other institutions in society, particularly major social organizations, to collect information needed by the public and relay it to the media for dissemination. The identification, collection, and dissemination of socially significant news is too important and complex a task to be left solely to mass media personnel.

Newsmaking will not meet the needs of textbook-hunting students and professors who are looking for a broadly gauged discussion of the respective merits of various sociological, psychological, and political theories which have been advanced to explain the whys and wherefores of newsmaking. Roshco's focus is too narrow for that. But within the limits which the author has set for himself, he does an excellent job in putting forth and illustrating interesting and important hypotheses. The book, therefore, is a sound addition to the sociology of newsmaking and deserves wide attention by the lay and scholarly community.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance *by Martin J. Sherwin. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975.—xvi, 315 pp. $10.00.*

A World Destroyed is the best work so far on the development and use of the atomic bomb. The research is meticulous and the judgments are balanced. It is also a literate book, well and stylishly written. The book is divided into three parts. The first chronicles the theoretical developments that made the bomb possible, the circumstances and the personalities that led to Roosevelt's decision to go ahead with its construction, and the subsequent evolution of the Manhattan Project. Sherwin catches the near desperate

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fear of many scientists that they were behind the Germans. He notes the friction between the military, the academicians, and the engineers from DuPont, but the portrait is balanced. Even the much maligned General Groves is described as "an honest and exceptionally able administrator . . ." (p. 58).

The second part of the book details Roosevelt's rather hazy and erratic notions about the organization of the postwar world and the diplomatic role of the bomb. It also shows the scientists' increasing awareness of the political implications of the terrible force they were working so hard to unleash. According to Sherwin, the major decision in this second period, and it was taken uncritically by Roosevelt, was the agreement with Churchill not to inform the Soviet Union about Anglo-American efforts to produce the bomb.

The third part of Sherwin's history covers the months between Roosevelt's death and the surrender of Japan. This section is nearly as long as the other two combined and the author vividly captures the headlong race of events and decisions that terminated with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

According to Sherwin, after Roosevelt's death there was a shift in attitude toward the Soviet Union. Roosevelt's Uncle Joe became for Truman an expansionist Stalin who must be made obedient to the terms of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. The war against Germany had ended, but the Japanese showed little interest in unconditional surrender. Sherwin maintains that Truman, Byrnes, and Stimson "consciously considered two diplomatic effects of a combat demonstration of the atomic bomb: first, the impact of the attack on Japan's leaders, who might be persuaded thereby to end the war; and second, the impact on the Soviet Union's leaders, who might then prove to be more cooperative" (p. 199). This is much more balanced than Alperovitz's theorizing and appears a reasonable judgment.

However, the author puts forth a second thesis. Like Lisle Rose, though in a more muted way, Sherwin believes more attention should have been paid to the problems of international control and Soviet sensibilities. He is sympathetic to the proposals made by Niels Bohr in the spring and summer of 1944 for inviting Soviet participation in "postwar atomic energy planning, before the bomb was a certainty and before the war was over" (p. 96). Accordingly, Sherwin places considerable weight behind Roosevelt and Churchill's decision taken at Hyde Park in September 1944 for continued Anglo-American cooperation and no leakage of information to the Russians.

If this is meant as a suggestion that Anglo-American atomic policy of total secrecy was unrealistic with regard to the Soviet Union, I would concur. If this is meant as a suggestion that Anglo-American attitudes shaped Soviet policy, I would strongly disagree. Molotov outlined Soviet objectives in Europe to Eden in December 1941. They have not varied in thirty years. The partitioning of Germany, satellite states on the Soviet Union's European frontier and the advancement of that frontier by the annexation of all of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, a large part of Poland, and small parts of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Finland. The Soviet Union clearly envisaged a postwar world dominated by spheres of influence. Stalin had no interest in an open society or on-site inspections, or the supposed community of scientists.

In part secretly, and in part openly, Roosevelt accepted this position. The president

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once warned Stalin that the American people did not understand political realities. Stalin advised their rapid education or America and Russia might arm against each other. Truman could not, or would not, follow Roosevelt's lead. The Manhattan Project assured that the arms race would be atomic.

But in the final analysis, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was based on its own self-interest defined in traditional and nationalistic terms. If the United States accepts the fundamentals of these terms, you have detente; if the United States rejects them wholly, you have a cold war. Detente also retains its traditional competitive meaning. Sherwin, in his own way, and only as a wishful alternative, repeats Truman's error: Washington does not have influence upon the basic principles of Soviet policy.

Sherwin also neglects what engineers call the state-of-the-art principle. The uranium and hydrogen bombs were technologically inevitable. Nationalism, self-interest, scientific resources, and a basic ignorance of what the weapons' effects would be determined their use. Nationalism, self-interest, scientific resources, and a fuller knowledge of these effects have so far prevented their further use.

A World Destroyed includes an Appendix of relevant documentary materials.

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Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice *by Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974.—xii, 666 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $6.95.*

Two decades ago in the West a whole gamut of disciplines sought to apply the notion of deterrence to prevention of a surprise nuclear attack. Professor Oscar Morgenstern urged the Soviet Union to copy our invulnerable sea-based force, while Herman Kahn stretched the formulation to "extended deterrence."

Deterrence arguably discouraged Moscow from the temptation to stray across the World War II European truce line, and in this sense deterrence "worked" (though one cannot prove this negative). But the United States nuclear monopoly did not deter the Berlin blockade, Czech takeover, or savage political warfare against the United States.

Above all, deterrence did not discourage others from all sorts of military, political, and economic frustrations of the United States preference for worldwide stability, if not capitalism. Some specific deterrence strategies were incredible (massive retaliation), inapplicable (Southeast Asia), or irrelevant (Eisenhower Doctrine in Middle East). The reasons were the same as for deterrence's successes: deterrence takes place inside someone else's head, and it tends to fail when one is unable to read the minds of those to whom one imputes one's own brand of rationality.

After a decade or more of analytical silence following the creative theory-building period of deterrence, Alexander George and Richard Smoke have produced a highly important book, which reviews the basis for the original theory, tests it

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against empirical history, and suggests some "pre-theory" of reformulated deterrence. The book begins with a history recalling the roots in Western economic marginal-utility analysis of what the authors call the "normative-prescriptive" deterrence theory that Americans assumed was usable in a two-actor relationship of which only one actor was an American. The assumptions and premises of contemporary deterrence theory are laid out very clearly, followed by a valuable test of its propositions against historical evidence in the form of eleven case studies—a method to which George has been a leading contributor.

The authors' conclusions are devastating: American policy makers fell into a whole succession of conceptual traps in situations where classical deterrence theory was applied in undiscriminating fashion. This inspires them to essay an explanatory theory of "differentiated deterrence," according to which deterrence "should be viewed not as a self-contained strategy but as an integral part of a broader, multifaceted influence process" (p. 591).

The work should serve as a model for the review and reform of some important components of the United States conceptual apparatus in sectors where it is inapplicable to changed circumstances.

Deterrence of nuclear war surely remains the number one policy imperative, and now new ways must be found to deter unbridled terrorism. But classic deterrence strategies will not lower oil prices or increase supplies, nor will they bring bicycle-based civilizations to heel. That these two constructive thinkers are not alone in their concern for the need for reappraisal of deterrence theory is illustrated in a statement by the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in April 1975, who questioned the future of a policy theory which depends on "the absolute control of . . . engines of destruction, all in a state of readiness day and night, month after month, all managed by people . . . with the usual admixture of heroes and villains, wise men and fools. It would be an insult to [our] ingenuity . . . to argue that for decades to come, such an unbelievably explosive contraption is the best we can build." The next step is to find a way to translate the George-Smoke scholarship in terms which can be used by policy makers who share Fred Ikle's concern "to make deterrence safer."

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Terrorists and Terrorism *by Edward Hyams. New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1975.—200 pp. $7.95.*

Political Terrorism *by Paul Wilkinson. New York, Halsted Press, John Wiley & Sons, 1974.—160 pp. $11.95.*

The books under review reflect the heightening contemporary concern with terror, terrorists, and terrorism, and they cover overlapping grounds—though from contrasting perspectives. Both books explore theories and theorists of terror and terror-

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ism, and they consider an array of case studies across time and space. However, whereas Edward Hyams is sanguine about and sympathetic toward certain forms of terrorism, Paul Wilkinson considers terrorism as pathological and calls for strict countermeasures. Hyams, the dust jacket informs us, is "a novelist of distinction and a noted writer on gardens . . . viticulture . . . [and] various aspects of history." Wilkinson is a professor of political science.

Terrorists and Terrorism is in two parts. In the first, Hyams discusses the contributions of such key figures in the literature on terrorism as Max Stirner, Sergei Nechayev, Michael Bakunin, and Johann Most. In the second, he explores the deployment of terrorist tactics by such diverse revolutionary and nonrevolutionary groups as the Carbonari, the Mafia, the Stern Gang, the Palestinians, and the IRA.

Hyams defines terrorism as violence used for political ends. And he distinguishes two species: (1) direct terrorism, in which "the terrorist seeks to terrorize the actual tenants of power and office," and (2) indirect terrorism, which "consists in discrediting a government by demonstrating that it cannot protect its own people or their property" (p. 10). He believes that terrorism, if deployed on an effective and sustained basis, is capable of achieving a range of revolutionary and other objectives.

Hyams concludes that "where there is law imposed by force there will be injustice: as I have said . . . *it is in law that social injustice is embodied and by law that it is sanctioned*" (p. 189). Terrorism is seen as "a normal condition of social life under the rule of law . . . a cathartic fever incident to civilization" (p. 189). For it is Hyams' presumption that, since terrorism is an expression of class conflict, it is directed against the establishment, hence against the law which is its expression and instrument. It follows that "terrorism is a social state which can never be eliminated except . . . by pre-emptive, sustained counter-terrorism" (pp. 187–188). Since the incidence of terrorism "can be reduced by progressive liberalization of the laws in favor of an even greater and more generous measure of social justice," terrorism is "self-reducing" (p. 189).

Having defined terror as "a psychic state of great fear or dread" (p. 9), Wilkinson approaches political terrorism as "the use of coercive intimidation by revolutionary movements, regimes or individuals for political motives" (p. 11). He argues that "what fundamentally distinguishes terrorism from other forms of organized violence is not simply its severity but its features of amorality and antinomianism" (p. 16). Other characteristics common to all forms of political terror are "indiscriminateness, unpredictability, arbitrariness, ruthless destructiveness" (p. 17). An important distinction exists between political terror and political terrorism: the latter involves "a sustained policy involving the waging of organized terror" (p. 17).

Wilkinson sets out "to construct a more flexible typology [of terrorism] which is not rigidly tied to the ruler-ruled dichotomy and which encompasses terrorism which stems from motives other than revolution or repression" (p. 35). He distinguishes three basic types: (1) Revolutionary terrorism involves the resort to "*systematic tactics of terroristic violence with the object of bringing about political revo-*

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lution" (p. 35). (2) Subrevolutionary terrorism "is employed *for political motives other than revolution or governmental repression*" (p. 38). It may be undertaken by individuals or small groups and it is typically sporadic. (3) Repressive terrorism is "*the systematic use of terroristic acts of violence for the purposes of suppressing, putting down, quelling, or restraining certain groups, individuals or forms of behavior* deemed to be undesirable by the repressor" (p. 40).

The body of Wilkinson's book is devoted to assaying a wide range of instances of terrorism, from the eleventh-century Assassins to the IRA, from the Jacobins to the Mau Mau, from the Stern Gang to the Tupamaros. And it closes with a discussion of some possible avenues for developing a theory of revolutionary terrorism.

Wilkinson's discussion of a range of countermeasures against terrorism—both national and international—ends in the following conclusion: "The best hope for effective action to reduce the vulnerability of liberal democracies to attacks by international terrorists lies in the adoption of stronger anti-terrorist measures by individual governments, and in the formulation of a European Community policy against terrorism" (p. 149). This statement highlights the limited range of Wilkinson's concerns.

While the books under review contribute substantially to our understanding of terror, terrorists, and terrorism, by no means do they exhaust the subject. Analytical problems associated with typology construction and theory building remain. The psychological dimension and implications of terror deserve far more sustained attention. And the subject of "war terror" (specifically excluded from consideration by Wilkinson) must come in for extended and independent treatment.

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Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946 *by W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel. New York, Random House, 1975.—xii, 595 pp. $15.00.*

Averell Harriman's memoirs appear thirty years after the end of World War II and the events in which the author played a prominent role. Based on Harriman's personal files and recollections—apparently in discussions with his writer, Elie Abel—these years are vividly recreated. During the dark days of Britain's fight for survival, after an initial trip to London by Harry Hopkins who recommended vast American assistance, Harriman followed him as Roosevelt's special representative to recommend everything "short of war, to keep the British Isles afloat" (p. 19). Later, and again following Hopkins who once more had recommended aid despite official apprehension of a Russian defeat, Harriman went to Moscow as ambassador. As a man who had direct access to Roosevelt, he was in constant touch with Stalin, as in England he had been with Churchill.

Yet it seems that the book appears too late. Other participants' memoirs and histories have already covered the same Big Three conferences, controversies over the

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Second Front, Soviet suspicions and demands on almost all issues, and Western attempts—especially by Roosevelt—to win Stalin's trust for postwar cooperation. For readers less familiar with conduct of foreign and military policies during 1941–1946, this account provides much information in a very readable and interesting book which, as a bonus, includes some witty, frank, and perceptive comments by Harriman's daughter.

This does not deny the value of Harriman's own observations. One concerns Stalin whom the ambassador saw frequently to get things done when no one below the Russian leader was willing to make any decisions (or favorable decisions). Harriman speculates that as dictatorial as Stalin was, his frequent changes of mood during negotiations—from friendliness to rudeness, from flexibility to stubbornness —were the product of his need to demonstrate his toughness and defense of Russian interests to his colleagues; furthermore, Stalin occasionally seemed to have been uninformed of certain issues by his foreign minister, or misinformed by Molotov whom Harriman judged as more suspicious and militant than his chief. What also emerges from this book are Soviet negotiating techniques: procrastination, enhancing the United States desire for agreement; agreement on principles, i.e., no agreement at all, requiring concessions to gain a specific accord; rudeness and denunciations, raising the level of tension and enhancing United States anxiety and desire to reestablish an amicable mood; firmness on key issues, with concessions on secondary issues; agreements without implementation; excessive demands; and the writing of the final communiques (Roosevelt was unwilling to argue over "just words"). Harriman recommended a tougher American bargaining stance, including a willingness to accept the consequences of nonagreement and to demonstrate our unwillingness to cooperate in the future. Yet, while increasingly apprehensive about Soviet intentions, Harriman on the whole shared Washington's optimism about future American-Soviet relations, at least if the United States, showed more mettle in negotiations. It was not attempts to resolve differences and satisfy the needs of the three "policemen," especially at Yalta, which later precipitated the cold war. Rather, it was Soviet violations of agreements or the weakness of regimes, such as Chiang Kai-shek's, unable to hold the Russians to agreements.

As distinguished and able as Ambassador Harriman was, the question which his account of allied World War II diplomacy raises implicitly is whether his service really made a significant difference to the outcome of the war. What seems clear is that American options were from the beginning very narrow. If German domination of Europe was to be prevented, aid to Britain after France's collapse was unavoidable; so was the decision to help Russia, for she had to be kept in the war to help drain Germany's strength and keep her occupied in the East, far away from England. And since Germany was stronger than Japan, the decision to defeat the former was also unavoidable. So were the results: Russian domination of Eastern Europe; American and Russian emergence as superpowers; American influence in Western Europe as a result of the Second Front Stalin so vigorously urged, Soviet influence in China because neither Chiang nor Japan could prevent the Red Army

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from marching into China, even had the United States not wanted Russian assistance against Japan or had Roosevelt at Yalta not signed the agreement restoring Russia's "former rights" (pre-1904) in that country. Harriman, an able defendant of American interests and excellent advisor to presidents, could not have altered these results.

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Detente in Historical Perspective *edited by George Schwab and Henry Friedlander. New York, Cyrco Press, 1975.—ix, 171 pp. $7.95.*

Secretary of State Kissinger recently commented that he was beginning to wish that he had never heard the word "detente." Noting a "repetitiveness" in the current debate on that subject, the editors of this volume, containing the collected papers and selected comments at the first CUNY Conference on History and Politics (October 1974), considered it timely "to widen the scope of the discussion by focusing more precisely on the historical dimension" (p. vii). The result is one of the first scholarly efforts to view the Kissinger-Nixon revolution in relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China "in perspective"—that is, against the larger historical backdrop of East-West relations and of past attempts by Western nations to achieve international detente.

The assumption on which these exercises is based, as Gertrude Himmelfarb makes explicit in a philosophic introduction, is that history teaches "lessons"; that the study of historical origins and relevant analogies may reveal the "principles" that determine success or failure in politics. Cautioning against too utilitarian a view of the past, however, she cites the warnings of Herbert Butterfield and Michael Oakeshott against using it to solve the problems of the present or expecting it to "talk sense" (p. 5).

The most pertinent historical parallel with the present-day international situation is evidently considered by the editors to be the experience of Britain and France in the interwar period in trying to bring about peace by negotiation with Germany. This is the subject of a knowledgeable essay by Keith Eubank. Rather unhistorically he treats the European diplomacy of 1919–1939 as a phase of "the policy of detente," which is therefore implied to have an autonomous and continuous existence. He is possibly led into this spurious persistence by his discovery that during the interwar years the words "appeasement" and "detente" were often used interchangeably (until the former came to have unsavory connotations).

With greater conceptual rigor, John H. Herz, writing from a political scientist's viewpoint, subsumes both "detente" (relaxation of tensions) and "appeasement" (unilateral concessions for relaxation of tensions) within the general rules of "conflict theory." Emphasizing the general international system within which conflict occurs, he argues that the present is *not* comparable to the 1930s because the United

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States and the Soviet Union, unlike Britain and Germany earlier, are leaders of bipolar blocs and are deterred from risking all-out war by "the mutually suicidal nature of the nuclear weapon" (p. 31). Detente is possible today, and does *not* involve appeasement, he maintains, because both sides are "basically status-quo-minded" (p. 33).

Further clarification awaits the reader in Hans J. Morgenthau's elegant essay, in which he distinguishes between moralistic "general concepts" like detente which capture the public imagination and disarm critical analysis and the specific "political purposes" which these concepts serve. Looking at the actual world situation, he finds that tension has in fact abated in only two areas: the realm of ideological confrontation, where detente is welcome because it makes "civilized intercourse" possible, and the region of central Europe, where "the issue of the territorial status quo" has been largely settled (p. 72–75). In the Middle East and other non-European parts of the world, detente has not been possible, Erich Isaac interestingly explains, because the "legitimacy" of political boundary lines has not been established (pp. 109–114).

The next essays, by Peter C. Ludz on *Ostpolitik* and Dankwart A. Rustow on the Middle Eastern oil conflict, are not primarily focused on "the historical dimension." More historical in emphasis is the contribution by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who characterizes detente as "a new phase in the evolution of the cold war" (p. 125) and locates its origins in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. By the end of the 1960s, he argues, the detente mood became "so powerful as to compel" President Nixon to proclaim that a new era of negotiation had succeeded an era of confrontation (p. 126). Like Schlesinger, George Schwab, in the final essay, stresses the persistence of ideological competition. "The only thing that changes from time to time," he says of the Soviet perspective on detente, "are the tactics resorted to in helping the historical process push what is already falling" (p. 143).

Does *Detente in Historical Perspective* succeed in its purpose? Despite the historical references it contains, it is, as a whole, a steadfastly present-minded work. It does not engender a sense of objective detachment or place its subject in broad secular context. The most notable substantive omission is the lack of comparative treatment of previous "relaxations of tensions" in the history of the Soviet-American relationship itself, including, for instance, the 1933 Roosevelt-Litvinov accords and the wartime Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin agreements. By highlighting such lacunae, however, the book may encourage the filling in of its historical sketch by other scholars.

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The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them *by E. J. Kahn, Jr. New York, The Viking Press, 1975.—xii, 337 pp. $12.95.*

During World War II an American businessman, Alfred Kohlberg, decided that the Institute of Pacific Relations and a number of American Foreign Service officers were involved in a communist-inspired plot to undermine Chiang Kai-shek's regime in China. With the help of friends like Isaac Don Levine, George Sokolsky, and Ralph de Toledano—who publicized his charges and facilitated contacts with congressional anticommunist crusaders—Kohlberg pursued the IPR and the Foreign Service officers relentlessly. Not until the days when Americans died fighting Chinese in Korea, however, did Kohlberg's campaign succeed. Amidst the hysteria soon labeled McCarthyism, a hostile congressional investigation drove away the IPR's sources of financial support and the organization gradually disintegrated. Under intense pressure, the Department of State terminated the careers of the most prominent of the accused officers. E. J. Kahn, Jr., tells the story of the Foreign Service officers who worked in China—their antecedents, their wartime experiences in China, and their fate in postwar America.

Contrary to the jacket testimonials, this is probably not Kahn's best book. It is a rambling, undocumented collection of anecdotes—some dubious, others trivial. Much of the account is based on hearsay and it lacks any systematic analysis. But it is nonetheless a book of considerable value. In a form comprehensible to the general reader, Kahn describes the national disgrace of the persecution of John Paton Davies, Jack Service, John Carter Vincent, and their colleagues, as well as their ultimate vindication in the 1970s.

Kahn's sympathy for the Foreign Service officers betrayed by their government and their people in the 1950s is undisguised. All of their good deeds are chronicled and every insult inflicted on them, however minor is reported. Friends of Kohlberg, McCarthy, and Chiang Kai-shek are not likely to be persuaded. They will doubtless be outraged by Kahn's repetition of every scurrilous bit of gossip about Chiang, his inuendos about Madame Chiang, and his facile dismissals of men like Patrick Hurley and Albert Wedemeyer. His penchant for ridiculing those with whom he does not agree does little to enhance his credibility. But most of the world, less sensitive about the honor of the Chiangs and long aware that McCarthyism was an abomination, will be delighted by the book.

The episode has at least three dimensions of great interest. First, there is tragedy: the conditions under which these men and their families lived during a quarter-century of persecution and humiliation. Cleared again and again by a variety of investigators, they nonetheless lost their jobs and had suspicion cast upon their loyalty. Those who survived the purge were not unmarked. Most of these men served in minor posts thereafter or were advanced more slowly than their peers. Kahn focuses on this dimension.

Second, there was the failure of the Foreign Service to protect its own and the failure of the secretaries of state to protect men who with their honest and generally accurate analyses offended the sensibilities of the Red-baiters and the friends of Chiang

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Kai-shek. Kahn reminds us that the Truman administration—Dean Acheson—failed to shield Clubb and Service, sharing with Eisenhower and Dulles responsibility for decimating the ranks of the men best informed about East Asia and especially China. The unwillingness of the Foreign Service Officers Association to counter the pressures of Kohlberg and McCarthy in the 1950s was not forgotten by Ray Ludden when the association sought to honor him in 1973.

Third, there is the puzzle of the men who tried, with marked success, to destory the critics of Chiang. Kahn does not undertake to explain the incredible malice of men like Louis Budenz, Whittaker Chambers, or Senator Pat McCarran. Why did they lie? Why did they conspire to ruin the lives of men they did not know? With rare exception there is no evidence of any personal contact. What hatreds were they indulging? And what kind of society listens to obscene, indecent men like these—and makes pariahs of those who labored so hard to serve it so well?

Kahn's tale will be especially rewarding to readers who are not specialists in American-East Asian relations. After a shaky beginning, the story holds together, providing some sense of the suffering the "China Hands" endured.

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Cold War America: From Hiroshima to Watergate *by Lawrence S. Wittner. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.—x, 403 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $6.95.*

Cold War America is a post-Watergate text for the disillusioned. Lawrence Wittner, former Vassar professor and author of a study of the American peace movement, readily admits his intellectual affinity with the critics of recent American domestic and foreign policies. He candidly concedes that "some people will not like this book" (p. ix).

Wittner's central premise is that since World War II the United States has betrayed the principles on which it was founded and committed itself to the worship of wealth and power. Its record, therefore, is one of failure and frustration. By the early 1970s, he argues, the only thing that was clear about America was the fact of its failure. "Even affluent Americans grumbled among themselves. Things do not work as they should. What they failed to see, or refrained from seeing, was that a harmonious, fulfilling society had a price—the one price they were not prepared to pay. And that price was equality" (p. 332).

Though Wittner clearly believes that the United States initiated and prolonged the cold war, he is no mere apologist for the Soviet Union. Both America and Russia emerged as amoral superpowers whose interventions in the Dominican Republic and Czechoslovakia demonstrated their refusal to tolerate "libertarian socialism" within their spheres of influence. But, like many of the disaffected, Wittner reserves his harshest criticisms for American liberals who, in most instances, are conveniently lumped together under the label of "Cold War liberals." Their sin was acceptance of cold war orthodoxy and a political shift to flabby centrism. To the author

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the typical American labor leader is a George Meany who values the cold war for the jobs that union members find in the military-industrial complex and who earns more than $35,000 a year, lives in a plush Washington suburb, and boasts to the press that he "never had anything to do with a picket line" (p. 133). While Wittner can empathize with a Eugene McCarthy or the student protest movement of the 1960s, he ultimately finds them lacking a political philosophy sufficient to carry their ideals into practice.

The scope of *Cold War America* is broad and thorough. Wittner devotes as much attention to domestic as to foreign policy, to social as to political history. He writes with flair and force; has a real gift for synthesis; and has consulted all the relevant sources. His overall interpretation, to the sure, is neither original nor novel. Post-war American foreign policy originated in the pursuit of an economic "open door" that would guarantee ever expanding overseas markets and continuous capitalist profits, while the cold war that inevitably ensued led to the sacrifice and betrayal of domestic concerns—both themes that have been explored by many previous critics of the American scene.

It is difficult to take issue with what is, in effect, a deeply researched personal statement, a text with the qualities of a sermon. Yet some aspects of this book are genuinely disturbing. There are no footnotes, a flaw which becomes troubling in view of the many quotations that put American leaders in the worst possible light and make them appear either foolish or knavish cold warriors. John Kennedy, on the eve of his inaugural, for example, is described as "relieved" to learn of the plans for the Bay of Pigs. The text at times borders on cynicism. Neither Kennedy nor Johnson receive credit for good intentions or commitment to principle; their civil rights programs, when examined, become mere devices to produce reelection. Sometimes the interpretations tend toward the simplistic. Great attention is paid to the profits made by American overseas corporations, following which there are passages describing the low standard of living and pitiful annual wages in Third World countries—as if there was an absolute one-on-one correlation between them and no other variables in the equation. There is character assassination by adjective and phrase. The word "millionaire" usually precedes Rockefeller; when John Foster Dulles is first introduced, it is with the snide (and false) observation that in the 1930s he had been "a consistent apologist for fascist expansion" (p. 141); and the White House meeting that dealt with the Cuban missile crisis is described in terms of the wealth and power of the participants. Such cheap shots—and there are too many—undercut much of the force of Wittner's often perceptive and trenchant social criticism and detract from the impact of a book which does indeed present a wealth of material not found in conventional or consensus histories.

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The 1940s: Decade of Triumph and Trouble *by Cabell Phillips. New York, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1975.—ix, 414 pp. $12.95.*

From the Humphrey Bogart films to the Harry Truman whistle-stop speeches, the 1940s exert a fascination over American scholars, screenwriters, fashion designers, and important sections of the general public. With this in mind, it is not surprising to find Cabell Phillips, the talented old political reporter of *The New York Times*, presenting what he calls a "journalistic reprise . . . . to set the important happenings of the forties in the context of contemporary human experience—to tell what it was like to be there at the time" (p. ix).

Relying heavily on *The New York Times* and older primary and secondary sources, Phillips begins his "journalistic reprise" with a brief portrait of American life in 1940, and concludes it with an interesting anecdotal account of the Alger Hiss case. In between, he covers national politics; war mobilization; wartime diplomacy and the cold war; and the government's misadventures with incarcerated Japanese-Americans, alleged Nazi and communist spies, and civil liberties. Phillips concludes rather optimistically that "the most significant consequence in human terms of the changes we have been considering, is the democratization of American society . . . . the context of sharing on more or less equal terms in the common wealth and of a common acceptance of the ideal of individual dignity and independence. Today's dominant middle class, unlike that of the past, is not relegated to the periphery of power and influence: it sits at the center, or close enough not to feel disenfranchised" (pp. 383–384).

Whatever the value of Phillips' conclusions, they are not especially related to his narrative, which deals almost exclusively with diplomatic and political history, rather than with the history of thought, culture, and society. For example, Phillips treats shifting occupational patterns, life styles, and social values very superficially. Also, he largely ignores the remarkable achievements of the American theater, cinema, music, and art of the period, and their relationship to a changing society.

Furthermore, much of his political and diplomatic narrative is out of date and painfully ignorant of the serious scholarly literature on the 1940s that has developed over the last decade (beyond his occasional use of recent textbooks, and Margaret Truman's biography of her father). Good historical journalism questions the past and looks to many sources for its answers. Phillips, unfortunately, has thrown together a chronology of the 1940s that has the analytical level of *The New York Times* editorials of the period, and adds little to an understanding of the decade save some colorful anecdotes on important figures and political fights.

Nowhere are these general deficiencies more apparent than in Phillips' treatment of the cold war. "That historic conflict," he writes, "might well be written as an international folk drama centering around a cast composed of Stalin the Cynic, Churchill the Pragmatist, and Roosevelt the Altruist. . . . The cold war sprang inevitably from a fierce clash of ideologies for the soul of Europe" (pp. 300–301). On Czechoslovakia, Phillips notes "in a particularly brutal coup d'état, the Red Army snuffed out the last vestige of democratic freedom . . ." (p. 315), even though

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the Red Army was not involved directly in the 1948 coup. On China, he notes that "the first open break [occurred] between a strong leftist minority led by Mao, a disciple of Lenin, and the dominant Kuomintang Party, bequeathed by China's 'liberator,' Sun Yat-sen, to his brilliant son-in-law, Chiang" (p. 319). Chiang, of course, hardly received the Kuomintang from Sun as a bequest; he was, as subsequent events proved, less than brilliant; and he was not even Sun's son-in-law!

In conclusion, a good popular history of the 1940s has yet to be written. Cabell Phillips, even with his interesting anecdotes concerning Wendell Willkie, David Lilienthal, the Hiss-Chambers case, etc., really has not done it by any standard. In fact, a good deal of his work falls below the level of his better *New York Times* articles in the 1940s.

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Livingston College, Rutgers University

The Rise and Fall of American Communism *by Philip J. Jaffe. New York, Horizon Press, 1975.—236 pp. $10.00.*

This book is a distinct disappointment. It promises significant new insights and details about the American Communist party in the 1930s and 1940s, and about Earl Browder, the secretary of the party for most of those years. Bertram Wolfe, in an incisive and at times intelligently critical introduction, asserts that on the basis of this book "many of our historians will want to rewrite that part of the history of our time" (p. 4). And Jaffe sets forth his purpose as being "to describe the forces that drove the [American] Communist Party almost into oblivion" and to demonstrate "that the rise and fall of Browder was synonymous with the rise and fall of American Communism" (p. 9).

Wolfe is certain that Jaffe was the right man to write such a book, and assuredly there are few people as qualified to undertake such a task as is Jaffe. A devoted personal friend of Browder (a relative by marriage), Jaffe was by his own admission "a close fellow traveler of the American Communist Party from 1930 to 1945" (p. 12). Probably best known for his role in the notorious *Amerasia* case, over the years he achieved considerable knowledge and understanding about the operations of the party. Moreover, Browder—despite his equivocation about recounting his party experiences to anyone for publication of any sort—seems to have trusted Jaffe and to have given him various documents as well as discussed the possibility of a biography.

The subject matter that Jaffe deals with is fascinating. The topics touched on include the American Communist party's immediate response to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, the struggles between Browder and Foster, the conversion of the party into a political association in 1944, the Duclos article in 1945 which attacked Browder and paved the way for his dismissal as a party official, Browder's years as an "outcast" from the party, and his attempts to rewrite history. There are also intriguing chapters on Jaffe's formal "meetings with the Politburo of the American

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Party" and on his views about those who would revise the history of post-World War II American policy; Jaffe condemns them for writing "little about Soviet foreign policy and military adventures" and for "deliberately omitting material that does not suit" (p. 204) the revisionists' purposes.

Unfortunately, in dealing with these variegated subjects Jaffe adds little to what already is known and has been spelled out in works like Joseph Starobin's excellent study of American Communism from 1943 to 1957 or the workmanlike but still valuable history of the American Communist party by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser. Jaffe has for the first time reproduced a few relatively unimportant documents such as two shortwave messages sent in code from Moscow to Browder. And Jaffe has raised some interesting questions about the positive predictions concerning American capitalism made by Eugene Varga, who was condemned by Stalin and was forced to recant his ideas until after the Soviet dictator's death.

Moreover, Browder's reticence about revealing his party activities in detail, even to so close a confidant as Jaffe, results in the book being somewhat lopsided. It is disproportionately concerned with the "fall of communism." And not much attention is paid to the "rise." As a result, the book lacks resonance, and seems at times more a passionate tract than the study it claims to be.

Although well written in spots, the book on the whole tends to meander and occasionally is repetitious. Because of Jaffe's unique position as "a sort of super fellow traveler" (in Wolfe's phrase), there may be some interest in this book among specialists in the field. But in the main, unfortunately, Jaffe's book adds little of consequence to what already is known and has been written about at length. At best this book serves as a relatively unimportant footnote to a very important area of history.

DANIEL J. LEAB
Seton Hall University

Jails: The Ultimate Ghetto *by Ronald Goldfarb. Garden City, N. Y., Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975.—x, 470, $9.95.*

In the field of criminal justice, it is both unfortunate and understandable that criminologists know so little about the operations, resident needs, current problems, levels of services and practices, and techniques of delivery of human services in jails. Criminologists cannot even be certain of the number, much less the conditions, of jails. Ronald Goldfarb's book sheds little light on the problem.

This book contains a poorly executed scheme of progression, including eight chapters on Jails in America—An Introduction; Jails: The Poorhouse of the Twentieth Century; Confinement of the Sick; Narcotics Addicts in Jail; Alcoholics in Jail; Juvenile Jails; Revolution and Law Reform in the Jails; and Toward a New Concept of Jails. The poorly disjointed first seven chapters appear to prepare the reader for a bold new approach to jails, but the venture is not effective. This is one of those books which, once you have started reading it, you find hard to pick up again.

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Its main contribution is found in the last chapter in which, after noting some of the related and unresolved constitutional issues, the author proposes a sharply reordered and redesigned conception of a human delivery system within a three-wing detention facility to be operated by a local Department of Human Resources. Local administrators would provide specific services designed to meet the needs of jail clients, and a State Department of Human Resources would set and enforce standards for such detention facilities. Among the services to be provided are rather extensive medical care programs; the author argues that this approach would not be more expensive than current ones. This undoubtedly would make a bold new approach more palatable to implementers, but this reviewer has serious reservations about such costs and effectiveness arguments. From a humanitarian perspective, one could endorse the proposal, but program evaluators would be remiss if they did not caution against this assertion.

The book was already dated in manuscript form; the author acknowledges in 1974 that the manuscript had been out of his hands for over a year, and that an effort had been made to include recent information. Reference to and quotations from the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (approximately five pages) are obvious examples.

One irritating aspect of the text is the absence of references for certain assertions, although court case and law citations are extensive. Referring at one point to the use of summonses, the author states: "Taxpayers costs for welfare and detention have been reduced significantly where such programs are used, with no corresponding dimunition of public safety" (p. 43). One would certainly want to know which social science researcher would conduct such a study and then make an unqualified statement of this nature.

Also problematic to his new concept of jails is the definition of "demonstrably dangerous" offenders who could not be released prior to trial. Caught in the lawyer's dilemma of categorical definition through statute and the need for individual considerations (after all, some persons are more equal than others), the author hedges with a statement of the need to protect such definitions with remedies. One suspects that the practical result would be widespread discretion.

Finally, in the new conception, adequate diagnostic and treatment planning would be affected for each of a large number of individuals within forty-eight hours from the point of arrest to release to the community or treatment agencies. It is unlikely that the machinery and technology for adequate diagnosis and treatment programming exist, much less could be effected in such a short time.

This reviewer could not recommend the book to introductory criminology or criminal justice course instructors, due to the complexity of the legal footnotes and writing style. Nor is it an appropriate text for advanced course instructors, since there is so little that is new in this book which was dated before it left the author.

HARRY E. ALLEN
The Ohio State University

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A Time to Die *by Tom Wicker. New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1975.—342 pp. $10.00.*

A Time to Die is Tom Wicker's account of his four days at Attica Prison as a member of the Observers Committee which vainly attempted to mediate the historic prison revolt of September 1970.

Outwardly an example of the "new journalism" pioneered by Tom Wolfe, Norman Mailer, and Hunter S. Thompson, the book is closer in spirit to *Moby Dick* (which it frequently paraphrases) than *Armies of the Night*. Unfortunately, it is far less artfully written than either. But one forgives Wicker his literary sins because, as the narrator and major character in *A Time to Die*, he is a man literally driven to tell the truth, to bear witness to the shattering of his liberal faith in the gunfire of Attica.

This voyage of self-discovery begins when Wicker's luncheon at an exclusive Washington, D. C., club is interrupted by a telephone call from *The New York Times*. Rebelling prisoners at Attica, N. Y., have read some of his articles on prison reform. They want him to join a committee of liberal journalists, reform-minded state legislators, community organizers, and lawyers to observe and "tell the truth" about the rebellion. Compelled by journalistic instinct (as well as by the need to prove his courage) and sustained by a liberal's faith in Reason and in Compromise, he plunges into the Attica maelstrom like Ishmael signing on board the *Pequod*.

The result, as in Ishmael's case, is a *bouleversement*—the world turned upside down—and a consequent loss of innocence. Wicker soon leaves even the dubious protection of the "official" prison for the wilderness of D-Yard, where he encounters the insurgent representatives of that wretched underclass which American journalists (and political scientists) have been trained not to "see." One by one, Wicker's assumptions are annihilated. This is no run-of-the-prison revolt, but a mini-revolution led by radicalized prisoners who make serious demands (e.g., for the removal of the prison superintendant) and who are clearly willing to kill and die for their beliefs. The prisoners, who hold fifty hostages, do not want the Observers Committee merely to observe. They want men like William Kunstler, Bobby Seale, and—gulp!—Tom Wicker to *represent* them in negotiations with the authorities.

Throwing off the mask of detachment, Wicker recognizes quickly that all the prisoner demands are negotiable except one: the demand for amnesty. But he does not despair. With so many lives at stake, he thinks, "Surely . . . reasonable men could find a formula that would, for all practical purposes, mean something close to amnesty without men like (prison officials) James and Oswald having to admit that it *was* amnesty" (p. 44). Wicker knows, because Lyndon Baines Johnson told him so, that in public affairs, "the highest premium is always on the ability to 'work something out,' to 'find a formula' for compromise" (p. 44). But this is what he unlearns at Attica. After four days of heartbreakingly, infuriatingly detailed negotiations, thirty-nine corpses litter D-Yard—ten hostages and twenty-nine inmates, all killed by corrections officers and state troopers. Wicker now un-

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derstands that what the state lacked was not the means or ability to compromise, but the *motive:*

> Wicker did not doubt Rockefeller's personal courage, if that was what it would take to bring him to Attica. Nor did he believe that Rockefeller was so calloused and careless of human life that he simply did not care who and how many might die at Attica. He wondered if the trouble was not, rather, that to the Rockefellers of the world, those institutions, processes, and arrangements by which humans had sought to order their affairs had become, finally, more important than the people who had erected them and sought to live by them (p. 218).

The result of this insight, and of the overpowering realization that "caging men" makes all of us zoo keepers (p. 59), should be, one would think, to bind Wicker to the cause for which the Attica inmates died: the overthrow of a system based on class and race privilege, and the construction of a better system. But as he admits, he remains a "moderate to the end" (p. 298). Revolutionary ideology, especially on the lips of vague and demagogic New Lefts, make him "uncomfortable intellectually. What he knew of history impelled him to ask: *Overthrow society and replace it with what? With what old injustice to what new victims?*" (p. 78). Wicker seems to understand that this pessimism alienates him as much from the Attica rebels as from Commissioner Oswald and Nelson Rockefeller. But he does not recognize that his own view is also "ideology." In abandoning the idea of progress, Wicker unwittingly embraces a conservatism more thoroughgoing than Rockefeller's pragmatism, a bourgeois despair more typical of the European than the American Right. His question "to what new victims?" could only be asked by one who considers himself, fundamentally, not a victim but a victor.

Unlike Ishmael, Tom Wicker is not reborn at his voyage's disastrous end; in a sense, he goes down with the liberal ship. Still, this is a story worth telling and retelling. Wicker's confusion reflects not only the ideology of his class but the terrible shock of Attica, which continues to disturb conscientious Americans five years after the event.

RICHARD E. LIBMAN-RUBENSTEIN
Roosevelt University

Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, Volume IV (1916–1921): Mr. Justice Brandeis *edited by Melvin I. Urofsky and David M. Levy. Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1975.—xxv, 587 pp. $20.00.*

As the editors point out, this collection is significant primarily because the letters reflect Brandeis' reaction to three important struggles: his defense of his nomination to the Supreme Court in 1916 in which he was successful; his participation in 1917 in the struggle over a Jewish homeland in Palestine which resulted in the Balfour Declaration; and his failure in 1921 to control the course of American Zionism. The period covered is from January 10, 1916, through June 25, 1921.

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In between are reflections of his continued interest in the things of the world and of the mind. There are also a few delightful letters from abroad· "London is civilization . . ." (p. 403); including enthusiastic descriptions of Palestine. This reviewer, for one, cannot agree, however, that the view upon the Dead Sea from the Mount of Olives is more beautiful than the Grand Canyon (p. 418).

There are here fewer homely personal touches than in the earlier letters. But in 1919 he writes from New York: "my only occupation was a walk, buying a beautiful light dress shirt and reading the Book of Esther" (p. 400). And in June, 1971, from Woods Hole, he writes: "Had some lovely canoeing yesterday and today and we are seriously contemplating bathing although the water is said to be 64°" (p. 566), but we are not told whether the swim took place.

Of particular interest is the short note to President Wilson on the day of the armistice: "Thoughout the war I have refrained from burdening you with communications. Today I venture to send you some lines from Euripides" (p. 362).

The editors tell us that the lines were from *The Bacchae* and give them in full. I quote the last five lines:

What else is Wisdom? What of man's endeavour
Or God's high grace so lovely and so great?
To stand from fear set free, to breathe and wait;
And shall not Loveliness be loved for ever?

This collection throws no light on Brandeis' relations with his colleagues on the Supreme Court. But there is an interesting long letter (p. 241) to Chief Justice White about Brandeis' investments, mostly in railroad, utility, and municipal bonds, and his concern lest holding these might disqualify him from participation in some case. And when the chief wrote that he need have no concern he answered, "It is a great relief to know that there is no need of my disturbing my investments, which would have involved quite a serious task" (p. 249).

The current volume has both the defects and the virtues of the earlier ones—too many trivial letters, excellent notes—although why there needed to be a page-long note about Franklin Delano Roosevelt (p. 475) is hard to understand. And mention of Henry Alsberg (n. 1, p. 305) might have included his remarkable service in supervising the preparation of the American Guides while he headed the Writers Project during the Depression.

OSMOND K. FRAENKEL
New York

Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years *by Sidney Fine. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975.—viii, 608 pp. $20.00.*

To those concerned with the urban fiscal crisis of the 1970s and to students of the Great Depression of the 1930s, this biography has much to offer. Nearly half of its pages depict the struggles of Mayor Frank Murphy against the deteriorating situa-

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tion in Depression-wracked Detroit. The account of a major city precariously straddling an increasing gap between soaring welfare costs and shriveling revenues provides a dramatic and particularly pertinent narrative for readers today.

Sidney Fine has assembled the material masterfully in this first of a projected three-volume biography. His subject, an ambitious and capable Detroit lawyer, rose from municipal court judge to mayor of Detroit (1930–1933), became governor-general of the Philippines, served as governor of Michigan during the sit-down strikes of 1937, then became Roosevelt's attorney general and finally a member of the liberal wing of the Supreme Court from 1940 until his death in 1949. Murphy's papers and those of other Michigan notables provide the basis for this extensively researched volume which ends in 1933.

While generally sympathetic to his subject, Fine is too judicious to eschew criticism or to omit ironic inconsistencies. Murphy is portrayed as a strangely dichotomous individual. Idealistic and rigorous as a judge, he simultaneously and illegally accepted a retainer from the Chrysler Corporation. A champion of the poor and oppressed, he coveted the company of the wealthy and became a member of their social set. Shedding his initial conservatism, he grew to fame as a liberal hero. Innovative and capable, he nevertheless often suffered from indecision and vacillation. Deftly employing psychological as well as political concepts, Fine presents Frank Murphy as an extremely complex and human individual.

Murphy's politics are particularly interesting. Raised in a closely knit Irish-American family, the son of a Democratic county boss, he never became the archetype "Irish politician." Instead, he rejected his father's machine-style party politics and concentrated on independent political campaigns. In Detroit, he built his own bipartisan coalition. With the help of the Hearst newspaper and his own reputation as a judge for fairness to underprivileged groups, Murphy won the support of normally Republican blacks and traditionally Democratic members of organized labor and white immigrant ethnic groups. It was a personal following which twice elected him mayor during the depths of the Depression.

This account of the Depression in Detroit is local history at its best. Fine recaptures the agony of those years of massive unemployment and the suffering of the old and the "new poor." He documents Murphy's expansion of the city's relief program. Limited and erratic because of effective opposition by those concerned with fiscal soundness and the maintenance of the work ethic, Detroit's welfare program failed to keep pace with the swelling ranks of the jobless. Public health officials found malnutrition increasing among the poor. People died of starvation. Suicide increased. Fine also notes the outbreak of "disturbances" when relief was curtailed, the eruption of minor eviction riots, an increase in petty thievery especially from grocery stores, and a dramatic rise in burglary and other crimes against property.

Equally well treated are Murphy's struggles to finance his relief programs. Tax delinquencies mounted and municipal income shrank while the city's expenditures mushroomed. Faced with mounting deficits, unpaid bills, and impending redemption of notes and bonds, city officials scurried to maintain cash flow and urban programs through additional loans from the business and financial community. With their in-

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creased leverage, the creditors successfully demanded cutbacks in city spending and relief rolls. Nevertheless, the city missed its payrolls in April 1932 and a year later when the governor ordered a prolonged holiday to avoid the bankruptcy of Detroit's major banks, the city suspended payment on its debt, a technical default. A long-term refunding program was established in the spring of 1933.

Chapter 13 traces the creation of an urban lobbying bloc and the obtaining for the first time of federal relief funds directly to the cities. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation served as the vehicle for this aid, and Fine's account modifies traditional treatments of the RFC which have minimized its relief activities and emphasized its loans to banks, railroads, and insurance companies. From a different perspective, Fine affirms that it was primarily RFC relief loans that allowed Detroit and many other cities to feed the hungry and the unemployed during the terrible winter of 1932–1933.

In evaluating Murphy's performance, Fine calls him one of Detroit's great mayors, a reformer at a time of economic adversity, advocating public relief, and supporting the needs of organized labor. He favored municipal ownership of the city's street-railway system, battled privately owned utilities, advocated the merit system, and raised the tone of municipal government.

Fine's three volumes will undoubtedly become the definitive biography of Frank Murphy. However, the question remains as to whether Frank Murphy, or any secondary figure in American history, is worth a three-volume biography, even such an excellent work of scholarship as this.

JOHN W. CHAMBERS
Barnard College, Columbia University

Bread upon the Waters: Federal Aids to the Maritime Industries *by Gerald R. Jantscher. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1975.—x, 164 pp. $8.95.*

Bread upon the Waters by Gerald R. Jantscher, a member of the staff of the Economic Studies program of The Brookings Institution, is a brief study of United States government aids to the shipping and shipbuilding industries, with more emphasis on the former.

Chapter One provides background and perspective and declares that the purpose of the book is "to describe the principal aids that these industries receive, estimate their cost to the U. S. public, and evaluate the reasons that are commonly offered to justify this assistance" (p. 2). The next chapter cover summarily the various forms of public assistance that nations provide their maritime industries. This is followed by a discussion of the operating differential subsidy which provides for government payments to certain operators in the foreign trade to offset the difference between the high operating costs of United States flag ships and the lower costs of foreign flag ships. Chapter Four considers the construction differential subsidy that provides government payments for the domestic construction of ships which are intended to equate costs of construction in

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United States shipyards with those of ships built abroad. The author considers this to be a subsidy to United States shipbuilders rather than to shipowners. Chapter Five discusses the cabotage laws of the United States—statutes reserving the coasting trade and the trade with the nation's territories and possessions to ships built in this country and documented under its laws. Next comes an excellent primer of the complicated tax subsidies which permit the establishment by ship operators of capital construction funds into which they can deposit taxable income from United States flag ships and thereby postpone paying taxes if the funds are used to build or rebuild ships to be operated in certain statutorily specified trades. Chapter Seven discusses the cargo preference system—statutes requiring that a certain minimum percentage of government cargoes in foreign commerce, usually 50 percent, be carried in United States flag ships. The next two chapters critically examine the economic rationale used to justify the aids and the national security justification for the public assistance, found by the author to be the "soundest" argument and "unquestionably more credible than the economic arguments" (p. 116) for such assistance. Finally, Chapter Ten concludes by "recommending that an official study should be undertaken to define the proper objectives of federal maritime assistance and to determine how the current program should be altered to serve the nation better" (p. 138).

The author, while noting that the purpose of the book is to describe "the principal aids" (p. 2), ignores the important United States financing assistance program (originally insurance and currently guarantee) provided by Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which affords great benefit to the maritime industries at little, if any, cost to the government.

Jantscher is studiously critical of the federal aids to the maritime industries. He bases his criticisms on a cost-benefit analysis of the maritime assistance programs. However, certain of his conclusions as to cost and benefit rely on estimates and are drawn from debatable assumptions. Also, he does not provide a cost-risk analysis of the nonsupport of the maritime industries which is the alternative he seems to advocate. Nor does he take into proper consideration that other nations are expanding their maritime capability for the purpose of accomplishing national political and economic objectives. Thus his arguments, in what seems to be a spirit of laissez-faire economics, as to the extent to which the United States may depend on foreign suppliers for ships and shipping services, are not convincing.

The book is well written and is a thoughtful, albeit provocative, addition to the writings in this field. It is hoped, however, that it will generate studies of other points of view so that full public understanding may be promoted and sound public policy may be developed on these issues of national importance.

STEVE C. DUNE
New York

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James W. Wadsworth, Jr.: The Gentleman from New York *by Martin L. Fausold. Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1975.—xvi, 457 pp. $17.50.*

The life of James W. Wadsworth, Jr., richly merits a full-scale biographical treatment. Wadsworth, the son of a former congressman and the son-in-law of Secretary of State John Hay, represented what Fausold describes as the "gentry-elite conservative" (p. 81) strain in twentieth-century American political life. Elected to the New York State Assembly in 1904, Wadsworth was chosen as speaker two years later while still the youngest member of that house. In 1914, Wadsworth moved from state to national political life with his election to the United States Senate. Wadsworth's principal area of interest as a senator lay in the shaping of national defense policy. As chairman of the Military Affairs Committee during the postwar period, he pressed unsuccessfully for the adoption of universal military training.

Defeated by Robert Wagner in 1926, Wadsworth returned to his farm in the Genesee Valley until his return to Congress, this time the House of Representatives, in 1933. Wadsworth's career in the House, lasting until 1950, was marked by an inveterate opposition to New Deal and Fair Deal policies. His distrust of President Roosevelt's domestic policies, which led him to help organize the American Liberty League, did not carry over into the realm of foreign policy. He wholeheartedly supported the preparedness program before World War II and coauthored the nation's first peacetime draft act. Wadsworth's public life, spanning the first half of the twentieth century, consisted largely of resisting the progressive political impulse. Much like Robert Taft, he pressed an antistatist ideology and proved a cogent critic, both in committees and on the House floor, of governmental expansion and centralization. Despite the unpopularity of many of his positions, his House colleagues named him as the "ablest member" in 1947. Unlike Taft, however, his antistatism broke down in the area of military preparedness. His devotion to the principle of universal military training and his essentially uncritical posture in regard to defense spending earned him the title of "Mr. National Defense."

Fausold's biography, an admiring portrait, reflects a wide range of research: Wadsworth's family and legislative papers, oral history memoirs and interviews, an extensive culling of manuscript collections and doctoral dissertations, and an impressive examination of published sources. Eschewing any attempt to express the inner man, Fausold concentrates on Wadsworth's public life and times and offers a sound assessment of the significance of Wadsworth's career. The study, however, is marred in several respects. Fausold confuses the issue on a vote which Wadsworth considered "the most dramatic" of his congressional career. In August 1941, the House, by a one vote margin, extended by eighteen months the service of selectees inducted under the 1940 draft act. Fausold assumes that the vote represented a razor-edge decision on the continuation of the draft system itself, rather than simply the extension of service of the draftees. A reading of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 would make it clear that that legislation would continue in effect until May 15, 1945. In addition, the volume has numerous errors of lesser significance. Fausold speaks of the "summer of 1942" (p. 85) when he means the summer of 1912, has Harding's inaugural address on March 4, 1920 (p. 101) rather than 1921, has the 73rd Congress convening in 1943 (p. 243) instead

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of 1934, refers to "majority leader McCormick" (p. 332) rather than McCormack, and speaks of the "Gallop" polls (p. 336) instead of Gallup. I encountered more than two dozen other errors, an unfortunate situation in a book which reflects such rigorous research standards.

JOHN O'SULLIVAN
Florida Atlantic University

Federal Tax Reform: The Impossible Dream? *by George F. Break and Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1975.—xiv, 142 pp. $6.95.*

Federal tax reform means different things to different people. To many, it has come to mean elimination of provisions which enable some wealthy Americans to substantially avoid paying income tax. To growing numbers of businessmen and legislators, it means reducing the tax burden on corporate and investment income. Russell Long, influential chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, believes the term simply is appropriated by proponents of different legislative programs to enhance their attractiveness. As a result, he recently quipped that meaningful tax reform was "anything that can muster fifty-one votes in the Senate."

Early in this volume, economists Break and Pechman provide their own two-part definition of tax reform: to reduce the federal tax burden on the lowest income groups; and to increase uniformity of tax burdens, and hence horizontal equity, among upper-income families. The authors stress that increasing horizontal equity by eliminating preferential tax treatment for particular forms of income would not necessarily increase the overall tax burden of upper-income taxpayers because these changes would be accompanied by substantial offsetting reductions in overall effective tax rates.

The authors initially outline the major sources of federal tax revenue—the individual income tax, corporate income tax, and social security (payroll) tax—and indicate who currently pays these taxes by income class. They then explain the structure of these major taxes, the grounds on which they have been criticized, and major proposals which have been suggested to change them. The final chapter contains alternative packages of proposals which, to varying degrees, would accomplish the two goals of greater progressivity and horizontal equity espoused by the authors.

Many changes suggested by Break and Pechman go far beyond the most radical proposals seriously considered by Congress in the name of "tax reform" during the past decade. Their maximum packages are blueprints for substantially changing the taxation of all business and investment income, as well as the relative tax burdens for most Americans. For example, they would tax all capital gains as ordinary income, eliminate the property tax deduction, limit the deduction for mortgage and other interest payments, and integrate the corporate and individual income taxes by taxing all corporate earnings to shareholders at individual income tax rates.

Absent a radical change in popular opinion or a strong initiative from a subsequent administration, there is little chance for enactment of such major changes in the fore-

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seeable future. As the authors recognize, those who believe they benefit from the current rules will fight relatively harder in Congress to maintain them than would those who could benefit from the changes fight to see them enacted. However, there is reason to believe some of the other more modest but still very substantial income tax changes suggested by Break and Pechman could be enacted in this decade. This likelihood is, in part, due to an expectation of increased congressional perception of the erosion of the tax base through past enactment of "tax expenditures," and of the need to periodically evaluate the efficiency of these revenue foregoing tax provisions as part of the new congressional budget process.

In recent years, there has been less discussion about changing the social security tax structure than the individual and corporate income tax structures. To some extent, this has stemmed from fear that making the social security tax program more progressive would make it appear less like insurance and therefore would reduce its widespread acceptance. Whatever the reason for this relative lack of attention by many, Break and Pechman fully integrate the impact of the social security tax with that of income taxes, and make clear that the regressive nature of the former is the principal factor contributing to the lack of substantial overall progressivity in the federal tax system.

This book should be read by everyone interested in federal tax policy. For individuals not fully familiar with the field, the authors clearly explain the nature of the tax system and of major proposals for change. Persons already familiar with the area still should find very useful many of the authors' insights into these proposals as well as the estimates of their potential impact in changing relative tax burdens. However, this volume cannot serve as the total basis upon which detailed judgments on major tax policy questions can be made. The competing considerations involved in many major aspects of tax policy are so complex that they cannot be fully presented in a 135-page text, no matter how concisely it is written.

IRA L. TANNENBAUM
Senate Budget Committee

Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974 *edited by Howard R. Penniman. Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975.—x, 310 pp. $4.50.*

This is the third in a series of election studies issued under the auspices of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research of Washington, D. C. The earlier volumes analyzed the two British parliamentary elections of 1974 and the French presidential election of the same year. Howard R. Penniman of Georgetown University has edited all three volumes and has written a preface to this one. Except for him and for Richard M. Scammon who contributes a useful appendix on Canadian general election results, 1968–1974, the authors of this volume are all teachers of political science in Canadian universities, with eight of the nine attached to universities in the province of Ontario, the ninth being at McGill University in Montreal. Thus what we have here is the Ontario man's map of Canadian party politics. One wonders if the volume might

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not have been enriched had Professor Penniman cast his net a little more widely when seeking contributors, especially in view of the importance of regionalism in Canadian politics, a fact that is repeatedly stressed in this study.

Each chapter is a separate entity, with occasional cross references, but the book maintains no general thesis and reaches no general conclusion. Thus it cannot be reviewed as a whole nor will space permit comment on each of the nine essays. They all maintain a high level of scholarship, and the authors have made sophisticated use of surveys, interviews, newspaper accounts, and official sources. There are numerous graphs and statistical tables. The footnote references are so detailed as to constitute a kind of bibliography of Canadian party politics in general.

The nine chapters begin with a general survey of the party system by John Meisel of Queen's. There follows a chapter by William P. Irvine, also of Queen's, giving an overview of the 1974 election, and then a series of four essays on the contending parties (Liberal, Progressive Conservative, New Democratic, Social Credit) by four different writers. The survey concludes with chapters on campaign financing, on the measurement of public opinion, and on the mass media.

Although the book has no general thesis, certain ideas such as the predominance of the Liberal party in a multiparty system and the frequence of minority governments find repeated mention. But the one that is most prominently featured is the importance of regionalism in Canadian life. Yet in the analysis, regionalism is more frequently noted than its workings in the election analyzed. This is least true of Michael B. Stein's chapter on the Social Credit party, which is the most interesting single contribution to the volume, and of Frederick J. Fletcher's lively presentation of the role of the mass media in the campaign.

The victory of the Liberals in 1974 was somewhat anomalous. Pierre Trudeau had been in office since 1968 albeit only as the head of a minority government since 1972. It might be expected that the electorate would blame the Liberals for the inflation and recession from which the country was suffering. Yet when the votes were counted the Liberals had won 141 seats out of a total of 264. The explanation for this outcome that is most commonly given is in terms of superior Liberal leadership and organization, but William P. Irvine advances the thesis that it was simply a "reversion to basic party commitment" (p. 52). According to this hypothesis, which should bring encouragement to Democrats in the United States, the weary and apathetic voters, unable to understand the mysteries of inflation and recession, simply chose the party to which they normally adhered.

This volume can be recommended to those who are interested in the comparative study of parties and elections.

THOMAS PEARDON
Barnard College, Columbia University

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On Socialist Democracy *by Roy A. Medvedev. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975.—xx, 405 pp. $12.50.*

This is an important book, more complex than it might seem at first glance. It is not merely a political statement by one of the foremost Soviet dissidents; it is also a theoretical study of the relationship between democracy and socialism and an analysis of the likely course of reform and regeneration in Russian society. The theory is excellent, the analysis is basically good although with some ambiguities, and the politics are sound.

Democracy, Medvedev understands, is a *sine qua non* of socialism, not a "superstructural" afterthought, but an element in the "base," the means of the social and economic power of the people. "Without consistent democratization within the actual economic machinery," he writes, "it will be impossible to overcome those most serious vices of the Soviet economy, negligence and irresponsibility, which result primarily from the absence of *a sense of ownership* on the part not only of many working people but also of management in industry and agriculture" (p. 234). The antidemocratic structure of Soviet society is thus not simply a violation of the freedom of the citizen; it is also a source of economic backwardness, of bureaucracy, of inefficiency.

Indeed, Medvedev makes a spirited—and utterly compelling—socialist defense of the value of bourgeois democracy (one wishes that the Portuguese Communists would ponder it well). He understands that "the democratic order of many Western countries constitutes their most important tradition, their most precious political heritage," a means of the socialist struggle, not the antithesis to it, "the product of decades, sometimes centuries, of stubborn struggle by the people for their rights" (p. 32). This point, like Medvedev's insistence upon the functional relationship between democracy and socialism, is not merely the assertion of a value (though it is, and should be, that); it is a tough-minded, historical and economical, analysis of the political and social role of freedom under capitalism and socialism.

In his development of a dissident perspective toward Soviet society, Medvedev emphasizes gradualism: "A social infrastructure has evolved that provides the leadership with unprecedented means of manipulation and control. Given such a system, it is difficult to imagine any rapid or radical changes taking place (although the possibility should not be discounted altogether). The most realistic hope is that of a slow and gradual evolutionary transformation" (p. xix). It would, of course, be presumptuous for a foreign observer to try and correct the intuitions of an involved Soviet citizen with regard to the likely tempo of development there. There is, however, at least an ambiguity in this analysis, one that surfaced in Medvedev's earlier book, *Let History Judge*. It is that Medvedev, very much in the mode of Issac Deutscher, views Stalinism as a monstrous, and yet creative, episode in Soviet life, as a development which, despite its intolerable perversions, was still somehow "progressive" in a socialist sense. From this it follows that the infrastructure of Soviet society contains much that is sound and that an evolutionary freeing of this structure from its temporary Stalinist excrescences will put the nation back on the road to freedom.

Stalin did indeed lead in the industrialization of Russia, and that will make socialism

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possible there. But he did so with basically antisocialist methods (Medvedev refers to China as a "military despotism," a concept which he might apply to Stalin's rule as well). Moreover, even if the transformation of Soviet society will probably be evolutionary (if it takes place at all), it still must be basic enough to shift power from a bureaucratic class to the people. This last point is implied in Medvedev's discussion of democracy; it may be slighted in his analysis of Soviet trends.

But this is only to record a caveat. The practical political program of this book—which begins with interparty democracy—is excellent and it is of considerable moment that a leading Soviet dissident argues against the dictatorship in his country from within Marxist and socialist premises and methodology. Moreover, he does the job brilliantly.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON
Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee

Parts of a Lifetime *by Milovan Djilas, edited by Michael Milenkovitch and Deborah Milenkovitch. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975.—xii, 442 pp. $15.00.*

This is an ably edited book containing a variety of interesting writings by Milovan Djilas, many of them published for the first time. There are poems and short stories going back to his student days, but the bulk of the volume consists of his writings since World War II, not all of it political. There are random thoughts on writers and literature, on philosophy, and on the human condition generally. The material is so arranged that one gets some feeling of the way in which the author's thinking has evolved over the years.

The most interesting of the previously unpublished works, to this reviewer, at least, are "The Collapse of Hell," "Nordic Dream," and "Jail Diary." Any one who has read his major books will not want to spend much time in reading extracts from them. More rewarding are the selections from his articles, such as "On Alienation: Thoughts on a Marxist Myth." Also, there are interesting reflections on Lenin, on Stalin, on Soviet imperialism, on national communism, and on the new left.

It is not clear when Djilas first came to have doubts about the way Communist society was being built, but there are hints of it even in some party-line articles which were written in the late 1940s or early 1950s, when he was still a minister in the government. Early on he spotted the bureaucracy as the nucleus of the New Class, and although he did not want to believe his own perceptions, he could not long resist. The new Yugoslav regime was not even a half-dozen years old when he concluded that the Communist revolution, as other revolutions before it, was fought for a social class, the proletariat (or the people), but the Communist leaders did not allow the proletariat to organize society politically or in other ways. Instead, they imposed a rigid dictatorship, whose main support came from the bureaucracy of that dictatorship, leading to the establishment of the New Class.

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Djilas is a gifted writer, whether he is depicting the peace and quiet of the peasant countryside, or describing the atrocities of war. Some of his writings convey a yearning for the past, signifying that he is not too far removed from the soil and his peasant heritage, and yet in much of his active political life he seems to have fought against that heritage. One wonders if a more apt title for this book might have been "Milovan Djilas: Man of Many Parts."

The editors have provided a useful general introduction as well as brief notes along the way. This reviewer believes, however, that their reference to Djilas as a "rebellious Montenegrin" may be misleading, because Djilas regards himself as a Serb, as do most Montenegrins except when the reference is to geography or when they want to differentiate their historical exploits from those of their fellow Serbs in Serbia.

Political scientists especially will regret the failure to include in this collection what might have been a major contribution. There is a teasing reference (pp. 11–12) to an unpublished essay, "The Omniscience of Folly," which deals with "the workings of the inner party leadership," but alas it is not included here.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH
Vanderbilt University

Latin America: The Search for a New International Role *edited by Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum. New York, Halsted Press, John Wiley & Sons, 1975.—297 pp. $17.50.*

This is the first volume in an annual Latin American International Affairs Series sponsored by the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York. The book contains thirteen essays organized into four sections entitled Domestic Factors of Inter-American Foreign Policy-Making; Intra-Latin American Relations; Inter-American Relations; and Latin America and the World. The divisions are somewhat artificial, and the placing of some articles in one rather than another section somewhat arbitrary, but overall a wholesome attempt has been made to give due space and attention to *Latin American* perspectives and experiences in hemispheric politics.

There is something in this volume for almost everyone. It opens with a useful if rather pedestrian recounting of "Trends in Inter-American Relations: 1972–mid-1974" by Yale Ferguson. A polemical and highly effective essay by Kalman Silvert entitled "The Kitsch in Hemispheric Realpolitik" follows. Other strong essays are by Robert W. Anderson who very properly places "the Puerto Rican question" at center stage in hemispheric relations (despite United States claims that it is a "domestic" issue); Carlos Fortin on Allende's foreign policy (in an effort to remain calm about intervention he understates the case against the United States); Alexander S. C. Barros on national security diplomacy in South America; Robert Swansbrough on Peru's diplomatic offensive; and E. D. Brown on Latin America and the international law of the sea. There are also contributions by Irving Louis Horowitz on United States foreign policy, Edward

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Milenky on Latin American approaches to world affairs, Ben Stephansky on the "new dialogue," Thomas Skidmore on Brazil, and Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski on the impact of higher oil prices on petroleum importing Latin American nations. This is certainly a mixed bag of topics, but each is potentially of some use to persons interested in the specific subject matter treated.

Perhaps the most useful contribution of all, however, is by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. In the longest essay in the book, he offers up "The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective." Schlesinger has the great virtue of consistency—it would seem that he has not had a new or self-critical thought on Latin America in the past decade-and-a-half. From the distinguished historian who authored the State Department White Paper justifying the subsequent United States organized invasion at the Bay of Pigs, we now get statements like "The formula of the Alliance for Progress still seems right to me" (p. 85). It is all still there: The belief in the United States role in making the hemisphere safe for democracy (with the national security implications left intact), the activist aid and investment mentality (with all the harmony of interest assumptions left intact), etc., etc., etc. The essay thus goes high on my suggested bibliography when students ask with true innocence how the Kennedy administration could have developed such a bundle of interventionist, hurtful, and arrogant policies toward Latin America. Schlesinger's paper will help them to understand.

In future volumes in this series, it is to be hoped that the editors will make at least two improvements: First, since they are in the enviable position of being able to commission papers (and, one assumes, to guarantee publication), they should attempt to impose more thematic coherence on successive volumes. This initial effort literally goes all over the theoretical and substantive map. Second, where feasible they should seek Latin American authors, who frequently not only have more interesting things to say than their North American colleagues, but also seldom have opportunities to present their views to English-speaking audiences. In the present volume, only three out of thirteen authors are Latin Americans. The ratio is too low. Finally, is it too much to ask that a volume sponsored by the Center for Inter-American Relations (housed in an elegant Park Avenue mansion and with a board which reads like a Who's Who of the eastern establishment) be given a decent publication subsidy? If Center officials really care about getting materials on Latin America into the hands of a large public, they would not allow their books to be priced so exorbitantly that only government agencies, the wealthier libraries, and their own members can afford to buy them.

RICHARD R. FAGEN
Stanford University

Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile: A Dossier on Workers' Participation in the Revolutionary Process *by Michel Raptis. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1975.—173 pp. $9.95.*

This book is a useful antidote to the dogmatic and ill-informed diatribes which portray the Chilean working class as merely involved in economic struggles or as help-

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less spectators in the conflict between the Allende government and the right-wing opposition. Raptis traces the rise of workers' councils in the factories, of community councils in the barrios, and of neighborhood food-distribution committees, which resisted the black-marketeering and hoarding of the bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie. Raptis' discussion of the massive growth of popular democratic power during the Allende period provides us with a clue to the terroristic practices of the military regime which followed: the butchery was perceived by the military regime and its United States and Chilean supporters as the only way to restore the prerogatives of the capitalist class, as well as the only way to put the workers back in their place—i.e., as docile objects of exploitation. Raptis includes an accurate account of the conflicts between the Allende government supported by the Communist party which attempted to restrain the process within the framework of bourgeois legality and the burgeoning self-management movement which sought to establish a new, more representative political framework of direct popular rule.

The last section of the book contains a series of documents, interviews, notes, etc., published in Chile dealing with self-management and communal councils.

Despite its useful account, the book lacks depth. The development of class consciousness is not described as an historical process. The struggles and circumstances which created a working-class culture through the traditional left-wing organizations is scantily discussed (and not infrequently distorted). All that we are presented with is a picture of the advanced forms, i.e., workers' councils. Notions of workers' "instincts" and "spontaneity" hardly explain social behavior. More to the point is the fact that Socialist and Communist workers applied ideas learned from, but not always practiced by, their leaders. And it is this complex interaction between leaders and "bases" that Raptis does not capture and which weakens his account of the tragedy of the Allende period. Raptis underestimates the importance of the diffuse socialist consciousness and loyalties which the workers' movement experienced under "reformist" left leaders and focuses on the gradual divergences which only appeared after 1971 under the impact of massive struggles. Thus he does not explain why workers who were radicalized beyond their leaders did not abandon the traditional left parties. Raptis places great importance on the issue of self-management and he is correct in judging its central importance in the organization of any socialist society deserving the name. But in the transitional period between capitalist and socialist society, when all the antisocialist forces from the CIA, through subversive generals to fascist street-fighter, are hurling every imaginable weapon in the way, the limits of self-management become obvious. In itself, self-management was an unstable phenomenon between capitalism and socialist revolution: threatening capitalist prerogatives but not securely anchored within a state structure capable of consolidating the new social power. Hence the limits of self-management as an organizational instrument for taking power: it lacks the centralized organization and militarized component necessary for unifying the fragmented sectoral struggles and taking control of the state. The central issue is how nondemocratic forms of representation necessary for a successful transition

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become transformed into institutions of self-management. In his postmortem, Raptis wavers between calls for revolutionary leadership and more self-management.

JAMES F. PETRAS
State University of New York, Binghamton

Saints and Samurai: The Political Culture of the American and Japanese Elites *by Lewis Austin. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1975.—vii, 197 pp. $12.50.*

The appealing notion that a nation's psychology helps to determine its politics has spawned a rich and variegated literature on national character and political culture. In recent years, impressed by evidence that ordinary citizens have faint contact with national affairs, researchers have begun concentrating on the culture of elites. Among the first systematic studies of elite political culture to appear is Professor Austin's thoughtful exploration of the hopes, fears, and maxims of eighty-four upper- and middle-level business executives in America and Japan.

Students of culture and character generally can be divided into two camps—the poets and the statisticians. Poets draw insights from literature, history, and daily life to compose a verbal portrait of national traits. The proper criteria for judging their efforts are primarily aesthetic: Is the portrait vivid, harmonious, and well-composed? Statisticians draw samples, compose questionnaires, and calculate indices. The proper standards here are quantitative: Are the responses reliable, the differences significant (statistically), the hypotheses confirmed? Statisticians count, poets recount. An important merit of Austin's work is that he has tried valiantly to combine statistics and poetry.

To matched samples of Japanese in-service management trainees and Yale alumni back for an Old Blue reunion, Austin administered a battery of psychological scales and tests. From a comparison of the national profiles of the responses, he extracts a number of intriguing conclusions about contrasting interpersonal norms—and, by inference, contrasting political norms—in the two cultures. (His small samples preclude analysis of intranational patterns.) His multifaceted findings can only be illustrated here. Hierarchical legitimacy in Japanese organizations seems to rest primarily on "personalistic" traits, such as warmth and sincerity, whereas Americans emphasize "prescriptive" and "performance" criteria, such as fairness and decisiveness. Americans accentuate individual responsibility and autonomy and accept conflict as legitimate, whereas the Japanese stress social responsibility, social control, and social harmony. In an impressive final chapter Austin argues that these and other cultural contrasts influence the ways the two nations select leaders, reach decisions, administer policies, and conduct foreign affairs.

In his exploration of these two cultures, Austin emerges as a better poet than statistician. Readers not overly fastidious about methodological technicalities will find that the book stands favorable comparison with the better examples of the national character literature. Austin writes very well. He has an eye for subtle nuance and an ear for re-

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vealing anecdote. His paired national portraits are, on the whole, aesthetically pleasing, and if there are few individual surprises in the traits he depicts, that too lends plausibility to the whole.

On the other hand, the statisticians among us will be less satisfied. The coding of responses, most especially into his personalistic/prescriptive/performance trichotomy, cannot have been simple, but we are offered no evidence of the reliability of these judgments. The assessment of statistical findings is often disturbingly casual; broad conclusions sometimes rest on no more than one or two responses, while contrary evidence of equal magnitude is elsewhere ignored.

With disconcerting frequency, the book resorts to that rhetorically attractive, but logically perilous device familiar from the national character literature—the presumably pregnant paradox. When essentially contradictory traits are ascribed to a culture, virtually any pattern of behavior imaginable can be said to be consistent with it. Austin, for example, asserts that conflict is "legitimate, but avoided" in American political culture, and "illegitimate, but accepted" in Japanese political culture (pp. 106–107). Leaving aside the question of whether this paired paradox is in fact consistent with the statistical evidence, it is a shaky foundation on which to build a theory of Japanese (or American) politics, since it could "explain" either a politics of conflict or a politics of concord. A theory which can thus explain anything, explains nothing. At times paradox slips into outright contradiction; for example, the Japanese are said both to seek open confrontation (p. 68) and to avoid it (p. 70).

Do responses to questions about the proper and the good represent norms that are typically embodied in actual behavior, or are norms emphasized precisely when they are most often violated? In short, do responses reflect common behaviors or common misbehaviors? Austin, like most students of political culture, usually assumes the former, for that assumption underlies the entire methodology. But faced with anomalous findings, such as the Americans' apparently greater regard for warm family life, he casually adopts the opposite assumption, that "our values must be emphasized more strongly the less we are able to live up to them" (p. 51).

Despite the thirty-eight tables of data in this book, it is fair to place Austin in the poets' camp. When, in the last of those tables, the data directly contradict his lyric description of Americans as puritanical, isolated, desperate for success, and the Japanese as emotional, dutiful, eager for social approbation, Austin allows the poetry to rest unscathed by the numbers.

My unease over the statistical and theoretical flaws of this book must not obscure my appreciation of its poetry. Lay readers seeking practical introduction to an alien culture will find illuminating Austin's carefully phrased maxims for avoiding Japanese-American misunderstanding. Professionals seeking a comparison of organizational norms in these contrasting postindustrial societies will find thought-provoking evidence and insight. Despite my own bias on the statistics-and-poetry issue, I enjoyed reading this book.

ROBERT D. PUTNAM
University of Michigan

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Japanese Radicals Revisited: Student Protest in Postwar Japan *by Ellis S. Krauss. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.—xiv, 192 pp. $11.00.*

Political socialization has special appeal as a field of study because the question it asks—how do people acquire and maintain political beliefs and behavior patterns? —is central to the understanding of political life. Given the scope of the question itself, it is ironic that few studies of political socialization look beyond narrow issues. Where they should be concerned with a process of change accompanying growth and maturation, typically they focus on a single age group (e.g., United States public school fifth graders). Where they should be treating the interplay among a wide range of variables that simultaneously affect human behavior and belief, often they focus on only a few variables at a time, pitting them against one another (mothers versus fathers, parents versus peers) in isolation. To suggest how political attitudes and behavior alter over time, most researchers muster little more than static, cross-sectional comparisons of attitudinal data (the attitudes of today's fifth graders compared to those of today's tenth graders) that tells us almost nothing about the process of change itself.

Ellis Krauss' work, *Japanese Radicals Revisited: Student Protest in Postwar Japan,* is a significant attempt to overcome some of these serious deficiencies in the literature. The book is a longitudinal study of a sample of former student activists interviewed eight years after they were studied by another researcher. Working with data sets collected at two points in the lives of a single group of respondents allows Krauss to speak with more authority about change than almost any writer to date in the political socialization field.

Parts of the work are less successful than others. Several early chapters rely on data collected in the first study and retrospective data collected in the second to try to show how and why the respondents became political activists. In these chapters Krauss tests a number of issues examined by other writers in the political socialization literature (family background variables and the role of various agents of socialization), but is no more successful than most in showing how the absence or presence of certain variables, singly or in combination, translates into actual behavior.

It is in the latter chapters that the longitudinal data available to Krauss allow him to make an important contribution. He focuses on the question of what happens to the political beliefs and behavior of student activists after they leave the university. Do they carry them into adulthood, or do they, as many people in Japan and other countries believe, give them up in the process of adjusting to the adult world? If a "generational" model (attributed to Mannheim) obtains, then the beliefs of youth "persist into adulthood, as do differences of generation" (p. 12). But if a "maturational" model (attributed to Eisenstadt) applies, then youth can be seen as a passing phase of experience, with youthful beliefs giving way as the individual adjusts to and adopts, adult roles. Krauss, with longitudinal data at his disposal, is in a unique position to investigate the relevance of these models, which point up an issue of prime importance to those interested in political socialization.

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His findings are complex. Overall, attitude and behavior change among his Japanese sample are best explained by the generational model, but there are numerous qualifiers. Behavior, he found, was more affected by adult roles than belief. And, in general, the level of activism during his respondents' student days proved to be a major variable. Activists were much less likely to alter their political beliefs *or* behavior after they entered the adult world than those in the sample who had been less active politically as students.

In addition to shedding light on key questions, Krauss offers new data on adult behavior for a field that until now has mainly studied children and adolescents. By vividly describing the environment, the issues, to which his informants respond, he provides a wider social context for understanding both individual and sociopolitical change in Japan. Students of political socialization have much to learn from this new addition.

SUSAN J. PHARR
Social Science Research Council

Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa *by B. O. Nwabueze. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974.—xiii, 442 pp. $25.00.*

It is with some trepidation that one picks up an institutional treatise by a legal scholar. With twenty of the forty-seven independent African states under military rule, and armies waiting in the wings in a number of others, one wonders what the study of public law still has to contribute to an understanding of African political change. These fears are scarcely assauged when the initial chapters suggest a framework of presidentialism drawn primarily from American constitutional history.

Skepticism dissolves when one reaches the heart of the study, a painstaking and meticulous inquest into the legal mechanisms of the aggregation and centralization of power in the presidential office. The political scientist is disarmed by passages such as that reciting the linkage between rhetorical concepts of chieftaincy and the contemporary presidency. The exercise of authority is "personal, permanent, mystical and pervasive," observes Professor Nwabueze (p. 107); thus legal analysis is informed by a political perspective.

The readere is escorted past a series of exhibits of constitutional politics: the construction of unitary states, legal entrenchment of one-party systems, the subordination of the legislative branches, conversion of public services into presidential instruments, and the emasculation of human rights guarantees that constrained executive action. One is led by Nwabueze to an implacable conclusion: "Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa has tended towards dictatorship and tyranny not so much because of its great power as because of insufficient constitutional, political and social restraint upon that power, and because conditions in Africa, with the opportunities for total mobilization of the nation and the greatly enhanced authority which they give to the President, are particularly favourable to the growth of dictatorship" (p. 435). Implacable, but

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not polemical: the author fully recognizes all of the compelling arguments in favor of reinforcing the power and authority of the state.

Nwabueze is particularly qualified for the task he has assigned himself. He has taught law at Lagos and Nsukka, in his native Nigeria, and more recently at the University of Zambia. In 1972, he was named by President Kaunda to serve on the committee charged with drafting a one-party constitution for Zambia. Parenthetically, one of the more intriguing nuggets one finds in the book is the listing of commission proposals aimed at restraint of executive power which were rejected by the Zambian government. The present work is the second volume of a trilogy on constitutional law and politics in the new Commonwealth; the first, *Constitutionalism in the Emergent States*, has already drawn favorable reviews. The third will deal with the role of the judiciary.

Thorough coverage is provided for constitutional phases of postindependence politics in Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierre Leone, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. He does not deal with military regimes, extraconstitutional by definition. One also regrets that his analysis does not extend to Francophonic states, where similar trends are observable. His careful sifting of judicial and parliamentary documents, which have not on the whole been systematically exploited by political scientists, contributes not only to our knowledge of public law, but provides many insights into political institutions.

Nwabueze notes, following C. J. Friedrich, that the American constitutional system provides part of the inspiration for the presidential state. However, in transplantation, all of the institutional restraints (checks and balances of the legislature and judiciary and bill of rights) were left behind (p. 104). Nor can constitutional limits be reinforced by a public that demands accountability; President Nyerere is quoted in a most perceptive observation: "When the nation does not have the ethic which will enable the government to say: 'We cannot do this, that is un-Tanganyikan'—or the people to say: 'That we cannot tolerate, that is un-Tanganyikan'—if the people do not have that kind of ethic, it does not matter what kind of constitution you frame" (p. 106).

Ghana was the pioneer in constitutional enactment of the presidential state. As early as 1957, Minister of Interior Krobo Edusei declared in Parliament that, "there is nothing in the country of Ghana that the Government cannot do, except to change a man into a woman and a woman into man" (p. 335). Though the Ghana tale is well enough known, the influence of Ghanian legal precedent in erecting the presidential state elsewhere is much less familiar.

There are points on which one might debate the author. Had his perspective been shaped by political sociology and economy as well as constitutional politics, he might have been led to consider the implications of the crystallization of a political-administrative middle class, whose consumption expectations may require the protection of presidential regimes which choke off the discontents of the impoverished. He might also have wished to weigh his position against recent contributions of neocolonialism theorists such as Colin Leys and Samir Amin.

Through it all, Nwabueze retains a stubborn faith in constitutionalism as a moral and efficient political order. The vitality of these values in the face of so many discour-

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aging events is in itself interesting. If one may take the author as representative of African intellectuals, perhaps in the long run constraints to personalist, presidential autocracy, will emerge.

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin/Madison

The Politics of Pollution in a Comparative Perspective: Ecology and Power in Four Nations *by Cynthia H. Enloe. New York, David McKay Company, 1975. —x, 342 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $4.95.*

In light of the unprecedented crisis in world affairs, political scientists should deal with the politics of the great global survival problems, such as overpopulation, exhaustion of resources, environment destruction, and the threat of nuclear extinction. Only study concerned, directly or indirectly, with policy questions regarding these problems deserves to be called "relevant." Therefore it is a matter for rejoicing when a book like Cynthia Enloe's appears that, in almost ideal fashion, lives up to the requirements of relevancy in the study of political science. While there have been scattered inquiries into the policies and politics of pollution, what we needed was a comparative study of environment politics summing up those inquiries.

The book approaches its topic in two ways: There is, first, a wide-ranging analysis of how environmental issues become political ones (the author here, incidentally, raises the fundamental problem of "issueness," i.e., the question of how more or less vaguely felt "problems" become political "issues"—a theoretical concern so far largely neglected) and how different political systems—both industrial and developing ones—deal (or fail to deal) with these issues. There follow case studies of pollution politics in the United States, the Soviot Union, Japan, and Britain. The findings are striking. Thus, for the United States, the role of what the author calls a "subgovernment" consisting of special interest groups and the respective congressional committees and executive bureaus, generally working hand in hand to stall antipollution efforts carried on by less well-organized and little institutionalized groups, is especially characteristic. In Japan the role of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party has been prominent. What struck this reviewer particularly is the respective Soviet situation. If one assumes that one of the chief handicaps of environmental protection in capitalistic systems is the profit interest of enterprises whose costs are increased by antipollution measures, one might conclude that in systems of central economic planning similar motives would not play a role. Not so: profit motives, as the author lucidly points out, are replaced in the Soviet Union by the competition between officials or plant managers for fulfilling production quotas, and in the absence of organized citizen's pressure whatever is done to protect the environment depends on the top decision makers, who, at this point, still adhere to the gospel of productivity and of unlimited economic growth.

In most developing countries, too, the ruling groups feel that they, as the latecomers in "modernization," have a right to their share in pollution in order to make

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up for the lag. There is a quote from an Indian: "The wealthy worry about car fumes; we worry about starvation" (p. 132). The interconnectedness of it all is not seen. Nor does one realize that the pollution problems are global and can be solved only through international cooperation and organization. The author refers to that briefly—perhaps too briefly. We need, in addition to this study of *internal* pollution politics, one on comparative approaches in the respective foreign-policy area. The attitudes of the different nations and groups of nations at the Stockholm, Bucharest, and Caracas conferences (and many others, past and coming) would offer a wealth of material. Perhaps Enloe will deal with this in a follow-up volume. This is said not in a sense of carping but of gratitude for what has been presented here. It is a book to be cherished by all who care for the future and who are convinced of the urgency of getting those who rule us to give—finally—precedence to the long-term interests of all over the short-term interests of the few or even the "masses." "Environmentalists of the world, unite—you have nothing to lose but your planet!"

JOHN H. HERZ
City College of the City University of New York

Sociologie des relations internationales *by Marcel Merle. Paris, Dalloz, 1974.—436 pp. 58 fr.*

This excellent fifteen-chapter study of international relations consists of four parts: (1) the different conceptions of international relations (pp. 13–143); (2) the international milieu (pp. 147–236); (3) the actors (pp. 239–362); and (4) the system (pp. 367–419).

In dealing with his subject matter, the author, like Raymond Aron, denies the possibility of any pure, scientific theory of international relations, on the grounds that no distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables and no rigorous quantification of either the stakes or the risks involved in international politics are possible. Underlining, however, that the sociologist's approach differs from the historian's, he seeks to present a "systematic version" (a *theoria* in the original, visual sense of the ancient Greek word) of the period of history in which we live, adopting as a working hypothesis that the ensemble under study constitutes a system.

Though he disavows any deterministic approach in terms of explanation, he concludes that the transformation of international relations in our era is due less to a change in the conduct of the actors—states, international organizations, and nongovernmental and transnational organizations and movements—than to a change in the milieu or environment in which these actors, old and new, operate. In other words, in his view, the international conduct of the actors has become more and more a function of the pressures exerted upon them from inside, and of the limits imposed on them from outside by the structure of the environment.

As far as the future is concerned, he raises the questions of whether some of the actors will manage to capture and exploit the contradictions inhering in the system to their own advantage and will succeed in imposing their domination upon it, or

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whether the principal actors, renouncing by common accord the risk of their confrontation, will join forces in order to reduce the demographic, economic, social, and other disequilibria that threaten the system's stability.

This book constitutes evidence of the diffusion among French political scientists of what the author calls "the sociological conception of Anglo-Saxon inspiration of international relations." However, it is more than an American-style book on international politics of a traditional character addressed mainly to French students and their needs, with illustrative material taken, for instance, from French public opinion polls, from French politics (national and international), or from memoirs written by French statesmen or diplomats. The book's first (and longest) part presents a valuable analysis of the different Western conceptions of international relations and politics. And the work as a whole offers a lucid, critical, and constructive overview of contemporary thinking on international relations by scholars active in the field on both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, it contributes to our knowledge of the field because of its many fruitful and original insights.

STEPHEN G. XYDIS
Hunter College,
The City University of New York

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

British Political Facts 1900–1975, 4th ed. *by David Butler and Anne Sloman. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1975.—xix, 432 pp. $19.95.*

Who's Who in American Politics 1975–1976, 5th ed. *edited by Jacques Cattell Press. New York, R. R. Bowker Company, 1975.—xxiv, 1090 pp. $48.50.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 20: 1910 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1975.—xxii, 604 pp. $22.50.*

Provisional Models for Developing an Undergraduate Economics Program: Monograph on Curricular Government *by Allyn O. Lockner and B. J. McCandless. Pierre, S. Dak., State Publishing Company, 1975.—20 pp. $1.25.*

Congress Investigates: A Documented History, 1792–1974 *edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Roger Burns. New York, Chelsea House Publishers in association with R. R. Bowker Company, 1975.—4103 pp. $150.00 per 5-volume set.*

Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy *by William F. Scott. New York, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975.—viii, 72 pp. Cloth, $4.95; paper, $2.75.*

The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. XXII: July 1798–March 1799 *edited by Harold C. Syrett. New York, Columbia University Press, 1975.—xiv, 649 pp. $20.00.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

According to N. Stephen Kane ["American Businessmen and Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 1975], identified as an historian at the State Department, "radical revisionists" contend that the relationship between policy makers and businessmen is "virtually collusive." It is regrettable that some historians prefer the practice of labeling members of their craft rather than to deal with questions on their own merit. It would be equally unproductive to charge Mr. Kane with being a "court historian" because he is associated with an alleged agency of the "Establishment," i.e., the State Department. At this point, an observation by the historian Woodrow Wilson seems relevant: "The masters of the government of the United States are the combined capitalists and manufacturers of the United States. It is written on every intimate page of the records of Congress, it is written through the history of conferences at the White House, that the suggestions of economic policy come from one source, not from many sources."

To "prove" his denial that businessmen have had any significant part in determining policy, Mr. Kane cites the factors governing American policy toward the Obregon regime in Mexico. Yet, Mr. Kane finds that only *after* Thomas Lamont, senior partner in J. P. Morgan & Co., "began to apply subtle pressure" upon Secretary Hughes did the State Department soften its line!

Regarding Mr. Kane's general proposition that businessmen do not have a "major influence on policy decisions," one must assume that *all* governments possess an inner drive untainted by contending socioeconomic groups. But *all* governments are the products of cultural configurations and their policies must ultimately bear the imprint of their origins. The common denominator in Western democracies, including the United States, is the special priority granted to the protection of private property. Therefore, there is nothing "conspiratorial" when the United States government exercises the fullness of its strength at home or abroad (as in Mexico) to uphold the sanctity of private property.

Very sincerely yours,
HERBERT KRIEDMAN
Nassau Community College

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Mr. Kane replies:

Professor Kriedman apparently failed to grasp the thrust of my article, and consequently I am more puzzled than enlightened by his letter.

I am not certain what rankles him about my use of the words "radical revisionists." I defined what I meant by that term, and treated the assumptions made by this group of scholars about the relationship between businessmen and policy makers as legitimate, if not entirely accurate.

Unfortunately, Professor Kriedman does not tell us in what context Woodrow Wilson's statement originally appeared. I am sure, however, he will agree that as an historian Wilson had the same obligation as scholars today to substantiate his assertions with factual evidence.

Professor Kriedman insists that there was a causal connection between Thomas Lamont's "subtle pressure" on Secretary Hughes and the State Department's decision to extend recognition. I found none, and this finding is implicit in my article. For those who wished to have additional documentation relating to Lamont's role, I cited my article in the *Business History Review*.

The final paragraph of Professor Kriedman's letter completely mystifies me. The generalizations I drew from my case study concerned the link between businessmen and policy makers within the framework of decision making in the State Department. I did not say that economic considerations play no role in the decision-making process or that government decisions are made in a vacuum absolutely unaffected by group pressures, nor did I suggest that it was unusual for the United States to seek protection for American citizens investing abroad against discriminatory actions by foreign governments. What Professor Kriedman refuses to accept is that even though these things are true, they do not constitute irrefutable proof that businessmen *effectively* influence *major* foreign policy decisions.

N. STEPHEN KANE
Historical Office, Department of State

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

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

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